¶ 2. At all relevant times, Thomas McGoff was employed by A.R. Sandri, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation that operates gas stations and other businesses in New England and New York. McGoff was a sales manager whose territory included northern Vermont and New Hampshire. At the time of the accident that led to the instant lawsuit, Sandri had supplied McGoff with a company car, a Pymouth Caravan, which he kept at his Barre, Vermont home. The Plymouth was owned by Sandri, registered in Massachusetts, and insured by Acadia. Sandri had two fleet insurance policies with Acadia •— one for vehicles registered in Massachusetts and one for vehicles registered in other states. The Plymouth, along with 133 other vehicles, was covered by the policy issued for vehicles registered in Massachusetts. The policy listed the vehicles, including the Plymouth driven by McGoff, as being garaged in Massachusetts, apparently based on Sandri’s representation. The policy had elective UIM coverage of $20,000 per person and elective liability coverage of $1,000,000 per occurrence.
¶ 3. In June 2004, McGoff was seriously injured in a two-car automobile accident in Richmond, Vermont. McGoff made a claim against the other driver, who carried liability coverage of $100,000. In the spring of 2007, he also made the instant claim for additional UIM coverage against Acadia. Acadia denied coverage because the policy’s $20,000 UIM coverage is less than the alleged tortfeasor’s $100,000 liability coverage. See 23 V.S.A. § 941(f) (providing that motor vehicle is underinsured to extent that liability insurance limits are less than limits of insured’s UIM coverage or that liability insurance has been reduced by payments to others to amount less than limits of insured’s UIM coverage);
Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Lawton,
¶ 4. Without setting forth “[a] statement of the issues presented for review,” as required by V.R.A.P. 28(a)(1), plaintiffs generally claim that the superior court erred by granting Acadia summary judgment and then proceed, over the remainder of their brief, to assert various points of law and fact — some suggesting claims of error, some not, and some raised for the first time on appeal. Plaintiffs’ main argument, though, appears to be that the court erred in ruling that Vermont’s UIM requirements do not apply to the instant policy on grounds that the policy was not delivered or issued for delivery in Vermont. Plaintiffs appear to argue that because the Plymouth was garaged in Vermont rather than in Massachusetts, as indicated in the Acadia policy, and thus should have been registered in Vermont rather than Massachusetts, § 941’s UIM requirements should apply. This position is contrary to the plain language of § 941(a) as well as the nearly unanimous relevant case law, and therefore we decline to adopt it under the present circumstances.
¶ 5. In relevant part, § 941(a) provides that no motor vehicle policy “may be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless” UM/UIM coverage is provided for the protection of the insureds. Section 941(c) requires that UM/UIM coverage in a policy be provided in the same amount as the liability coverage “unless the policyholder otherwise directs.” As noted, the Acadia policy elected $20,000 in UIM coverage, which was permissible under Massachusetts law. Plaintiffs, however, seek to apply § 941(c) to compel UIM coverage of $1,000,000 — the amount of liability coverage in the Acadia policy. In furtherance of this argument, plaintiffs contend that, although the face of the Acadia policy indicates that Sandri elected $20,000 in UIM coverage, there remains a question as to whether Acadia notified Sandri that it had the option of electing UIM coverage up to the policy’s $1,000,000 liability limits.
¶ 6. Plaintiffs’ attempt at obtaining $1,000,000 in UIM coverage by applying the requirements of § 941 fails primarily because, on its face, § 941(a) limits application of that statute’s requirements to policies “delivered or issued for delivery in this state.” The Acadia policy in question was not delivered or issued for delivery in Vermont. Rather, it was a Massachusetts fleet policy that was written on a Massachusetts form and approved by a Massachusetts regulator. The policy was issued and delivered to Sandri, a Massachusetts company with its principal place of business
¶ 7. Plaintiffs do not benefit from the fact that the language in § 941(a) also refers to vehicles “registered or principally garaged in this state.” Even if we assume that the critical fact is where the Plymouth was actually garaged rather than where the policy indicated it was garaged, but see
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Craddock,
¶ 8. Whether the issue is framed as one of statutory construction or choice-of-law, the courts construing statutes similar to § 941(a) are nearly unanimous in concluding that insurance policies such as the instant Acadia policy are not subject to that state’s statutory UM/UIM coverage requirements unless the policy was delivered or issued for delivery in that state, even if the subject vehicle was regularly garaged in that state. See
Cherokee Ins. Co. v. Sanches,
¶ 10. The only case law that plaintiffs cite to the contrary is
Henderson v. Lincoln National Speciality Insurance Co.,
¶ 11. According to plaintiffs, the “central issue” in this case is whether the Acadia policy, which was “meant” for de
livery in Vermont, must comply with § 941(c). The premise to this argument is faulty, however. Nothing in the record suggests that the Acadia policy in question was “meant” to be delivered in Vermont. As noted, Sandri, a Massachusetts business and McGoffs employer, owned two fleet insurance policies — one covering vehicles registered in Massachusetts, including the Plymouth supplied to McGoff in Vermont, and one covering vehicles registered in other New England states and New York. Even assuming that Sandri and Acadia knew that the Plymouth would be principally garaged in Vermont, and further assuming that the vehicle should have been — and in fact had been — registered in Vermont, the Plymouth presumably would have been added to the second Acadia policy that included vehicles not registered in Massachusetts — a policy that presumably was delivered or issued for delivery in Massachusetts, where Sandri’s headquarters was located. Nothing in the record suggests otherwise. Certainly, nothing in the record suggests that the policy would have been delivered or issued for delivery in Vermont even assuming all of the principals knew where the Plymouth was actually garaged. We recognize that in determining whether material facts exist for trial, all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, see
O’Donnell v. Bank of Vt.,
¶ 12. As noted earlier, plaintiffs also contend that Acadia failed to notify Sandri that, under Massachusetts law, it could elect UIM coverage up to the level of the policy’s liability coverage. As plaintiffs acknowledge, however, Massachusetts law does not require insurance companies to advise clients of the option to purchase UIM coverage up to the amount of bodily injury liability coverage — unless special circumstances exist. Here, the Acadia policy indicates that Sandri in fact elected to undertake UIM coverage of $20,000, as opposed to none or some other amount. Further, as the trial court found, the record did not demonstrate special circumstances compelling additional notice requirements, but rather revealed an ordinary business relationship between an insurer, a commercial broker, and a client corporation operating a fleet of vehicles across several states. Therefore, even if we assume that plaintiffs have standing to bring their lack-of-notice argument, the argument would fail in this instance. And even if there was a notice requirement in these circumstances, we fail to see how the lack of notice could somehow trigger § 941(c), which would nonetheless remain inapplicable in this case for the reasons stated above.
¶ 13. Finally, we reject plaintiffs’ argument “that Vermont’s UIM law should be applied to policies that are admittedly excluded by the statutory test because it is the right thing to do to protect the public.” Our role is to interpret the law to give effect to the Legislature’s intent, not to impose our policy preferences on the public. See
In re Route 103 Quarry,
Affirmed.