78 Pa. Super. 376 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1922
Opinion by
The plaintiff purchased a policy from the defendant ^company insuring against loss or damage by fire a lot
The defendant is a foreign company, having its general offices in the City of Edinburgh, Scotland. Its policies, duly executed, by its general manager and United States manager were delivered in blank to its local agent, who had full authority to put the same into actual operation by countersigning and delivering them to persons seeking insurance. Attached to the policy in suit and, to all others as we understand it, as it came to the local agent, was a blank form of removal to be signed by the local agent when necessity therefor should arise. It declares, as the act of the company, as follows: “Permission is hereby granted to remove the property insured by this policy to the......situate......and this policy is hereby made to cover the same property in new locality, all liability in former locality to cease from this date.” This permission, so granted by the company, was again to become effective when signed by the agent who, of course, had full authority to bind the company by attaching his signature as the evidence of his assent to the removal. It may then be fairly assumed that the company contemplated the possible or probable removal of such insured goods from one location to another and the local agent was given authority, in his discretion, to assent to such removal. The act of signing was, and was contemplated to be, the sole act of the agent. The assured could do and was expected to do nothing more than present his policy to the agent and secure his assent to the act of removal. The blank form already referred to, further indicates the local agent had power to determine whether the hazard would be increased or lessened by the removal to the new locality and to fix the rate of the increase or decrease in the rate as circumstances might warrant.
Now the jury would be entirely warranted, under the evidence and the charge of the court, in finding that the plaintiff took his policy to the local agent and sought his
It being thus reasonably clear that the agent was acting, at least, within the apparent scope of his authority, it follows the situation is precisely the same as if the transaction had occurred between the plaintiff and the president of the company at its home office. “The liability of the principal is coextensive with the agent’s ostensible authority: Farmers’ Mutual Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 73 Pa. 342; Hoge v. Ins. Co., 138 Pa. 66; Enamel Co. v. Fire Ins. Co., 45 Pa. Superior Ct. 550.” Had this transaction actually taken place between the plaintiff and the president of the company and had that officer indicated his assent to the removal and taken the policy for the purpose of attaching his signature to the formal consent attached to the policy, would the company thereafter be estopped to deny its liability because its president had failed to attach his signature in writing after having assented to the removal and promised to do whatever was necessary to make it effective? It seems to us that to hold otherwise, would be a violation of the clear spirit of the doctrine thus declared by Mr. Justice Sharswood in Mentz v. Lancaster Fire Ins. Co., 79 Pa. 475: “The evidence offered and rejected was that the agent had told the assured that the proper endorsement
■.The case at bar is readily distinguishable from our own case of Devaney v. Northwestern National Ins. Co., 64 Pa. Superior Ct. 510, and Waynesboro Ins. Co. v. Conover, 98 Pa. 384, and the intervening line of cases following the latter.They held that it was no part of the duty nor was it within the power of a local agent to interpret and declare the legal meaning of a written clause in the policy. That being true, his declaration that the policy did not mean what it said, and the folly of the plaintiff in accepting his interpretation of the meaning of the language of the contract, could not have the effect of denying to the company the right to defend on a plain breach of the covenant of the policy. We are not here dealing with a case where a plaintiff must rely on his ability to expunge from the written contract a material covenant thereof on the ground that the company had waived its right so to do. The removal of the personal property insured in
As already stated, the disposition of this question practically determines the case. We are aware there have been presented a number of assignments of error for our consideration and it has been given to each and every one of them, but, we can perceive no advantage to be derived from a detailed consideration of them one by one. They are all overruled.
Judgment affirmed.