Thе plaintiff McGlauflin was operating for hire an automobile, between Hudson and Marlborough, for the conveyance of passengers. The other plaintiffs boarded the automobile abоut eight o’clock in the evening, July 27, 1915, at Hudson, to be carried to Marlborough. About a mile from the starting рlace the public highway crosses the defendant’s railroad at grade. The railroad crоssing cannot be seen by a person travelling in the direction in which the plaintiffs were going until within about two hundred and fifty to three hundred feet of it. There was an electric bell at the right of the highway, designed to warn travellers on the highway of approaching trains, which was installed
The jury found that the bell was silent from the time the plaintiffs сame within hearing until the time of the collision, and that 'the train had not been on the crossing for more than five minutes before the accident occurred. St. 1906, c. 463, Part II, § 155. They found for tíre defendant against the plaintiff McGlauflin, and his case is before us on exceptions, with a stipulation that if the evidеnce of the failure to ring the bell did not show negligence of the defendant or its servants, and if the сase should not have been submitted to the jury on this issue of negligence, then judgment is to be entered fоr the defendant; they also found for the other plaintiffs, and the judge reported the cases to this court.
The only negligence relied on is the failure of the electric gpng to ring. Even if this apрliance were maintained by the-defendant because required to do so under the authority of the statute, its purpose was to protect travellers on the highway from the danger of approaching trains, and not to warn the public against cars and engines which were standing still. A plaintiff сannot recover for the violation of a statute unless there is a causal connection between his injury and the condition to which the statute applies. Berdos v. Tremont & Suffolk Mills,
The train was east bound. There was evidence that, when a train was approaching the crossing, the mechanism was so arrangеd that fifteen hundred feet west of the highway the bell would begin to ring and would continue to ring until the last car оf the train had reached a point thirty feet west of the highway. Even if the gong did not sound when the plaintiffs drеw near the crossing, and it was customary for it to ring when trains were passing, this would not be a violation оf the statute. The plaintiffs could not rely on this circumstance to establish the defendant’s negligenсe, although it might have bearing upon the question of the plaintiffs’ care.
The fact that the defendant maintained this electric appliance to warn the public against the danger of аpproaching cars and engines, and voluntarily assumed the duty without an order or request from the rаilroad commissioners, does not show that the arrangement was intended t'a protect travellers against the danger of collision with a car standing on the track, or that the mechanism was оperated for such, a purpose: A failure to use a safety appliance, adоpted as a protection against some particular danger, cannot be relied upon to prove negligence when the injury is caused by another danger which the applianсe was not designed to guard against; and the responsibility voluntarily assumed to maintain these signals impоses no higher duty upon a railroad company than the statute requires. There is nothing in Cross v. Boston & Maine Railroad,
According to the report and stipulation, as the failure of the electric bell to ring did not tend to show negligence causing the injury, judgment is to be entered for the defendant. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the exceptions in the McGlauflin case.
Judgment for the defendant in each case.
So ordered: