*1 EAKIN, concurring. Justice majority’s Superior decision to vacate agree I with the order, under unjust claim for enrichment any as Court’s (Second) barred would be of the Restatement Contracts have parties of limitations. While the applicable statute viable, current law such a claim is not contested whether entitled to partial is not recover defaulting vendee provides obligations, its contractual it failed fulfill payments where makes a reason non-defaulting profit by if the vendor even v. Company Restaurant Hotel & default. Kaufman Thomas, (1963). Thus, defaulting 87, A.2d 411 Pa. here; our unjust claim enrichment bring vendee cannot prohibits, a claim current cannot enforce which law court For an it should exist. parties believe simply because here, would claim to be viable this Court unjust enrichment Hotel to overturn have Kaufman the Superior I and would vacate separately, Thus write Hotel reaching on without Court’s order based Kaufman question. statute limitations
Licensing, Appellant. Pennsylvania. Supreme Court of Argued Api’íí 2006. Decided Feb. *3 Wile, Cramer, Terrance M. Esq., P. Harold Timothy Esq., Edwards, Pennsylva- for of Esq., Harrisburg, Commonwealth of Licens- nia, of Bureau Driver Department Transportation, ing. Warenda, Jr., Morrisville, for James Joseph Esq.,
John McGrory. C.J., CASTILLE, NEWMAN, CAPPY, and
BEFORE: BALDWIN, SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER and JJ.
OPINION Justice CASTILLE. issue of appeal presents appellant,
This the narrow whether (PennDOT), indepen- had Transportation Law, Ignition dent under (since interlock re- § to enforce the repealed), or subsequent on drivers convicted of second quirement (DUI) in offense of under the influence instances the interlock impose require- the trial court failed to where order.1 The Court ment its Commonwealth court, from that panel below followed a series decisions Court, determined that heretofore not reviewed this which to enforce the inter- independent authority PennDOT lackеd in effect at the time requirement lock under Interlock Law follow, DUI conviction. For the reasons that we appellee’s and therefore disagree, we reverse. 28, 2002,
On June convicted the Court of appellee was of former County Common Pleas of Bucks DUI violation conviction.2,3 3731(a)(1) (a)(4), § his ninth such 75 Pa.C.S. but not appellee The trial court sentenced time served did appellee approved ignition order install devices vehicles, on Inter- required by Ignition his as was the former lock impose which directs trial courts upon subsequent defendant’s conviction of a second or DUI offense: questiоn presented appeal incapable repetition,
1. The in this of future given Assembly repealed that the General has the former law and replaced legislation explicitly delegating it with to PennDOT the author- 3805(b) ity impose requirement. interlock 1, See 75 Pa.C.S. (effective Nonetheless, 2004). February appeal the resolution of this law, appeals, affects a number of decided the former which are under currently pending before this Court. Appellee prior through was convicted seven times DUI from 1980 2. addition, upon In appellee accepted his first arrest in was (ARD) Disposition program. in the Accelerated Rehabilitative Pursuant 7002(c), acceptance to 42 Pa.C.S. this of ARD constituted a first Thus, appellee eight prior conviction. had DUI convictions erroneously instant offense. The Commonwealth Court stated in its opinion appellee’s eighth that the 2002 conviction at issue involves DUI conviction. appellee’s 3. The version of Section 3731 in effect at the time ninth *4 28, 2002, February pertinent provided part: arrest on drive, (a) person operate Offense defined.—A shall not or be in physical any actual control of the movement a vehicle in following circumstances: (1) degree While under the influence of alcohol to a which renders person driving. incapable the of safe (4) by weight While the amount of alcohol in the blood of: (i) greater; an adult is 0.10 or or (ii) greater. a minor is 0.02 or
(b) offense. —In to any addition subsequent or Second court, person the where a requirements imposed by other subsequent of a second or violation of 75 has been convicted 3731, of an the court shall order the installation Pa.C.S. motor vehicle interlock device on each approved ignition restoration of upon to be effective by person owned A record shall be privileges by departmеnt. operating the court has ordered department submitted to the when approved ignition the installation of an device. may person’s operating restore such department Before a from must receive certification privilege, department system court that the has been install- ed. 7002(b) County The Bucks (emphasis supplied). 28, 2002, certified June conviction appellee’s
Clerk of Courts 11, July PennDOT on
Thereafter, 29, 2002, notified July appellee on PennDOT for one driving privileges suspended year mail that his were 27, appel- December 2003. The notification informed effective that, satisfy at the conclusion of his he must suspension, lee of the Interlock Law to restoration of requirements prior or face an additional operating privilege year suspen- his sion: INTERLOCK
IGNITION
your
privileges
you
Before
can be restored
are
vehicle(s)
all
required by
by you
law to have
owned
be
This
Ignition
System.
is a
equipped with
the Influence.
your
Driving
result of
conviction
Under
your driving
If
fail to
this
you
comply
requirement,
for an
You
suspended
year.
will remain
additional
privilege
information
this
regarding
requirement
will receive more
your eligibility
before
date.
approximately
days
from
August
appellee
statutory appeal
filed
On
County
in the Bucks
of Common
suspеnsion
notice
Court
Pleas,
that he install
challenging only
as a
to restora-
precondition
interlock devices on his vehicles
Ward Clark held a
driving privileges.
Judge
tion
his
Senior
*5
26, 2002, at
hearing
appellee
de novo
on November
which
authority
lacked
under the
argued that PennDOT
absent a court order.
impose
requirement
interlock
comply
to order that appellee
Because the trial court failed
not
PennDOT could
appellee argued,
with the Interlock
to the Com-
requirement
independently. Citing
enforce the
Department
decision in
v.
monwealth Court’s
Schneider
of
Licensing,
A.2d 363
Transportаtion, Bureau
Driver
of
(Pa.Cmwlth.2002),
577 Pa.
This Court review er, light of our decision Commonwealth *6 5, (2003), authori 488 PennDOT had Pa. 834 A.2d independent the trial court requirement, to enforce the interlock where ty inquiry pure question to As-this involves law failed do so. Ignition of the proper interpretation regarding E.g., and non-deferential. MCI plenary our review Comm’n, WorldCom, 577 Pennsylvania Utility Inc. v. Public 294, (2004); Academy A.2d 1239 Mosaica Charter Pa. 844 Commonwealth, Education, Pa. v. 572 School (2002). 191, involving statutory A.2d 813 As in all matters 813 Statutory the dictates of the Con interpretation, we follow Act, seq., provide § 1 1501 et struction Pa.C.S. which and construction of statutes is to object interpretation the intention of the Assem ascertain and effectuаte General 1921(b). 1903(a), plain §§ 1 The statute’s bly. See Pa.C.S. legislative the best indication of language generally provides See, Manufacturing v. e.g., intent. Commonwealth Gilmour 676, (2003); Blom, Co., 143, v. 573 Pa. 822 A.2d 679 Bowser (citations (2002) omitted); 609, 830, 569 Pa. 807 A.2d 835 Assigned Financial Claims Pennsylvania Responsibility (1995) (“Where 424, 84, Plan v. 541 Pa. 664 A.2d 87 English, ambiguity of a statute are clear and free from words words.”). very intent is to be from those legislative gleaned to discern legislative We will resort to other considerations are not 1 only explicit. intent when words statute 1921(c). Absentee Ballots Pa.C.S. See also Canvass of November, Election, k, 231, 2003 Pa. 843 A.2d General 577 (2004) Commonwealth, 1223, Dep’t 1230 (citing O'Rourke (2001)); Corrections, 161, 1194, 566 Pa. 778 A.2d 1201 Ramich Electric, (Schatz Inc.), Compensation Appeal v. Workers’ Bd. (2001). Pa.656, A.2d PennDOT, our attention on the appellant, as focuses version 7003(2) of former of the Interlock effect at the Section subsequent time of notification appellee’s PennDOT that he be to install interlock required would de- vices on his vehicles as a condition of restoring his privileges.5 Section addressed which “additional driver’s license restoration requirements,” provided pertinent part:
In addition to any requirements other for the established person’s operating restoration of a privileges under 75 § 1548 to (relating requirements Pa.C.S. for driving under offenders): influence
(2) A person seeking restoration of operating privileges shall apply to the department 1951(d) restricted license under (relating permit) driver’s license and learner’s clearly which bewill marked restrict person operating motor only vehicles equipped approved with an interlock ignition sys- tem. PennDOT,
Id. According because a person seeking restora- *7 tion of operating his privileges required was under Section 7003(2) apply to to ignition PennDOT for an interlock restrict- license, that, ed it follows or with without a court order requiring the to comply driver with the Interlock driver cannot lawfully operate a motor vehicle without suсh a Therefore, device. argues, PennDOT it necessarily falls with- in PennDOT’s authority require the installation of the device(s) as a condition of license restoration. support
PennDOT finds for this argument in swpra, Court, this where discussing impact of our determination to strike and certain provisions sever Interlock Law unconstitutional, which were found to be opined that the Law was still viable:
[S]evering portions those of Act 63 which effectuate the delegation to the sentencing court of the license restoration- related responsibilities executive of ordering installation of the devices and certifying they that have been installed does repealed February Section 7003 was effective 2004. The substan- 7003(2) requirements may tive of Section now be found at 75 Pa.C.S. 3805(b). § of incapable render the remainder of the statute execu-
not legislative tion in accordance with intent.... With these severed, legislation requires still recidivist provisions seeking driving privileges offenders restoration of DUI an interlock Department for restricted apply 7003(2). The precludes license. 42 Act also a license possession offender of such restricted from a in the any highway motor vehicle on Common- operating an equipped approved unless that vehicle wealth 7003(3). Act thus interlock Id. The still system. lawfully operating recidivist DUI offenders from prevents on the unless highways Pennsylvania they motor vehicles approved driving properly- limited license are have vehicle. equipped
Mockaitis, 834
at 502-503.
notes that
A.2d
PennDOT
7003(2)
to,
of
are
tied
or
requirements
Section
not
made
of a
upon,
requiring
the existence
court order
contingent
Further,
of an
device.
installation
Common
require
repeat
Court has construed Mockaitis to
wealth
offenders must
for and be issued interlock restrict
apply
DUI
they apply
operating
ed licenses when
restoration
Transportation,
See
v.
privileges.
Cinquina
Department of
(Pa.Cmwlth.2004)
that,
A.2d 525
after
(recognizing
Mock
aitis,
independent authority
require
PennDOT had
drivers
licenses);
be
apply
for and
issued
restricted
Con
(Pa.
Finally, PennDOT concludes
even this Court were to
authority
that
had no
independent
determine
PennDOT
to enforce the
absent a
requirement
seek
7003(2)
order, appellee
required
court
still
Section
by
was
and be
an interlock
license
for
issued
restricted
before
apply
Thus,
a
if
operate
he could
motor vehicle.
even
PennDOT’s
invalid,
notice to
was deemed
anticipatory
appellee
PennDOT
an interlock restricted
required to obtain
argues, appellee was
restored.
for
to be
operating privileges
license
order
his
that,
has
as this case
responds by emphasizing
Appellee
has
system,
legal landscape
the court
progressed through
contends
progeny. Appellee
to Mockaitis and its
changed due
struck
Law which were
provisions
that
provisions
Mockaitis included the
by
down and severed
device,
an interlock
and those
a driver to install
required
authority
for PennDOT’s
provisions
predicate
formed the sole
provi-
interlock restricted license. Absent those
to issue an
sions,
a recidivist DUI offender cannot be
appellee posits,
there is no
required
explicit
to install such a device because
Thus,
for
to order installation.
authority
any entity
for an interlock restrict-
predicate
necessity
conditions for the
following
Appellee
*9
pre
has established certain
Assembly
General
Our
enact
interpreting statutory
in
guide
the courts
sumptions
the
“does not
ments,
legislature
that
including presumptions
absurd,
of execution or
impossible
a result
that
intend
entire statute to be effective
and “intends the
unreasonable”
In accordance
Section
certain.” 1 Pa.C.S.
with
and
in
a
as to render
1922,
way
a statute
such
interpret
we will not
See,
County Sportsmen’s
e.g., Allegheny
it meaningless.
Rendell,
(2004);
In finding delegation of this execu- [the Law’s] responsibility tive courts unconstitutional under the doctrine, separation powers we do not question *10 necessity wisdom and for reasonable measures to ensure that recidivist drivers do not take to alcohol-impaired the streets. Nor do we the of question legislation wisdom that requiring recidivist DUI offenders be issued restricted licenses requiring them to operate only motor vehicles equipped with Department-approved ignition sys- tems.
Mockaitis, 834 A.2d at 501. salutary legislative With this goal mind, in expressly we held that the Interlock Law was still viable, even with the trial courts’ involvement severed from “[S]evering portions law: those of Act 63 which effectuate delegation to the court of the license restora tion-related responsibilities executive of ordering installation of the devices and that certifying they have been installed does not render the remainder of the statute of incapable execution in accordance legislative intent.” Id. at 502. Thus, it is plain that the dеcision in Mockaitis was never to, fact, intended nor did it in render the Interlock Law unenforceable.
Even absent the provisions of the Interlock Law struck in down the remaining statute requires those of subject fenders legislation to the to to apply PennDOT for an interlock restricted license as a of condition restoration. Im plicit this “license restoration requirement” is authority the department to refuse to issue the license absent proof that Moreover, device has been installed. when Mockaitis Court the provisions severed mandating that the sentencing court order the installation of the interlоck device and monitor compliance, we made clear our that the view Interlock Law could still be It implemented. logically PennDOT, follows that the agency charged responsibility with the to regu issue and licenses, late motor vehicle possesses necessary implied of in the authority require installation interlock devices restoring of vehicles habitual offenders as condition PennDOT, The driving privileges. authority though per- implicit, legitimate. is no less haps Appellee’s argument to the result contrary would lead absurd 7003(2) enforcement, ren- incapable Law is and Section is prohibited by dered a rеsult that is meaningless, analysis § 1922 and be to this contrary would Court’s that Accordingly, possessed Mockaitis. we hold PennDOT enforce interlock re- independent statutory authority to quirement.
Appellee objects finding that a PennDOT also con independent enforcement would be possesses trary current version of the Interlock 75 Pa.C.S. that, forward, it § 3805.6 Section 3805 makes clear going responsibility require the installation PennDOT in appropriate interlock devices cases: (a) (relat- person General rule. —If a section 3802 violates under influence of alcohol or controlled sub- ing *11 stance) 3806(a) prior and hаs a offense as defined in section offenses) (relating person to or if a has had their prior 1547(b.l) to operating privileges suspended pursuant section (relating chemical to determine of alcohol testing to amount substance) 3808(c) illegally or controlled or to (relating inter- operating equipped ignition a motor vehicle not with lock) privi- and the seeks a restoration person operating shall leges, department require issuing as condition pursuant a restricted license to this section that follow- occur: ing
(1) Each by person registered motor vehicle owned or person to thе has been an interlock equipped ignition with remains so for the duration system and of the restricted period. license prior pertains Title
6. The version of the Interlock Law was in which judiciary judicial proceedings. to the and In aftermath of the finding aspects the trial Mockaitis that court's involvement in executive unconstitutional, requirement of the Interlock Law was the General Assembly pertaining the Interlock to Title to motor moved law vehicles, authority which invokes the of PennDOT. (2) If there are no motor or by person vehicles owned to the so to the registered person person certify A persоn so shall be deemed to department. certifying motor requirement have satisfied the that all vehicles owned person registered person equipped or be interlock system required by an as this subsection. (g) 3805. Subsection then states that this new give department impose law “shall not authorization to requirement on a that has person [sic] offense to prior committed an under former section 3731 1, 2003, October without the issuance of a court order.” Id. § 3805(g). contends that subsection
Appellee (g) prohibits PennDOT imposing from the interlock on him. The requirement plain however, language provision, of the does not suрport appel- argument. lee’s The General that Assembly only stated Sec- tion impose 3805 does not authorize the interlock PennDOT requirement during period. stated time Subsection (g) law, proper does not address the interpretation prior applicable which was earlier cases. Nor does anything subsection (g) purport preclude concluding this Court from law, terms, that prior different containing granted authori- ty to to enforce the ignition requirement PennDOT noted, as an administrative if matter. As this Court were entity find that no had the authority prior to enforce the law’s ignition interlock requirement post-Moekaitis, the result indeed, be absurd and would it would render unreasonable — the prior version of the Interlock meaningless. For reasons, these we find PennDOT had under the former law to enforce the interlock on repeat post-Mockaitis, DUI offenders did so in the properly case *12 judice. sub
Accordingly, the decision of the Commonwealth Court is reversed.
Former Justice NEWMAN did not in the participate of decision this matter.
70 SAYLOR, and and EAKIN Justice CAPPY Justice
Chief the join opinion. BAER dissenting opinion. files a
Justice BALDWIN BALDWIN, dissenting. Justice of Trans- Department determination that the majority’s The Licensing possessed Bureau of Driver portation, to enforce the inter- former Interlock Law Ignition under the is, in my judgment, offenders repeat lock on DUI Therefore, I dissent. respectfully erroneous. Law, 42 Interlock Pa.C.S. enacting Ignition
In
the former
2003),
Assembly intended
§§
the General
(repealed
7001-7003
responsibility
place
judiciary
and
attempted
systems
offenders to install
ordering repeat DUI
to restoration of their
their vehicles as
condition
7002(b).
In accordance with the
Pa.C.S.
privileges.
law,
sentencing
required
provide
court was also
former
Licens-
Transportation,
Bureau
Driver
Department
a “certification” that an appropriate
ing (Department)
on each motor
system
had bеen installed
ignition
7002(b)
§§
by the offender.
Pa.C.S.
vehicle owned
7003(1).
required
certifica-
Once the
received
tion,
then authorized the
Ignition
Depart-
license
upon
ment to issue an
interlock restricted
7003(2).
application.
offender’s
Mockaitis,
however, in
determined
Commonwealth
We
(2003)
5,
Assembly’s
575 Pa.
834 A.2d
General
necessary
in the courts the executive function
attempt
place
issuance of an
interlock restricted license
to effectuate
doctrine. Ac
impermissibly
separation
powers
violated
Mockaitis,
Ignition
those
Inter
cordingly,
portions
court the
delegating
lock Law
executive
of the devices and
ordering installation
responsibilities
(See
they
have been installed were severed.
certifying
Mockaitis,
503,
30,
at
at
subsections
severing
575 Pa.
A.2d
7003(5)).1
7002(b), 7003(1), and the last clause of
493,
6, noting
at
n.
1. See also
575 Pa. at
n.
834 A.2d
7002(a)
directly implicated in
was not
Mockaitis be-
that subsection
*13
in Mockaitis that our
that the
holding
Ignition
We noted
Interlock
improperly delegated
responsibilities
Law
executive
require striking
to the
court did not
the Act
its
severed,
the unconstitutional
entirety.
provisions
With
we
statute,
remaining
determined that the
portions
specifi-
7003(2),
cally
required
seeking
still
recidivist DUI offenders
restoration of
to the
driving privileges
aрply
Department
Furthermore,
ignition
for an
interlock restricted license.
we
7003(3),
severed,
concluded that
not
an
precluded
which was
possession
operat-
offender
such restricted license from
motor
on a
in the
ing any
highway
vehicle
Commonwealth
unless
equipped
approved ignition
that vehicle was
with an
Mockaitis,
29-30,
Pa. at
system.
In the majority instant holds that independent authority has to order ignition installation of interlock devices on vehicles by owned serial DUI offenders. I respectfully disagree. In we determined that the Ignition Interlock improperly delegated executive re- Thus, sponsibility to the courts. the provisions of the Ignition Interlock delegated Law which this authority by were severed this from Court the remainder of the statute. Accordingly, Ignition Interlock Law was left procedure grant- without ing any entity authority to order ignition installation of permit interlock devices.2 To the Department to order offend- DUI, applied cause it to first offenses for but that “in terms of the 7002(a) delegates judiciary, executive functions it subsection 7002(b).” infirmity suffers from the same constitutional as subsection 2. The version of the Ignition Interlock Law at issue in Mockaitis and repealed. herein has Ignition since been The current version of the read into devices would be to
ers to install
not inсlude or
Legislature
did
language
the statute
Ignition
the former
enacting
to include.
In
intend
improperly, placed
albeit
Legislature expressly,
to order offenders to install
the courts alone
in Mockaitis
The determination
interlock devices.
separation
doctrine
precluded,
that the courts were
*14
interlock
ignition
installation of
ordering
from
powers,
orders,
those
does not
compliance with
certifying
devices and
of the
statutory language
the
this Court to substitute
permit
in the
place authority
and
former
Interlock Law
Ignition
the
of such devices where
to order installation
Department
authority.
no such
“We
the
Legislature
Department
awarded
to be found in the statute
are not
may
supply
not
words which
not have.”
it
it otherwise does
give
meaning
and so
to
a
which
Revenue,
876
v. Bd.
Finance
Corp.
Calvert Distillers
(1954).
668,
476, 481,
“It is clear that we
Pa.
103 A.2d
add to
not,
statutory interpretation,
may
under the rubric
Pennsyl
absent therefrom.”
legislation,
conspicuously
matter
Base
Cmty. Boys
Relations Comm’n Mars
vania Human
(1980).
102, 106,
1246,
Ass’n,
410 A.2d
Such
488 Pa.
ball
Legislature.
with the
properly
task lies
the
Interlock
Ignition
there is no indication within
Since
grant
Department
intended to
the
Legislature
ignition
to order installation of
authority
independent
has
devices,
Department
cоurt nor the
neither the
offenders to install such
to order recidivist DUI
authority
Mockaitis,
in
on their
As we determined
devices
vehicles.
however,
incapable
the statute
of execution.
this does not leave
may employ
remaining
portions
The
valid
Department
re-
legislative
to effectuate the
Interlock Law
Ignition
ignition
obtain an
that serial DUI offenders must
quirement
their
license
order
have
interlock restricted
490;
Mockaitis,
9,
at
915A.2d 1165 SERVICE, INC., Appellee, TIRE JOCKEY *15 Pennsylvania, OF DEPARTMENT COMMONWEALTH PROTECTION, Appellant. ENVIRONMENTAL Pennsylvania. Supreme Court of April Argued 20, 2007. Decided Feb. ed license did not exist Mockaitis. notes perhaps that the Interlock has since been amended and Law However, argues of its defects. he that it is cured substantive particular not this Court’s role to achieve a result to control offender, one role particular recidivist but rather this Court’s of the Interlock be original to declare version so as to be incapable proper application. flawed This Court’s task is to determine the relationship 7003(2) and Mockaitis to between Sеction achieve reasonable reading of the statute as it was affected the severance of the trial courts’ provisions excising delegated executive imposition requirement. role of the interlock As Penn- 7003(2) argues, plain language clearly DOT of Section subject dictates that a person apply Interlock Law must to PennDOT for an interlock restricted license as a condition of the restoration of his or suffer a further privileges, term of license The then suspension. question becomes whether, urges, requirement as PennDOT necessarily assumes PennDOT to enforce the interlock re whether, claims, quirement appellee predicate or as au thority imposing ceased to exist when this Court decided Mockaitis.