*2 YATES, O’NEILL, Before FOWLER JJ. of the conduct oc- that is an element result OPINION
MAJORITY § 1.04. this state.” Id. curs inside YATES, Justice. not have the State of Texas does contends Matthew him for either com- appellant, jurisdiction prosecute convicted *3 McGowan, bribery of trade secrets be- of commercial brib- mercial or theft of two counts 32.43(b) (Ver- or a result that is § cause neither “the conduct ery, TexPenal Code Ann. offense occurred in 1989),1 of trade of either and one count of theft element” non § The trial court as- Texas. Id. 31.05. secrets. offense at five punishment for each sessed of com- employee An commits the offense error, points In years confinement. five if, bribery the consent of his without mercial sufficiency challenges the of the intentionally knowingly or soli- employer, he in alleges the trial court erred evidence and cits, accept any agrees to benefit accepts, or (1) charges denying his motion to dismiss the or under- person agreement from another (2) jurisdiction; de- against him for want of influence his standing will the benefit the theft nying a motion to dismiss because of his em- to the affairs conduct in relation unconstitutionally of trade secrets statute is 32,43. Appellant § contends the ployer. (3) failing applied;
vague and overbroad as bribery complete is of commercial offense must be that a trade secret instruct accepts or employee the benefit once the secret; weight commenting on the and influenced agrees to have his conduct jury charge. in the text of the of the evidence benefit, employee subse- or not the part. part and reverse We affirm agreement. quently in furtherance of acts
Therefore, offense of appellant argues, the BACKGROUND complete when he bribery was commercial bribe, regardless of wheth- allegedly took the sting operation During the course of a drawings to er he ever transmitted specializing a firm the inves- conducted maintains be- Weightman. He further crimes, appellant, tigation collar of white State cause he lived and worked McGowan, sales- a Dresser-Rand Matthew allegedly took the Washington when he Seattle, acquired Washington, draw- man in bribe, nor a result that is an element neither machinery parts from ings highly technical brib- of commercial an element of the offense transmitted Dresser-Rand office and another Therefore, he ery place in Texas. took Weightman, a drawings to Kenneth these did not their results claims his actions and secondary parts who was manufacturer jurisdiction of subject him to the territorial parts. to manufacture and sell authorized hand, other on the this State. return, money to Weightman wired In jurisdiction over that Texas had maintains manufac- Weightman agreed McGowan. appellant accepted mon- offense because dummy corporation parts for a ture these within generated from a location ey that was sting operation. part created of Texas. State JURISDICTION argument, Contrary the State’s error, is not an element origin of the benefit In his first combines bribery. 1.04 Section jurisdiction because commercial Texas lacked maintains objective principals. subjective territorial fall allegedly committed do not the crimes he (Tex. juris Boetscher v. the limits of Texas’s territorial within 1990), grounds other App. rev’d on in Section 1.04 of diction as set forth — Amarillo Boetscher, nom., Ex Parte states that sub Penal Section 1.04 Texas Code. Jurisdiction jurisdiction an offense that “has over Texas within commenced conferred over offenses own conduct or the person commits his the state completed outside criminally the state but another for which he conduct of out- (subjective) offenses commenced and for if ... the conduct or a responsible either Therefore, 1.18(b). Leg., § 73rd Ch. appellant was convicted for which 1. The crimes 1, 1994, the code in penal code are to all September references were committed before was committed. the time the crime penal See Acts effect at code. date of the revised effective (ob- Although money wired to Texas. side the state but consummated within and, jective). presumably in primary policy Id. The consider- McGowan from Texas underlying exchange, documents were sent ations section 1.04 are that Texas of the offense of should have a substantial interest in or con- these acts are not elements bribery. There is no circumstan- nection with the criminal event it seeks commercial indicating tial or direct evidence that a bene- prosecute and that law enforcement should solicited, accepted agreed to in by plugging gaps existing fit was be facilitated jurisdiction may goes beyond exist law when a course of conduct Texas.2 single Washington, the boundaries of a state. Tex.Penal but not Texas. Commentary § 1.04 Practice Ann. Code also contends Texas (Vernon 1974). jurisdiction for the offense of was without juris determining whether Texas had *4 theft of a trade secret. Like commercial custody diction in an interference with child bribery, appellant maintains the offense of case, the Court of Criminal in Rob theft of a trade secret is not result-oriented (Tex.Crim. erts v. offending complete crime and is when the
App.1981),' considered an occurs where act party attempts to communicate the secret and where the result of an act occurs. successfully whether or not the secret is ease, only maintains,
If a crime covers
the
act of
In this
conscious
communicated.
he
wrongdoer, regardless
in
of its conse-
no element of the offense occurred
Texas
quences,
place
pun-
complete
the crime takes
in
and is
because the offense was
Wash
only
acts; but,
ington,
ishable
he
if a
where
crime
the state from which he transmitted
is
drawings Weightman.
disagree.
defined so as to include some of the
to
act,
consequences of an
as well as the act
A person commits the offense of theft of
itself,
generally regarded
is
crime
as
“if,
trade secrets
without the owner’s effec-
having been committed where the conse-
(1)
consent,
knowingly:
tive
steals
trade
occur,
quences
regardless of where the act
(2)
secret;
copy
repre-
makes a
of an article
place
(emphasis
original).
took
...
in
secret;
senting a trade
or
communicates
Roberts,
(quoting
at 164
C.J.S.
or transmits a trade secret.” TexPenal
31.05(b) (Vernon 1989).
Criminal Law section
current
at
Here,
version
§
Code Ann.
162).
section
alleged
transmitted
trade secrets to
Weightman
in Texas
a facsimile machine.
Here,
concedes,
the State
and we
Thus, the
issue whether the transmission
agree,
bribery
that commercial
is a conduct
Texas, Washington,
occurred in
in
or in both.
offense,
opposed
oriented
to a result ori
See,
e.g.,
ented offense.
Hubbard v.
“[t]o
The verb “transmit” means
send or
1984),
another,
(Tex.App.
giving Texas Section penal ror is overruled. of the code. sum, appellant’s conduct in re-
In because of theft of trade secrets THE lation to the offense OF EVIDENCE SUFFICIENCY requirements of the territorial fell within error, In his third 1.04, trial court did not err Section legally insufficient3 the evidence is contends denying appellant’s motion to dismiss for theft of trade support his conviction juris- case for want of theft of trade secrets reviewing sufficiency of secrets. However, because we have found diction. evidence, view the evidence this court must concerning appellant’s conduct that none the verdict to light most favorable bribery offense of commercial occurred could any trier of fact if rational determine denying appel- the trial court erred essential elements have found the the commercial brib- lant’s motion to dismiss Jackson doubt. beyond a reasonable crime ery Accordingly, appellant’s first case. 318-19, 99 S.Ct. Virginia, 443 U.S. part is sustained in and overruled of error (1979); Muniz 2788-89, L.Ed.2d part. (Tex.Crim.App.), 238, 246 U.S. rt. ce TRADE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 116, 126 (1993); L.Ed.2d 82 Soto *5 SECRETS STATUTE (Tex.App [14th S.W.2d . —Houston error, appellant of In his second refd). re pet. The standard Dist.] denying a maintains the trial court erred and circum direct view is the same for both the indictment because motion to dismiss State, 711 Chambers stantial evidence. 31.05(b) vague and overbroad Section (Tex.Crim.App.1986). S.W.2d Fifth and Four applied, violation of the review, sufficiency appellate conducting a Amendments to the United States teenth weight and court is not to re-evaluate of Law and the Due Course Constitution evidence, to act to credibility but of the Al provision of the Texas Constitution. decision. a rational reached ensure the raising though Weightman a motion filed Muniz, at 246. statute, constitutionality appellant did of the language of jury charge tracked The Weightman’s preserve not not. motion does asking jury to consider 31.05 Section appellant. Martinez error knowingly communicated appellant pet. . —Dallas secrets, namely, speci- or transmitted trade ref'd). pre Although appellant contends he Weightman with- drawings, to fied technical requesting an instructed error served of the owners. out the effective consent jury charge, ap objecting to the verdict and “the secret as charge further defined a trade objection way in no raised the con pellant’s any techni- any part or scientific whole or applied to him. stitutionality of the statute as information, procedure, design, process, cal Moreover, authority indicating cites no formula, has value and improvement that or right preserve measures a claimed how such pre- to measures that the has taken owner chal on a constitutional of dismissal based persons oth- becoming available vent from timely objection lenge. specific, Because no to have the owner selected er than those made, pre not this of error was was purposes.” See for limited access TexJPenal Curry our review. served for 31.05(a)(4). § Code Ann. (hold (Tex.Crim.App.1995) at the direction reflects that appellant when The record ing preserved no error is Holler, Dresser- engineer with Eugene object at trial that statute specifically fails to investigating Rand, operative the undercover applied because of unconstitutional as was State, 922 in Clewis v. appeal, such a review appellant this rized 3. At the time filed Nevertheless, Appeals not determined of Criminal had Court appeals sufficiency courts of whether the intermediate re- a factual we decline to conduct sufficiency a factual this State could conduct appellant did not because view in this instance supporting evidence a conviction. review of the request prior to oral submission. such a review recently autho- Criminal The Court of Weightman requested specific 640. To determine whether the mea- Dresser-Rand Weightman. part numbers from Holler se- taken effective to maintain sub- sures were parts they lected some of these because were secrecy drawings, of the the follow- stantial (1) high technology equipment readily and not ing are relevant: non-disclosure factors facility (3) (2) available outside the Dresser-Rand agreements, plant security, access to Oleans, Thereafter, New located York. information, at other measures. in-
appellant contacted the Oleans office and drawings in 636-37. The technical this case drawings dicated he needed the for select were drawn 1973 and and the between part existing numbers to service an customer drawing redrawn in 1985. There- in Alaska. The Oleans office sent the draw- fore, draw- we must determine whether the ings repair shop to Dresser-Rand’s Seattle ings substantially from remained secret days, where worked. Within year appellant transmitted the Weightman received several of the facsimiles by reviewing drawings Weightman, drawings, during all of which seized a were adequacy security mea- of Dresser-Rand’s Weightman’s subsequent search of office. regards to those documents. sures The search also revealed documentation of predecessors Dresser-Rand and its re- Weight- three wire transfers of funds from quired including appel- employees, all new man to via Western Union within agreement4 lant, sign a conflict interest Weightman’s receipt short time of of the employees pledged, in which new facsimiles. thereafter, During my I employment and dispute does that he made keep shall secret and confidential and not copy and transmitted the any person, any disclose to unauthorized drawings Weightman. Appellant main- secret or confidential information of tains the evidence fails to show that I COMPANY that obtain as result *6 drawings Weightman he transmitted to were during my employment. inception secret from their and remained se- throughout cret Appellant that entire time. Holler, Driscoll, Eugene Kathie and Dale contends drawings the evidence shows the Thibodeaux, long-time employees all of widely legally replicated through- were and Dresser-Rand, drawings testified that were secondary parts industry, out the machine kept key subject under lock and to limited security and that the measures that Dresser- by persons designated to such access receive Rand in instituted the late 1980’s insti- were facility information. to the Visitors were drawings tuted after the in public were the by They personnel. escorted authorized fur- longer domain no Appel- and trade secrets. always ther stated that Dresser-Rand uti- lant does not adequacy contest the security guards recently imple- lized and measures, security current but maintains security mented additional measures such as measures place ap- these were not in when security codes. Holler testified that Dress- pellant drawings alleged obtained the to be a requires confidentiality agreement er-Rand a trade secret. third-party receive with manufacturers who drawings prohibit The core element a trade secret is that mechanical vendors secret, although utilizing drawings it must remain a purposes absolute from the for oth- secrecy required. by is not Schalk v. 823 er than the use authorized Dresser-Rand. (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert. Driscoll testified that Dresser-Rand had
denied, placing stamps 503 U.S. on S.Ct. been red “trade secret” (1992). drawings year L.Ed.2d 425 There must be sub that it released since the secrecy employed by company. stantial element and the owner she became provided prevent adequate must have taken measures to find these measures secu- becoming rity during question per period trade secret from available to and were by secrecy sons other than those selected the owner effective to maintain the of the doeu-r purposes. to have access for limited Id. at ments. exchange security require pledge gifts pro-
4. New measures also now em- not to receive for ployees sign they prietary a Code of Conduct in which information. many To a “trade secret” within the clear Although reflects that be the record 31.05, information, meaning available in the Dresser-Rand were of Section market, testimony secondary design, improvement re- process, Holler’s formula secret, particular garding the selection of these but must must not be also be security implement- drawings, generally public measures to the unavailable and it frame, during appellant’s advantage ed this time give must one who uses it an over retrieving particular these draw- actions competitors that do not know of or use the facility support ings from a secured trade secret. Leonard finding jury’s that the documents 1988), aff'd, (Tex.App. — Dallas were, fact, (Tex.Crim.App.1991), transmitted or communicated Schalk v. Appellant’s trade secrets. third of er- 503 U.S. t. cer ror is overruled. A fair S.Ct. 118 L.Ed.2d suggests qual that to reading of this section JURY INSTRUCTION secret, question ify the article as a trade error, In his fourth (1) or techni- part must of scientific be all or by failing owner, court erred (2) maintains the trial information, be of value cal jury that a trade secret must be instruct the by measures access protected from further contends his de secret. all, except those se- taken the owner theory that the draw fensive of the case was purposes. for limited lected the owner in ings had not remained secret from their given by Thus, implicit in the definition jury ception, and as he was entitled to a such the doc- requirement the court was the issue. instruction this defensive Further, because uments be secret. that the owner jury required to find in the trial court should define prevent took measures documents charge any legal phrase that the must any- becoming available documents from resolving necessarily properly the is use persons selected those one other than sues, defined, statutorily and if the trial court purposes, the definition for owner limited provide statutory should definition necessarily in- charge trade secrets Nguyen that term. requested definition appellant’s cluded 1991,pet. [1st Dist.] . —Houston secrecy must have “a substantial element
refd). Additionally, is entitled a defendant alleged theft.” [the] existed to the date of every issue to an instruction on defensive *7 refusing not err in the trial court did evidence, evi raised the whether such on the se- appellant’s requested instruction weak, strong unimpeached or or dence is Appellant’s fourth crecy secret. of a trade contradicted, regardless of what the trial and point of error is overruled. may may not believe about the court or State, credibility of the evidence. Miller v. 582, (Tex.Crim.App.1991); 585 815 S.W.2d THE ON WEIGHT COMMENT (Tex. State, 380, 398 Thacker v. 889 S.W.2d THE EVIDENCE OF 1994, ref'd),
App. pet. [14th Dist.] — Houston error, appellant of In his fifth — 57, U.S. -, 133 cert. on the court commented contends the trial however, defendant, L.Ed.2d 21 A jury in the text of the weight the evidence an instruction worded not entitled have drawings in assuming the charge by long charge exactly requests, as as the as charge juryA secrets. question were trade correctly the law and tracks the stat states of the case applicable the law set forth should Thacker, 889 at 399. When ute. S.W.2d weight opinion on the expressing an without adequately covered requested instruction is testimony, evidence, summing up the of the submitted, charge is no error the there jury argu using discussing the facts or or refusing it. Id. cite the sympathy or ment to arouse the case, jury. passions of the In this the definition CrimPROC. Tex.Code (Vernon Supp.1996). A trial charge ANN.art. 36.14 in the tracked the defini trade secret jury instruc give court should never the 31.05 of the Texas tion set forth section ele- on the tion that constitutes a comment correctly stated the law. Penal Code and 739 offense, drawings trade secrets. alleged ing whether the were ments of the or assumes (Tex. State, State, v. 800 267 disputed Grady v. 634 See Collins S.W.2d fact. S.W.2d 1990, pet.) no 316, App. Dist.] (Tex.Crim.App.1982); [14th Richardson v. — Houston evidence); State, 538, (jury charge comment on (Tex.App not a 766 S.W.2d . —Hous (Tex. ref'd). State, charge v. 746 S.W.2d pet. Dist.] ton Francis [14th ref'd) App. pet. [14th Dist.] the truth of a controverted assumes — Houston (same). Therefore, charge weight the the court’s did issue is a comment on the the documents were trade se Whaley and is erroneous. v. not assume evidence crets, jurors (Tex.Crim.App.1986); apply the the but instructed Richardson, statutory determining at 541. In definition S.W.2d review drawings trade Because ing charge, appellate the were secrets. court is to read weight the trial court did not comment on the charge as a whole in order to “flesh out by submitting charge in explain application paragraph.” of the evidence and (Tex. form, appellant’s fifth Doyle present v. its we overrule Crim.App.1980) (opinion reh’g); of error. Jordan (Tex.App . —Hous Accordingly, judgment in cause num- ref'd). 1989,pet. ton [14th Dist.] judgment ber 653937 is affirmed. The
The trial court instructed the and the cause number 647407 reversed application paragraph as follows: in- cause remanded to the trial court with
Now, you beyond struction to dismiss the indictment. if find from the evidence County, a reasonable doubt that Harris defendant, McGowan, Matthew OPINION ON REHEARING June, day on or about the 8th did rehearing, appellant ar In his motion for knowingly communicate transmit objection gues for the first time that no trial Weightman namely: Kent a trade secret necessary preserve the constitutional technical information ... Eu- owned question Appellant quotes the for review. Holler, gene without the effective consent “Questions involving following passage: owner, you then will find the defen- constitutionality upon of a statute which a guilty charged dant in the indictment. defendant’s conviction is based should be ad
Appellant contends
paragraph
this
is a com-
courts,
by appellate
even when such
dressed
weight
ment on the
because it
evidence
appeal.”
issues are raised for the first time on
require
fails to
to find that
bb
Ra
secrets,
question
are
trade
(citing
(Tex.Crim.App.1987)
Moore
therefore,
specific drawings
assumes the
are
[14th
. —Houston
trade secrets.
pet.)).
no
notes the
Dist.]
disagree.
appeals
The trial court
of this state have often
directed
courts
See,
jury’s
duty
e.g., Long v.
attention to their
to determine
utilized the “Rabb rule.”
*8
1995)
State,
(Tex.App
were in fact
trade
tencing procedure
facially
statute] was not
that are
systemic requirements”
forfeitable
unconstitutional,
initio,’
nor was it “void ab
litigant’s
“essentially
independent
object
required
at trial in
Marin,
at 279. These
wishes.”
851 S.W.2d
preserve any
purposes of
order to
error for
or forfeited
rights cannot be waived
absolute
appeal.”
Garcia
887 S.W.2d
by
exam-
parties.
Id. As the “clearest”
(footnote omitted),
(Tex.Crim.App.1994)
point-
court
ple
rights,
the Marin
absolute
—
U.S. -,
cert.
jurisdiction of the
ed to
that affect the
laws
Curry
Both
statute that he
is unconstitutional.
law is no
(Tex.Crim.App.1988)
void
view,
properly
our
the Rabb rule is
rights,
power
no
law and confers no
bestows
applied
questioned
instances where the
anyone
justifies
performed
no act
jurisdiction
it.”).
hand,
statute affects the
of the court
the other
a constitu
under
On
judgment against
applied
to render a
the defen
challenge
tional
to a statute as
does
dant,
i.e.,
jurisdiction
when the statute affects “the
affect the
of the court. The
not
‘subject
power
power
upon
of the court
mat
the court the
over
statute does confer
act,
coupled
‘personal’
although
challenge
...
to the constitu-
ter’ of the case
with
however,
language
suggests
many
rights
opinion
fall into
4. Certain
constitutional
prior
rights.
category
the Court of Criminal
decisions
of forfeitable
say
guaran-
Marin are not in conflict. The court stated in
even constitutional
When we
"that
Marin:
object properly
tees can be waived
failure to
some,
all,
trial,”
at
we mean that
constitu-
regularly
adoption
Since its
we have
rights may be forfeited.
the other
tional
On
52(a) applied [Rule
]
in cases of forfeitable
hand, certain,
few,
relatively
rights must be
rights and never to the violation of funda-
trial
protected by
system’s impartial representa-
requirements
systemic
mental
or to the in-
expressly
party
waived
tives unless
fringement
rights
important
so
that their
belong. Determining
they
cate-
whom
which
implementation
mandatory
absent an ex-
gory
right occupies
usually
will
settle the
press waiver.
Marin,
procedural
question
default in the context of
tionality applied may constitute a defense majority opinion. a der of the under that statute. to a conviction challenge constitutionality of a statute to the charge jury’s is essential to the The court’s nonwaivable, absolute applied” “as is not a deliberations, charge “a must in therefore requirement prohibition. We conclude clude an accurate statement the law.” constitutionality challenge to the of a that (Tex. 726, 731 Abdnor v. 871 S.W.2d rights applied statute as falls into the class 1994) App. (citing v. 698 Crim. Cane may failure to assert be forfeited 1985)). (Tex. App. S.W.2d 138 Crim. them. Ap the Court of Criminal Schalk peals “it axiomatic that the core held that Because this case contests of a secret must be it element trade only constitutionality of the statute as (Tex. 633, 640 remains a secret.” 823 S.W.2d object applied, appellant required to at 1991), denied, 1006, App. cert. 503 U.S. Crim. Appellant trial. failed to meet this burden. 1763, L.Ed.2d 425 The 112 S.Ct. 118 appellant’s first of error. We overrule acknowledged that “Texas trade secret court Appellant also contends this Court should law arena.” origins in the civil law has its sufficiency have conducted a factual review Leith, Systems, Inc. v. (citing at 636 BPI State, 922 the evidence. See Clewis v. 1981))(Fifth (W.D.Tex. Cir F.Supp. 532 208 126 We denied S.W.2d utilizing the applying cuit case Texas law appellant’s post-submission requesting brief Restatement trade secret definition from the original sufficiency review. In our factual Torts, Huffines, 158 citing Hyde Corp. v. stated, opinion decline to conduct a we “we 566, 763, Tex. cert. S.W.2d sufficiency factual review this instance be- (1958)). 223, 898, 3 L.Ed.2d U.S. request cause did not such review Services, Inc. v. In Stewart & Stevenson Nevertheless, ap- prior to oral submission.” 89, Serv-Tech, (Tex.App. 879 S.W.2d pellant request to make such a renews the denied), this writ Dist.] -Houston [14th review. approved the trial court’s instruction court upon based the RESTATEMENT again the fac decline to review (FIRST) b, provides § comment which sufficiency Appellant tual of the evidence. TORTS pertinent part as follows: original in his did not raise this of error containing brief. Post-submission briefs new subject secret must be matter of trade points of error will be considered with knowledge or of public Matters of secret. appellate Rochelle v. leave of the court. industry knowledge in an cannot general (Tex.Crim.App. 791 S.W.2d his secret. appropriated one as 1990); see also Wilson v. completely disclosed Matters which are Dist.] [14th cannot be his goods one markets which . —Houston 'd). party may pet. ref “The idea that a secret. appellate court after a new issue on an force “From all Id. at 95. The court concluded: foreign to the rules briefs have been filed is find, ap- it able to the eases we have been Rochelle, ...” at in order to be pears to settled that be well sufficiency argu the factual did not make protection, a trade entitled to common-law brief, thus, original we de ment his we conclude that secret must be secret .... it. cline to address misappropria- there is no cause of action is not rehearing tion of confidential information The motion for is overruled. or, substantially secret.” either secret at least original)(eiting (emphasis Id. at 98-99 Dissenting Opinion by O’Neill Justice Boucher, 150 Tex. Wissman 12, 1996. filed December (1951); Personnel Hallmark Justice, O’NEILL, dissenting. Franks, Inc. v. (Tex. 1978, no App.-Houston [1st Dist.] I trial court erred Civ. Because believe the writ); Traylor, Co. Lamons Metal Gasket failing to include an instruction (Tex. secret, App.-Houston I Civ. must be a that a “trade secret” *11 n.r.e.)). party buy- widely to third More were disseminated [14th Dist.] writ ref'd sum, ers, suppliers. appel- In vendors and recently, Supreme the Texas Court has con around his con- lant’s entire defense centered that “once a trade secret is made firmed alleged that the “trade secrets” were ownership Computer Associatestention public all is lost.” believe, result, I not nor Altai, not As a do secret. Inte rn’l contend, (Tex. Co., that the error 1994)(citing Kinley does the State Luccous v. J.C. (Tex. 1964)(“It Accordingly, I reverse the would is self- harmless. 653937 and re- subject judgment in Cause Number that matter of a trade
evident secret”)). respects, In I a new trial. all other kept be mand for secret must majority opinion. concur with case, present although In the the definition statutory of “trade secret” tracked the defini-
tion, correctly it did not state the law.1
charge something defined “trade secret” as taken
that “has value and that the owner has prevent becoming from
measures to available persons than other those selected purposes.” access for limited
owner have The trial court neither instructed DETECTIVE & SMITH AGENCY the “trade secret” must be secret or SERVICE, NIGHTWATCH INC. d/b/a secret, substantially nor did he submit an Systems, Inc., Appellant, Alarm Smith inquiry finding. for the to make such a Further, disagree majority I with the SECURITY, STANLEY SMITH the court’s definition of “trade secret” neces- INC., Appellee. sarily appellant’s requested included the defi- nition that “an essential element of a trade No. 05-95-01536-CV. it secret is that has remained a secret.” jury charge Because the Court lacked this essential
instruction, Dallas. it was not an accurate statement of the law and was defective. Dec. 1996. undisputed timely It is that the Therefore, objected charge. reversal required injure if the error is calculated to defendant, rights which means that
there must some harm to the accused Abdnor,
from the error.
(quoting Almanza v. 686 S.W. 2d (Tex. 1984)). making App. Crim. this
determination, we must examine the error
light jury charge, of the entire the state of evidence, argument counsel
any other relevant information contained in
the record of the trial. Id. at 733. As a defense, appellant
substantial element of his
sought alleged to show “trade se- routinely replicated
cret” information market, secondary parts parts al-
leged capable to be trade secrets were fact,
being, engineered, and were reverse drawings upon
and the which the State relied al, argu- agree majority Although appellant compelling I that this issue was makes a with vague preserved. ment that the statute’s and overbroad defi- nition of "trade secret” renders it unconstitution-