109 Mo. 131 | Mo. | 1891
Action for libel. The petition in the cause, omitting caption, is as follows: Plaintiff alleges and states that he is a resident and citizen of the city of St. Louis, by occupation an attorney at law, and that he is also a member of the state senate of the state of Missouri, and was such member of said state senate on the twelfth and thirteenth of April, A. D. 1889; that defendant is a corporation, and is engaged in the publication, at said city of St. Louis, of the daily newspaper called The St. Lows Republic,
The defendant corporation interposed the following ■ demurrer:
“Now comes the said defendant and demurs to the amended petition of said plaintiff, and assigns, as grounds of demurrer thereto, that the alleged publication set out in said petition does not, by any reasonable intendment or construction, charge plaintiff with having been guilty of bribery, or with having offered bribes, or with having been ready to offer bribes to other members of the state senate of Missouri, to induce them to vote against the bill set out in said petition; nor does said publication, by any reasonable or fair intendment or construction, charge plaintiff with having received $50,000, or any other sum, as a bribe for his own or the votes of other members of said state senate of Missouri, in respect to said bill set out in said petition, or with being guilty of any of the other things charged in the innuendoes of said petition.
“ Second. Said alleged publication set out in said plaintiff’s petition does not state any libelous or defamatory matter or thing against said plaintiff, either personally or as a member of the state senate of Missouri.
“Third. Said petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a. cause of action against this defend•ant.-
*138 “Wherefore, the defendant prays the judgment of the court, whether or not it shall further answer said, petition.”
The trial court adjudged the petition insufficient in law, and the plaintiff declining to plead further final judgment was entered on the demurrer, and the plaintiff appeals.
Our statute defines libel to be: “A libel is the malicious defamation of a person, made public by any-printing, writing, sign, picture, representation or effigy, tending to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to-public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and social intercourse, or any malicious defamation, made public as-aforesaid, designed to blacken and vilify the memory of one who is dead, and tending to scandalize or provoke his surviving relatives and friends.” 1 R. S. 1889, sec. 3869. This section was enacted in 1879, Revised Statutes of that year, section 1590, and finds a. place under the head of “crimes and punishments,” and perhaps it would not strictly extend to civil actions,, except in so far as it might be found correct and in-conformity to definitions formulated by eminent jurists- and authors. The attempts, however, to define a libel, though practically innumerable, have never been so-comprehensive and accurate as to comprehend all cases-that may arise. Townshend’s Slander & Libel [4 Ed.] sec. 20. And such attempts in this regard in some-degree resemble similar attempted definitions of fraud.
A definition which has met with frequent approval is that given by Paksons, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Clapp, 4 Mass. 163: ‘‘A libel is a malicious publication,, expressed either in printing or writing or by signs and pictures, tending either to blacken the memory of one dead, or the reputation of one who is alive, and expose, him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.”
But it is immaterial for the purposes of this case which of the aforesaid definitions enunciated in the cases cited be adopted. Taking them to be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive for the present instance, let us apply them to the case at bar. Do the allegations of the petition in this case bring it within any of the definitions mentioned! And in this connection it. must be remembered that the demurrer confesses the-malice and falsity of the charge and also that the meaning supplied by the innuendo is the true meaning of the words charged to be libelous. Belknap v. Ball, 47 N. W. Repr 674. And the rule that in actions for libel the words must be taken mitiori sensu is now for the most part repudiated. Townshend on. Slander & Libel [4 Ed.] sec. 177, p. 216. , “The court on demurrer will see * * * if there is anything in the language-which by reasonable intendment is actionable.” Ho. Thus where the defendant wrote and published of the plaintiff, a hotel and job-coach proprietor by trade, and a Presbyterian by religion, that from mere motives of intolerance he had refused the.use of his hearse for the funeral of his deceased servant, because the body was. about to be interred in a Roman Catholic cemetery, held, overruling a demurrer to the declaration, that the court could not so clearly see that the language might not be actionable as to justify the withdrawal of the-case from a jury.” Townshend on Libel & Slander; Teacy v. McKenna, 4 Ir. R. Com. Law, 374.
In determining the force and effect of the alleged libelous words, though the meaning of the words used
“Words are now construed by courts as they always ought to have been in the plain and popular .sense in which the rest of the world naturally understand them.” Roberts v. Camden, 9 East, 93. “It is quite clear, from all the modern authorities, that the court must read these words in the sense in which ordinary persons, or in which we ourselves, out of court, reading this paragraph, would understand them.” Tenterden, C. J., in Harvey v. French, 1 Cr.
Other authorities collated by the diligence of plaintiff’s counsel abundantly support the same view; a view which is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace within its scope the head lines of the articles now in litigation. In Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 404, 405, 406, Andrews, J., said: “The charge against the plaintiff that he did a good thing in collecting soldiers’ and sailors’ claims against the government at a fearful percentage, and that the ‘ blood money ’ he got in this way was supposed to be a ‘big thing,’ in connection with the fact that he was a lawyer, may fairly be construed as imputing to him unjust, dishonest and extortionate conduct in his professional capacity, and justifies the meaning attributed to it in the complaint.
“The charge, that in his ‘sober moments’ he prosecuted his business, authorized the inference that he
“The defendants, in judgment of law, intended to charge what their language implied, and to produce the injury which was the natural and proximate result of their act. They may not, in fact, have had in mind the particular meaning charged by the plaintiff, or intended the special injury produced; but the law, for remedial purposes, adjudges that a wrong-doer intends all the natural and proximate consequences of the wrong, and administers punishment and allows compensation upon this presumption.
“It is claimed, however, that special damages could not be recovered in this case for injury sustained by the plaintiff in his professional character, for the reason that the libel does not state or imply that the plaintiff was a lawyer, and, therefore, does not relate to him in that character; and for the additional reason that no actual damages to him in his profession were proved. * * * But the publication was libelous per se, without reference to the professional character of the plaintiff; and no authority ’has been cited, or has come to our notice, holding that the plaintiff cannot, in such- a case, by extrinsic evidence connect the libelous words with his professional character, and recover the natural and proximate damages to him, in his profession, resulting therefrom.
“In an action for libel, the fact, that the words used had reference to the profession or business of the plaintiff, is not the substantive ground of the action. The actionable quality of the words used does not, in ,any case, depend upon that consideration.”
In Hart v. Wall, 2 L. R. C. P. Div., the plain
Upon a motion to set aside a nonsuit, it was held that, inasmuch as the letters were reasonably susceptible of a construction which would make them libelous, the opinion of the jury ought to have been taken upon their meaning. Lord Coleridge, C. J., said: “The question is not whether the letters are susceptible of an innocent interpretation, but whether no libelous construction can reasonably be put upon them; for, if such a construction may reasonably be given to them, it is for the jury to say whether or not that is the true interpretation of them; and that question should not have been withheld from them.”
In Odger on Libel & Slander the rule is stated to be (ch. 2, pp. 21, 22) that any written words are defamatory which impute to plaintiff that he has been guilty of any crime, fraud, dishonesty, immorality, vice or dishonorable conduct, or has been accused or suspected of any such misconduct, or which have a tendency to injure him in his office or engender an evil
The mere heading of an article may be libelous, though such article be the privileged report of legal proceedings. This was so ruled in Clement v. Lewis, 7 Moore, C. C. 200, where the heading was “Shameful Conduct of an Attorney. ”
.In Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158, Robinson, J.,. said: “This is an action of libel against the defendants, now appellants, editors and proprietors of a newspaper. Without setting out the libel at length,.it is sufficient to say, it charges the plaintiff, elected as a republican senator from Washington county, with being under the influence and control of a corrupt democratic-ring — with having participated in the republican caucus in nominating Mr. Pratt, as treasurer, and afterwards with having voted for Mr. Compton, the democratic ring candidate — with having aided the ring senators in defeating the bill for repealing the act authorizing the publication of the laws in newspapers, and by so doing-had proved false to his political obligations and a traitor to his party, and has brought dishonor upon the republicans of Washington county who had elected him to the senate. It further charges him with having a contract to furnish stone to the canal, which was given to him by its president, Mr. Gorman, the head and front of the democratic ring, because he was a senator, and ‘had a vote to give in the senate,’ and for no other reason. The article then concludes by saying, ‘The fruits of the contract to furnish stone to lengthen lochs on the canal are appearing. Look out for more.’ The-question presented by the demurrer is, whether a publication making such charges as these in regard to the-
In Belknap v. Ball, supra, the supreme court of Michigan held that to publish of a candidate for congress a false and malicious article representing him as saying: “I don’t propose to go into debate on the tariff additions on wool, quinine and all the things, because I ain’t built that way,” printing the words in a coarse and bold imitation of his handwriting, with misspelled words, and an imitation of his genuine signature at the end, was libelous and not privileged. A demurrer to the petition was sustained in the court below, but the judgment was reversed on appeal.
The court, by Grant, J., held the imputation of ignorance to a candidate for congress libelous, and-said: “ The character of the language set forth in the second count depends upon the meaning of the words, 11 ain’t built that way.’ The innuendo says that the defendant meant that plaintiff was too ignorant and imbecile to discuss the question, or to express in a decent way his intention not to discuss'it. The province of the innuendo is to explain and give meaning to ambiguous language. If extrinsic evidence is required to ascertain its meaning the jury must determine that
In Bettner v. Holt, 70 Cal. 270, Foote, C., said: “In the interpretation to be placed upon language charging the publication of a libel, a court of justice is to put such a construction upon the words which it (contains as may be derived 1 as well from the expressions used as from the whole scope and apparent object of the writer.’ Spencer v. Southwick, 10 Johns. 259; Cooper v. Greely, 1 Denio, 358. And not only is the language employed to be regarded with reference to the actual words used, but according to the sense and meaning under all the circumstances attending the publication which such' language may fairly be presumed to have conveyed to those to whom it was published. So that in such cases the language is uniformly to be regarded with what has been its effect, actual or presumed, and its sense is to be arrived at with the help ,of the cause and occasion of its publication.”
In the quite recent criminal case of State v. Armstrong, 106 Mo. 395, it was held to be a libel to send through the mail an envelope indorsed thereon in large letters, “Bad Debt Collecting Agency,” and that the intent animating the sender of the letter was quite ¡apparent. In that case G-antt, P. J., said: “This .envelope on its face was designed to attract the atten
In Twombly v. Monroe, 136 Mass. 464, an article published in a newspaper was headed “The Locust Street Brutality Explained,” and signed “ The Landlord;” stated that “the woman” came to his house on .a certain day, engaged rooms at a price named, and left at a certain time, having paid a certain sum; that about three months previously she decided not to come -down stairs at all, and was consequently a great deal of trouble; that he told her if she would leave at a time named and give him a certain sum, he would give her .a receipt in full, which she would not do; and that she kept her door locked,'and would not give any satisfaction; and concluded as follows: “ She is not a stranger -here, — she never made friends. Can find out all about her by taking a little trouble.” Held, in an action .against the tenant by the landlord for libel, that a ruling, as matter of law, that the publication was not libelous or actionable, was erroneous; and that the question should have been submitted to the jury.
In that case Field, J., said: “If the words published are fairly capable of two meanings, one harmless .and the other defamatory, it is a question for the jury in what sense readers may have understood them. * * * We are satisfied with the rule, that, at the trial of civil actions for libel, fit is only when the court can say that the publication is not reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning, and cannot reasonably be understood in any defamatory sense, that the court can
In Price v. Whitely, 50 Mo. 439, the following-language was made the basis of an action: “I found an imp of the devil, in the shape of Jim Price, sitting-upon the mayor’s seat." * * *' “And,, now, sir, that imp of the devil and cowardly snail, that shrinks-back into his shell at the sight of the slightest shadow-, had the bravery to issue an execution against me." And the language was held libelous, the definition of libel heretofore quoted from Commonwealth v. Clapp, supra, being again quoted with approval, having-already been quoted in a like manner in the earlier case-of Nelson v. Musgrave, 10 Mo. 648.
Now, what would be the impression produced upon the mind of any reader of intelligence on perusing the article in question? Would it not have a tendency, and a direct tendency, to produce a feeling of contempt, a sense of ridicule and of blameworthiness on the part of the plaintiff? Could any fairminded reader on reading the article and its suggestive headlines say such was not its effect and its intended effect? But whether this was the intended effect or not is immaterial,.
But in reading the bare words of the libel it must be remembered that they, for the purposes of the demurrer, must be read and be deemed to have been read in close connection with and as parcel of the innuendoes. Reading them in this way no possible ground can be left to doubt their libelous character. No room is left to doubt as charged in the innuendoes that it was intended by the article to convey the idea that the plaintiff was wholly unworthy of the high official position he was then filling and faithless thereto; that instead of representing his constituents he was representing the “liquor interest,” and that he was associated on terms of great familiarity, if not of criminal intimacy, with those who would not hesitate to employ a “slush fund” of $50,000, wherewith by bribery to secure a sufficient number of votes in the senate to defeat the “high-license bill.”
But it is immaterial, for the purposes of this case, absolutely to determine whether the article is libelous per se or not, because, under the authorities cited, if the language be ambiguous, the court should not take the case from the jury where one of the meanings of the article complained of is harmless and the other- defam
Whenever the libelous intent or seeming libelous intent appears though dimly and vaguely, as ‘ Through a glass darkly,” the question becomes one for the jury to say whether the meaning was harmless or defamatory. Quotations from text-writers and from adjudged cases have been largely made in this opinion, not as being absolutely necessary to a correct conclusion in this cause, but as showing in the instances cited how varied and futile have been the attempts in times past to asperse private or public character, and still escape the penalties of the law.
Of course, all of the foregoing observations, with respect to the case at bar, must be regarded as bottomed on the allegations of the petition, which the demurrer is deemed to confess to be true.