67 F. 254 | E.D. Wis. | 1895
(after stating the facts as above). The libel and the answer in this case differ mainly in their statements of the degree of peril or of comparative safety encountered in the towage to Milwaukee. The testimony was heard in open court, aud I find no substantial contradictions in matters material to a decision. It is apparent both that the libel states the conditions in some respects in terms of exaggeration, ami that the answer
There has been much discussion by the courts in attempted distinction of cases of mere towage from those of salvage, and in some a classification of “extraordinary towage” has been adopted. A notable instance of the latter distinction is found in The Emily B. Souder, 15 Blatchf. 185, Fed. Cas. No. 4,458, where Chief Justice Waite at the circuit reduced the amount decreed by the district court from $3,000 to $1,000; and the fact that the master of the assisting vessel did not give notice before taking the towline that he would claim salvage remuneration (although his steamer was thereby taken entirely out of her course, and put to expense and inconvenience) was mentioned as one of the reasons which made the service towage, and not salvage. In that case it appeared, however, that the assisted steamer, deprived of her steam power, had the use of her sails, had made fair progress, and within 24 hours would probably have reached the vicinity of her port; that she gave no signal of distress, but sought to have a charge fixed for towage. These circumstances and the absence of actual peril were evidently taken to deprive the service of the character of salvage, and the comment upon the want of any demand or assertion as a salvor is only referred to in connection with those facts, and cannot be understood to make notice or demand a prerequisite for salvage, or that its absence would count, of' itself, as a circumstance against the claim. Indeed, the rule is stated the other way,—that, in the absence of a definite proposal or arrangement, where a vessel in distress calls upon a passing vessel for help, salvage compensation is implied. The Louisa Jane, 2 Low, 295.
The delicate and difficult question remains to determine an amount for this salvage which shall not only recompense the service, but shall be a just reward for it, and shall also serve -as an encouragement of others to like action. At the same time, the court ought not to impose more than should be justly paid by the respondents in view of the extent of peril from which the vessel and cargo were rescued, or an amount that would constitute a precedent discouraging vessels in distress or peril from invoking and accepting necessary aid. In the quest of light for this determination, I have examined all the cases cited by counsel, and many additional. Each case depends, for the allowance made, upon its particular facts, and the view taken by the court of the conditions and surroundings. A review of them, pointing out distinctions, would extend this opinion unnecessarily. I deem it sufficient to