67 A.2d 61 | Del. Super. Ct. | 1949
Superior Court for New Castle County, Civil Action, No. 1078, 1948. The sole question here raised is this: May an injured employee, who has filed and withdrawn a claim for Workmen's Compensation against his employer, thereafter sue an alleged third party tort-feasor for damages on account of his injuries?
The defendant, arguing for a negative answer to this question, relies chiefly upon Furlong v. Cronan,
The present plaintiff cites Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v.Morin, (2 Cir.)
"There is nothing in the provisions of the Compensation Act which destroys the liability of a non-employer tort-feasor to respond in damages to the proper party for the death of an employee, notwithstanding such employee or his dependents has or have accepted the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law.When the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is borne inmind it would be highly unreasonable to assume that in itsenactment the Legislature intended to save a class of wrongdoerswho are in no wise related to the compensation scheme from theliability which the law had theretofore imposed upon them. The Workmen's Compensation Act concerns only employer and employee and is designed to afford a fair and equitable adjustment of their mutual rights and obligations, primarily for the benefit of the employee. A stranger to the employment is outside of theAct's contemplation, and his liabilities are not intended by theact to be disturbed. The only particular in which the act dealswith him appears in Section (38), and here there is no attempt todestroy his liability, the sole purpose of the section being tomake an alteration in the theretofore existing law in respect toparties plaintiff against him in case compensation has beenagreed upon. (Emphasis supplied)
It is charged that these words were mere dicta, unnecessary to the Court's decision, and that they are not binding upon the Superior Court, especially as the Silvia case involved a point of law entirely dissimilar from the one now before me. I agree that the factual situations are not alike and that I have a different point to determine, but I can not agree that the language of the Supreme Court is not binding upon this Court. That part of the opinion quoted above formed a very material link in the chain of reasoning of the Supreme Court. Certainly, it is not permissible for a lower Court to disregard such a definite and clear interpretation of a statute by our highest Court, made deliberately, and apparently treated by that Court as an important part of its logic. Any limitation, modification or alteration of its own language must be left to that Court. duPont v. Peyton,
The present question is purely a matter of statutory construction. "The sole purpose of the section being to make an alteration* * * in respect to parties plaintiff" against the tort-feasor "in case compensation has been agreed upon" or awarded, and the liabilities of the third party being undisturbed by the Act, it follows that the rule of the Morin case, supra, must govern *61 here, for the reasons given by Judge Swan. A contrary holding would necessitate ignoring the letter and spirit of the Supreme Court's pronouncement. Nothing in the case of O'Brien v.Wilmington Provision Company, supra, disagrees with this view. The sentence quoted above, upon which the defendant places so much reliance, must be read in conjunction with the rest of the opinion and, when so read, has no application to the present case.
It must be held that Section 38 of the Act in no way alters the liability of a third party tort-feasor, and that his only interest in the act is the right to make sure that he is being sued by the proper party plaintiff in order to avoid double liability. See Toronto Railway Co. v. Hutton, 59 Can.S.C. 413. Where the record discloses, as here, not only that no compensation has been paid, agreed upon or awarded, but also that no claim for compensation is pending and that none can now be filed (since a one-year limitation applies to such claims), a suit against him by the employee will lie.
The motion for summary judgment must be denied.