69 A.D. 314 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1902
The plaintiff sues as a taxpayer under the provisions of section 1925 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the sole question involved in this appeal is the constitutionality of chapters 704, 705 and 706 of the Laws of 1901. These statutes were designed to provide for changing the method of compensation for the county clerk, the sheriff and register of the county of Kings, from fees to fixed salaries •; and as these officers all stand upon an equal footing (Const. art. 10, § 1), and the provisions of the statutes are in effect the same, it will be unnecessary to consider each chapter separately. It is not disputed that these several bills were enacted by the Legislature with all of the formalities of general legislation, but it is urged that they were special city laws within the meaning of section 2 of article 12 of the Constitution of this State in force at the time of their passage, and, as they were submitted to the mayor of Mew York, as provided by the section cited, and returned without his approval, no subsequent action being taken by the Legislature, it is insisted that the bills never became law. If these statutes are, in fact, special city laws, there can be nó doubt that there is a fatal defect in their enactment, and this court should not hesitate to declare their nullity. But the rule is well settled that the Legislature is presumed to have acted within the limits of its authority (Fort v. Cummings, 90 Hun, 481; People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston, 119 N. Y. 569;
The meaning of words in a constitutional provision is to be reached! in two ways: First, by ascertaining what the framers desired to-guard against by the provision; and, second, by ascertaining the-meaning of the words when applied to a statute by writers and courts. (People v. Supervisors of Chautauqua, 43 N. Y. 10, 14; Sweet v. City of Syracuse, supra; Matter of Goedel v. Palmer, 15 App. Div. 86.) The Constitution (Art. 12, § 2), after providing for the classification of cities, says: “ Laws relating to the property, affairs or government of cities, and the several departments thereof, are divided into general and special city laws; general city laws aré those which relate to all the cities of one or more classes; special city laws are those which relate to a single city, or to less than all the cities of a class. Special city laws shall not be passed except in conformity with the provisions of this section.” Then follow the directions, which it is conceded were not complied with in the matter -now before üs.
The statutes under consideration, and which are alleged to be special city laws, are similar in purpose. We will use chapter 705 of the Laws of 1901, entitled “An act to make the office of sheriff of the county of Kings a salaried office and regulating the management of said office,” as typical of the series. It provides (§ 1), that on and after the 1st day of January, 1902, “ the sheriff of the county of Kings shall receive a salary of fifteen thousand dollars a year, as his compensation, which; compensation shall be in lieu of all fees,. perquisites, emoluments, commissions, percentages, services and duties performed by said sheriff of what
There can be no doubt that chapter 705 of the Laws of 1901 is a local bill within the meaning of section 16 of article 3 of the Constitution, which provides that “ no private or local hill, which may be passed by the Legislature, shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.” (Ferguson v. Ross, 126 N. Y. 459, 464, and authorities above cited.) If this statute relates to the city of New York in a constitutional sense, then there is more than one subject embraced in the act, and it is void under the provisions of the Constitution, last above cited, but no one has suggested that there was more than one subject embraced in chapter 705 of the Laws of 1901, or that such subject was not expressed in the title, which is “ An act to make the office of sheriff of the county of Kings a salaried office and regulating the management of said office.” An act of the Legislature must of necessity relate to its subject, and if there was but one subject embraced in chapter 705 of the Laws
A constitution is an instrument of government, made and adopted by the People for practical purposes connected with the common business and wants of human life (People v. New York Central Railroad Company, 24 N. Y. 485), and should be so construed as best to promote the great objects for which it was made, avoiding the two extremes of a liberal or strict construction. (North River Steamboat Company v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713, 750.) Looked at from this standpoint, it seems clear to us that the language of section 2 of article 12 is to be understood in the light of the provisions of section 16 of article 3, which has remained unchanged since the adoption of the Constitution of 1846. That is, that a bill “ relating to the property, affairs or government of cities, and the several departments thereof,” if it related to a single city, could have but one subject, and that would have to be expressed in the title, and such 'a bill, if it related to the “ property, affairs or government ” of the city, would be a special city law, which would be subject to the provisions of the section. In other words, if the statute was designed to regulate the affairs of the comptroller’s office of the city of Hew York, this fact would have to appear as the subject of the bill in its title, and, as the act would relate to the subject, it would be a special city law, and, as such, would have to be enacted in the manner specially pointed out in the Constitution. This meets all of the practical requirements, and avoids the impracticable necessity of examining minutely every private or local bill to determine whether it in fact relates, however remotely, to the “ property, affairs or government of cities.”
The proceedings of the convention in which the Constitution was-framed may properly be examined in considering the purpose of a given article or section (Matter of Goedel v. Palmer, 15 App. Div. 86), and while we shall not attempt to follow the somewhat stormy passage of this provision of the Constitution in alb of its stages through the convention which sat at Albany in 1894, it may not be out of place to call attention to the objects which were in view. With the opening of the convention a large number of propositions were introduced, looking to home rule for cities, and on the twenty-seventh day of July the committee on cities reported a proposed
Mr. Jesse Johnson, chairman of the committee on cities, in presenting the report of the committee to the convention Tuesday, August seventh (2 Revised Records, 110), said: “ The problem which is presented is the problem of giving some degree of municipal independence to the magnificent and growing cities that are the diadem of our State, without dismembering the sovereignty of the
The very able analysis of the statutory provisions relating to this question by the learned court at Special Term and which clearly indicates that all of the county expenses, if any should result from the changes made by the statutes under consideration, would be levied and assessed upon the property of Kings county, makes it unnecessary to go over that ground again. It is not to be doubted by those who are familiar with the affairs of Kings county that the fees which will be collected and turned over to the city of New York, under the provisions of these several statutes, will much more than meet the fixed charges which are provided for, so that it is entirely probable that the municipality will be handsomely paid for the discharge of the duties imposed upon it by these laws. But were it certain that the salaries and expenses would more than equal the fees, we are still of the opinion that it would not result in waste to the property or funds of the city of New York, and that the statutes do not relate to the city of New York in any constitutional sense, but to the subject of the laws, which are expressed in the titles to the several bills as enacted by the Legislature.
We have examined Exempt Firemen Association v. Trustees (34 App. Div. 138) and Chrystal v. Mayor (63 id. 93), as well as the many authorities cited by the appellant, but we find nothing which is not in accord with the conclusion reached in the present discussion. The statute (Laws of 1896 chap. 141) in the Exempt Firemen case was a local bill, and its subject, as expressed in the title, was “An act to provide for the application and distribution of receipts from premiums collected and to be collected, from foreign fire insurance companies doing business in the State under and pursuant to chapter six hundred and four of the laws of eighteen hundred and eighty-six, on insurance on property in Long Island City,” and the opinion of Goodrich, P. J., does not suggest an •authority for the contention of the appellant in the case before us.
The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
All concurred.
Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.