40 S.W. 503 | Tex. Crim. App. | 1897
Appellant was convicted of passing as true a certain forged instrument, in writing, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of five years; hence this appeal. The State's case was for passing as true an alleged forged vendor's lien note executed by one Knowles in 1893. It appears that said note was a part of a transaction involved in the sale of a tract of forty acres of land. The land was in the name of one Russell. It appears, however, that he held said tract of land in trust for appellant, McGlasson, and that the notes were made payable by Knowles to Russell, and subsequently transferred to appellant. There were three notes, each for the sum of $266.70, executed on the 17th day of November, 1893, and payable in one, two and three years thereafter. The forgery was alleged to be of the name of J.M. Knowles, the signer of said notes, and the vendee of said tract of land, and the passing was to one Roseborough. The State's evidence further tended to show that besides said genuine *623
notes, which were executed by J.M. Knowles, appellant forged and uttered other notes similar in terms to said genuine notes; the charge being for uttering one of the said last-mentioned forged notes. The evidence further showed that the genuine notes, except one, about which there was no testimony, were negotiated in 1894 to Silliman Co., at Fort Worth, and the alleged forged notes were pledged as Security to D.D. Roseborough in 1894, and the one appellant is charged to have uttered was bought by said Roseborough in 1895. The defense set up by appellant was to the effect that in executing said notes by Knowles there was a mistake, and in fact but two notes were executed, and that he subsequently called on Knowles, in 1894, and represented the mistake to him, and he agreed to, and did execute three notes in lieu of the alleged original notes; and he also stated to said Knowles at the time that said original notes were lost or mislaid, and he indemnified said Knowles against said original notes. Said original notes were shown to have been negotiated to Silliman Co., at Fort Worth, in 1894, by the defendant. Defendant, however, explains that he had no knowledge of said negotiation, and claimed not to have negotiated them. On the trial the State introduced a number of transactions similar to that involved in the prosecution in this case; that is, some of them genuine sales of land, with genuine notes, and then the forging of notes similar to said genuine notes, and the negotiation of the same. These are the notes known as the Holcomb, Stringer, and Wallace notes, negotiated to E. Rotan; and the Clark notes, also negotiated to Rotan, executed November 5, 1895, and negotiated in February, 1896; and the Curtis notes, executed on the 24th of July, 1893, and negotiated to Mrs. Sewell in 1894. The State introduced testimony showing that these notes were all based on land transactions, and that duplicates of the genuine original notes were forged, and both the originals and the forged duplicates were negotiated by the appellant, and that most of these transactions involved several notes — said notes being made payable in consecutive years. With the exception of the Curtis notes, which were executed in 1893, shortly before the execution of the notes in this case, the remainder of said notes were executed and negotiated subsequently, extending from 1894 to 1895. Appellant objected to the introduction of this testimony — that is, testimony regarding other transactions — on the ground that they were distinct offenses, not connected with the offense charged, and no part of the same, and not admissible. We have examined this question in the light of the authorities. It has been repeatedly held by this court that evidence of contemporaneous crimes was admissible when such evidence tended to establish identity in developing the res gesæ, or in making out the guilt of the accused by circumstances connected with the transaction, or to explain the intent with which the accused acted with respect to the matter charged against him. See, House v. State, 16 Tex.Crim. App., 25; Kelley v. State, 18 Tex.Crim. App., 262; Holmes v. State, 20 Tex.Crim. App., 509; Alexander v. State, 21 Tex.Crim. App., 407; Oliver v. State,
Reversed and Remanded. *627