483 S.W.3d 880
Tex. Crim. App.
2016

Michael Anthony MCGRUDER, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas

NO. PD-1263-14

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

February 24, 2016

485 S.W.3d 879

This may be where the so-called Heritage disclaimer, located in the oil-and-gas royalty clause, comes into play. I do not argue with the Court‘s assessment that Heritage “holds only that the effect of a lease is governed by a fair reading of its text,” ante at 876, and I agree a disclaimer of that precedent cannot itself free a royalty of post-production costs. But the “free and clear” language here is similar in specificity to the language held ineffective in Heritage, which provided “there shall be no deductions from the value of Lessor‘s royalty by reason of any required processing, cost of dehydration, compression, transportation or other matter to market such gas.” 939 S.W.2d at 120-21. The disclaimer could be interpreted as a belt-and-suspenders attempt to ensure the “free and clear” language is given effect despite its conflict with the oil royalty‘s market-value-at-the-well definition.

We are not asked to resolve these interpretive issues. But the vast difference between the royalty and overriding royalty clauses drills home my interpretation of the latter. If the extensive, specific, and detailed “free and clear” language should be read as only emphatic or surplusage, so should the mere “cost-free” designation. If the “free and clear” language expresses intent to modify the market-value-at-the-well oil royalty so that it does not bear post-production costs, the mere “cost-free” adjective cannot express the same intent as to the overriding royalty.

For the same reasons, I disagree with the Hyders that the Heritage disclaimer requires a broad construction of “cost-free.” Where the oil-and-gas royalty‘s extensive “free and clear” language resembles the language interpreted in Heritage, the overriding royalty‘s language does not. Where the “no deductions” language in Heritage was meaningless and ineffective, I read “cost-free” as redundant but not meaningless. And though the disclaimer expressly extends to “the terms and provisions of this Lease,” its location in the oil-and-gas-royalty clause highlights that it is intended to support the “free and clear” language, not to give the simple “cost-free” designation any additional meaning.

***

Parties are free to allocate post-production costs as they wish, and “[o]ur task is to determine how those costs were allocated under [this] particular lease[].” Heritage, 939 S.W.2d at 124 (Owen, J., concurring). I read the overriding-royalty clause as granting the Hyders a percentage of production before post-production value is added and without allocating their share of post-production costs to Chesapeake. I would thus hold Chesapeake properly deducted post-production costs to arrive at the royalty‘s value and would reverse the court of appeals’ judgment.

JUSTICE WILLETT, JUSTICE GUZMAN, and JUSTICE LEHRMANN, dissenting.

Mary Jo Holloway, Chappell Hill, for Appellant.

Jessica Escue, Assistant District Attorney, Bryan, Lisa C. McMinn, State‘s Attorney, Austin, for State.

Per Curiam.

OPINION

Section 724.012(b)(3)(B) of the Texas Transportation Code requires an officer who has arrested a driver for the offense of Driving While Intoxicated to take a specimen of that driver‘s breath or blood for an analysis of blood alcohol concentration when the officer has reliable information that the driver already has two or more prior DWI offenses. TEX. TRANS. CODE § 724.012(b)(3)(B). The DWI offender with two prior DWI convictions may not refuse, and the police must compel him to give a specimen, even in the absence of his assent-in-fact, under Section 724.012(b)(3)(B). In the instant case, Appellant‘s sole argument is that Section 724.012 violates the Fourth Amendment on its face because it requires an arresting officer to take a specimen for blood-alcohol analysis regardless of whether he either 1) first obtains a warrant or else 2) acts upon particularized exigent circumstances that would obviate the need for a warrant. Appellant does not argue, and we do not address, whether Section 724.012(b)(3)(B) may have operated in an unconstitutional manner as applied to him. We will vacate the court of appeals‘s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.

Appellant was driving a truck that was apparently connected to a suspicious person report. Police observed him pull somewhat sideways into a parking space in an apartment complex and then watched him disembark from the truck. They approached Appellant to question him about the circumstances of the suspicious person report, but it soon became apparent that he was intoxicated, and they arrested him. As they were preparing an affidavit to obtain a warrant for a blood specimen, they learned that Appellant had two prior convictions for DWI, so they took him straight to the hospital without a warrant and had a phlebotomist draw his blood. It was their understanding that no warrant was required because Appellant met the criteria for an automatic blood draw under the provisions of Section 724.012(b)(3)(B). Later analysis revealed a blood alcohol concentration of .09.

Appellant did not file a pre-trial motion to suppress the results of the blood analysis. Instead, at the time that the blood vial was introduced into evidence during a trial before the court, Appellant objected that the statute was unconstitutional because, among other things, it “allows for the collection of evidence without a search warrant[.]” The trial court overruled this objection and admitted the blood vial. When the State later proffered the written report of the forensic analysis reflecting a blood alcohol concentration of .09 grams of alcohol per 100 millimeters of blood, Appellant simply stated, “Renew my earlier objection.”1 Again, the trial court admitted the evidence. Appellant was convicted of felony DWI and his punishment, enhanced by two prior, non-DWI felony offenses, was assessed by the trial court at thirty years’ confinement in the penitentiary.

Appellant framed his only point of error on appeal as follows: “In the absence of exigent circumstances or consent, Section 724.012(b)(3)(B) of the Texas Transportation Code, violates the Texas and United States constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Appellant‘s Brief on Direct Appeal at 7. The Tenth Court of Appeals construed this to be a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, not an as-applied challenge, and rejected it as such. McGruder v. State, 475 S.W.3d 345, 349-50 (Tex. App.-Waco 2014). Justice Davis dissented. Id. at 350-53. In his petition for discretionary review, Appellant urges us to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that the statute is unconstitutional on its face.2

“A facial challenge is an attack on a statute itself as opposed to a particular application.” City of Los Angeles, California v. Patel, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2443, 2449, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015). “Fourth Amendment challenges to statutes authorizing warrantless searches are no exception” to the general rule that facial constitutional attacks may “proceed under a diverse array of constitutional provisions.” Id. Indeed, “facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment are not categorically barred or especially disfavored.” Id. Still, no appellate court in Texas of which we are aware has yet declared Section 724.012(b)(3)(B) to be unconstitutional on its face.3 This is no surprise, since facial challenges to the constitutionality of a statute are not ordinarily easy to establish. Resolution of a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute focuses on the language of the statute itself “rather than how it operates in practice.” State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 908 (Tex.Crim.App.2011). Because there is no “recognized ... ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment[,]” a defendant who challenges the facial constitutionality of a statute beyond that limited First Amendment context has “the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since [he] must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged statute] would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987); Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d at 909 & n. 13.4 In other words, “to prevail on a facial challenge” of the sort Appellant brings here, he “must establish that the statute always operates unconstitutionally in all possible circumstances.” State v. Rosseau, 396 S.W.3d 550, 557 (Tex.Crim.App.2013).

The court of appeals observed that the statute, “as written, ... does not require a blood or breath specimen to be taken contrary to the Fourth Amendment; that is, without a warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” McGruder, 475 S.W.3d at 350. Because the statutory mandate could be carried out consistently with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, the court of appeals concluded, it was not unconstitutional on its face. Id. When the court of appeals was considering the merits of this case, it did not have the benefit of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles v. Patel, supra (determining the standard of review for facial constitutionality) or the decision of this Court in State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 813 (Tex.Crim.App.2014) (holding that Section 724.012(b)(3)(B) of the Texas Transportation Code does not, by itself, “form a constitutionally valid alternative to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement“). We vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to that court for further consideration in light of the intervening opinions in Villarreal and Patel.

Notes

1
Appellant did not object, however, to the forensic chemist‘s oral testimony to the same effect. Given our disposition of Appellant‘s sole ground for review, the court of appeals may wish to address whether the doctrine of curative admissibility might apply. See George E. Dix & John M. Schmolesky, 43A TEXAS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 53:82, at 1058 (3rd ed. 2011) (“The admission of improper evidence does not constitute reversible error if the same facts were proved by evidence which was not objected to.“). An appellate court may not reverse a conviction without first addressing any issue of error preservation that might be presented by the record. Gipson v. State, 383 S.W.3d 152, 159 (Tex.Crim.App.2012).
2
For the first time in his merits brief on petition for discretionary review, Appellant argues that the court of appeals erred to construe his point of error on appeal to be limited to a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, claiming that he also argued on appeal (if multifariously) that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of his case. We did not grant discretionary review to address this question.
3
At least one other court of appeals has held that Section 724.012(b) is not unconstitutional on its face. Gore v. State, 451 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. filed).
4
See also Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 457, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984), for the proposition that “a facial challenge fails where ‘at least some’ constitutional applications exist“).
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