249 Mo. 266 | Mo. | 1913
Suit in equity, brought in the circuit court of Kansas City, by James W. McGhee and eighty-two others, similarly situated and affected, as plaintiffs, against Michael Walsh and the Commerce
Plaintiffs are the owners of certain parcels and lots of real estate, situate in said Kansas City in Oliver Park Addition, Niagara Place and Warder’s Addition thereto, and lying within the sewer district aforesaid.
The tax bills in question amount, in the aggregate, to $7313.04, out of the total of $59',910.37, issued for the whole work as done when the action was begun. Defendant Walsh obtained the tax bills for, doing the work of constructing the sewers; the manner in which defendant Commerce Trust Company got them, or part of them, is not disclosed, nor is it pertinent.
The further facts, history, chronology and the bone of contention, are these:
On May 7, 1909, Kansas City, acting under authority of section 7, article 8, of the charter, established Sewer District No. 305. By Ordinance No. 3524, approved December 10, 1909, the construction of the sewer in question was authorized; The resolution of the Board of Public Works providing for the construction of the sewer in question was adopted May 25,1909. June 11,1909, was fixed as the date of hearing concerning the proposed improvements,. when any and all property-owners interested in such improvements might, by written petition or otherwise, present their views regarding the improvement. The resolution and the notice of the date of hearing were duly published in the paper doing the city printing from May 30 to June 10, inclusive, 1909. After the hearing the board determined that said improvements should be made, and the contract was awarded to Michael Walsh, one of the respondents. There seems to be no claim that
“That all said lots or parcels of land owned by plaintiff lie below the bottom of the sewers constructed by defendant "Walsh under said ordinance 3542 and cannot be drained into said sewers, and all of said sewers are of no benefit whatever to the lots or parcels of land owned by the plaintiffs.”
Defendants contended in the court below, and contend here, that the petition answers itself when it alleges that the sewer district was created by city ordinance and that proceedings in accordance with the charter were taken to construct the district sewer, yet in addition to those facts, the record discloses alleged engineering reasons why it was not only proper, but the only reasonable thing to do, to construct sewers at the time this work was done only in the west part of the district, and to leave the property upon the streets where plaintiff’s lots are located to be taken care of by subsequent sewers.
' Appellants offered in evidence an ordinance describing a former sewer district, No. 252; the ordinance establishing the district was excluded by the court, but, appellants make no special complaint of this action. It appears that the most easterly line of Sewer District 252 coincided with the easterly city limits as existing prior to the extension in 1909. Sewer District .305, as created, lies on the west side of the slope of a water-shed, the drainage line of which runs practically north and south. Prior to the extension of the city limits, which occurred April 6, 1909, and the case involving the authority for which is reported in State' ex inf. v. Kansas City, 233 Mo. 162, there was only a narrow strip between the eastern line of a little stream running through this low ground and the eastern city
The record also shows that the rock encountered in the construction of sewers in the eastern part of this sewer district was especially hard to excavate. It shows the. judgment of an engineer of the city engineering department, of eleven years service, that the method taken of including the whole territory in Sewer District No. 305, and in building part of the sewers at that time and leaving the remainder to he taken care of as needed, was cheaper for the property-owner than to have made two districts out of the present territory of district 305. It was in evidence by defendant that proper engineering would require that the discharge of the sewers from the part of the district not sewered at that time was properly into the new joint-district sewer which was not then constructed, and that if an attempt were made to discharge into the creek, instead of the new joint-district sewer, the outfall would he carried across private property. There was evidence tending to show that the sewers which were constructed took care of part of the surface water that formerly came down on to the property at the bottom of the ravine. While this fact was disputed by the witnesses, yet the testimony of the engineers, and the laws of gravity, the lay of the land regarded, make it probable that this was a fact. This testimony was introduced to explain the engineering reasons why the plan was worked out in the present way, instead of some other way to suit the theory of plaintiffs.
The case was tried in the lower court on July 1, 1911, and the court found for the defendants and entered judgment accordingly. From this judgment plaintiffs have appealed, alleging both in the petition and the motion for a new trial, that the special tax-bills were issued in violation of section 30, article 2, of
I. It is contended by appellant “that all of the lots or parcels of land owned by plaintiffs lie below the bottom of the sewers constructed by defendant Walsh under said ordinance 3542, and cannot be drained into said sewers, and all of said sewers are of no benefit whatever to the lots or parcels of land owned by plaintiffs.” Defendants, by answer, frankly admit the truth of all this, except matters of benefits, which they say accrue indirectly, and generously add the further admission that no sewers can be constructed which will afford to plaintiffs drainage facilities, without prohibitive and unreasonable Cost, until a joint sewer is built.
So much being admitted, plaintiffs say that to enforce against them the taxbills in question would be to violate section 30, article 2 of the Constitution of Missouri of 1875, and section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Defendants urge that such result is a legal non sequitur, for the reasons (1) arising upon the facts; that (a) the sewer districts are by the charter of Kansas City fixed and unchangeable, like the laws of the Medes and Persians; that (b) a similar sanitary and storm sewer system as now enjoyed by the west part of District 305, will be, when and as soon as feasible, provided for the east part of the district where plaintiff’s property lies; that (c) a joint sewer will be necessary and is in actual contemplation, and the same will be paid for by the whole of District 305 and the adjoining benefited district; that (d) such sewers will be provided for plaintiffs when this can be done without unreasonable and prohibitive cost, which sewers, though solely for the use and benefit of plaintiffs, ivill be paid for by the whole of District 305, and that under this state of
The provisions of the charter of Kansas City, which furnish the authority under which said city acted in establishing Sewer District 305, and which provides the scheme and method of assessing and apportioning the costs of the construction of sewers therein, are found in section 7, article 8, which is as follows:
“Sec. 7. District sewers shall be constructed or reconstructed within the limits of the district heretofore or hereafter established by ordinance, as the case may be. Any sewer district heretofore or hereafter established may be subdivided, enlarged or changed by •ordinance at any time previous to the construction of any district sewer therein. But no such district shall be subdivided, enlarged or changed after a district sewer shall have been constructed therein. The city may, with the approval of the Board of Public Works, from time to time, cause a district server or sewers to be constructed or reconstructed in any sewer district heretofore or hereafter established, and such sewer or sewers shall be as shall be prescribed by the Board of Public Works and confirmed as herein required by ordinance. Any district sewer heretofore or hereafter constructed, may be changed, diminished, enlarged or extended, and shall have such laterals, inlets and other appurtenances as may be prescribed by the Board of Public Works and confirmed by ordinance. As soon as the work of constructing, changing, diminishing, enlarging, or extending any district sewer shall have been completed under a contract let for the purpose, the Board of Public Works shall compute the whole cost thereof, and- apportion and charge the same as a spe■cial tax against the lots of land in the district, exclu*279 sive of the improvements, and in the proportion that their respective areas bear to the area of .the whole district, exclusive of streets, avenues, alleys and public highways, and shall, except as in this article provided, make out and certify in favor of the contractor or contractors to be paid, special taxbills for the amount of the special tax against each lot or parcel of land in the district. The city shall in no event, nor in any manner whatever, be liable for or on account of the cost of work done in constructing, changing, diminishing, enlarging or extending any district sewer, except as in this article provided.”
That such is tbe legal effect of tbe adoption of such a charter, aside from tbe statute (which is lucid and clear), has been judicially determined by tbis court in several cases which came before us. [Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. l. c. 471; St. Louis v. DeLassus, 205 Mo. l. c. 585; St. Louis v. Liessing, 190 Mo. l. c. 480.] In the case of Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., supra, it was said by tbe court:
“A charter is tbe organic law of a city in this State, whether it emanate from tbe G-eneral Assembly, or is framed and adopted by tbe people of tbe munici*281 pality by authority of the Constitution. Being a law for the government of the municipality, it is binding upon all courts, and it violates no principle of our government to say that the courts, when called upon, must enforce these municipal laws unless they conflict with the Constitution, and are not in harmony with the Constitution and laws.”
The further objection inevitably arising, that such a power conferred upon the people of a city may be in violation of the rule or maxim that legislative power is not delegable, has been ansAvered in the negative by this court, in so many cases that in this State the question may be regarded as settled. [Metcalf v. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 102; State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529; State ex rel. v. Francis, 95 Mo. l. c. 49; Morrow v. Kansas City, 186 Mo. l. c. 683; Sluder v. Transit Co., 189 Mo. l. c. 128.]
This court, in the case of Morrow v. Kansas City, supra, said:
“The poAver to grant these municipal charters was nowhere expressly granted in either the Constitutions of 1820 or 1865, but was upheld on the ground that it fell, within the general grant of the legislative power, which was plenary, save where restricted by some constitutional prohibition, and as there were no such inhibitions, it was construed to be an unquestioned and continuing power.
“The powers of legislation conferred upon these municipal corporations to regulate and manage their local municipal affairs in conformity to ordinances adopted by themselves, Avere held no infringement upon the maxim that legislative power could not be delegated.”
These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the provisions of section 7 of article 8 of the charter of Kansas City of 1908, are to be regarded as having the same force as if they had been enacted into a statute by the General Assembly of the State. As a statute passed by the General Assembly.may be un
“The general sewer system of the city shall be divided into four classes, to-wit: Public, district, joint district and private sewers. The city may, by ordinance, find and determine the class to which any sewer belongs, and the finding and determination of the city in that respect shall be final-and conclusive.”
In the instant case the ordinance passed by the city designated the sewers about which this case revolves, as “district sewers.”
Analyzing section 7 of the charter, we see that the right is conferred upon the city acting through its legislative branch, to subdivide, enlarge or change by ordinance, any sewer district heretofore or hereafter established, up to and until a district sewer shall have been constructed in such district. Immediately upon the construction of any district sewers in such district, and automatically thereupon by the terms of this section, the right to enlarge, change or subdivide a sewer district ceases. For, continuing, this section says: “But no such district shall be subdivided, enlarged or changed after a district sewer shall have been constructed therein.”
By the further provisions of section 7 of the charter, the city (by ordinance) with the approval of the Board of Public Works, may cause all necessary sewer or sewers to be constructed in a sewer district, and any
It is well-settled in this State that the matter of establishing sewer districts in a city is intrusted by the Legislature to the common council thereof, and that the action of such common council is conclusive in a collateral attack. [Johnson v. Duer, 115 Mo. l. c. 376; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. l. c. 417; Meier v. St. Louis, 180 Mo. l. c. 409; Prior v. Construction Co., 170 Mo. l. c. 448.]
In the case of Prior v. Construction Co., supra, Marshall, J., speaking for this court, In Banc, and in an opinion' in which all concurred, said: . “ The constitutionality of charter provisions providing for the construction of streets, alleys, or sewers, and charging the cost of such construction proportionately upon all property abutting the improvement or within the established benefit district, either according to the front-foot rule or according to the area rule, is no longer open to debate. All such questions have been settled by the decisions of this court and those of the Supreme' Court of the United States. [St. Louis v. Oeters, 36 Mo. 456; Kansas City v. Ridenour, 84 Mo. 253; St. Joseph v. Owen, 110 Mo. 445;
And in the case of Meier v. St. Louis, snpra, likewise an opinion In Banc in which all concurred, Gantt, J., said: “It is now the settled law in this court that special assessments for local improvements are referable to the taxing power. [Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534; Barber Asphalt Co. v. French, 158 Mo. 534; Ibid. v. Ibid., 181 U. S. 324.] It is within the power of the Legislature to create special taxing districts, and to charge the cost of a local improvement, in whole or in part, upon the property in said districts, either according to valuation or superficial area or frontage. [Webster v. Fargo, 181 U. S. 394; Prior v. Construction Co., 170 Mo. 439; Asphalt Co. v. French, 158 Mo. 534; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495.]”
The Common Council of Kansas City in the exercise of a right, which, in the case at bar, was intrusted solely to such council, has seen fit to establish Sewer District 305 and to include the property of plaintiffs therein. The whole case of plaintiffs, in the last analysis, is referable to the correctness of this action. The illogical results of an interference in a proper case will be seen, when we regard the
No hardships upon plaintiffs in the ultimate working out of the scheme of building sewers in District 305, as established by the council, can occur. The council by ordinance, with the approval of the Board of Public Works, may build new district sewers and enlarge and extend those already built. When such sewers which are now constructed are extended, and when new sewers for the use, and it may be for the sole benefit of plaintiffs, are constructed, the cost thereof will be borne by the entire property in the district, according to the “area rule;” in other words, all of the seioers constructed in the district will, and must he paid for hy assessment against all of the property in the district. In the last analysis, no other rule is feasible or sensible. If we concede that as a matter of law each property-owner must be specifically benefited by each sewer, then the power to extend a sewer is futile. The moment a sewer is extended the benefits to property in the district already sewered would cease and no legal right to extend would exist. The city would, in effect, be compelled to build and complete every part of a finished and complete and final sewerage system at the identical instant of time — a thing not possible in practice.
If we presume, as we must, that the Common Council of Kansas City and the Board of Public Works thereof will perform the duties enjoined upon them when those duties shall, by public necessity, become incumbent, we must conclude that at the proper time sewers will be constructed for plaintiffs’ sole be-
As was said touching a similar case, that of St. Joseph to use v. Owen, 110 Mo. l. c. 454: “Circumstances will readily suggest themselves where an ordinance for the construction of a sewer would justly be regarded as most unreasonable, which should require a sewer to be constructed throughout the entire district, regardless of the needs of the district, or whether portions of the same were inhabited, or indeed uninhabitable. We see nothing in the charter requiring us to give it such an extreme construction. The burdens of the taxpayers are not one whit increased by the construction of the character here suggested; he simply pays, as does his neighbor, by the front-foot or ‘area rule,’ authorized by the charter, a rule quite recently approved in the case of St. Joseph v. Farrell, 106 Mo. 437.”
cannot in this manner and at this stage assail this action. [Johnson v. Duer, supra; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. l. c. 417.] If a timely question had been raised as to the alleged unreasonableness and oppressiveness of the action of the council in erecting and establishing the sewer district, so as to include plaintiffs’ lots, by some appropriate proceeding, a different question might be before us. Touching this, however, we. are not called on to pass.
II. Under the law and the facts here, are plaintiffs being assessed without accruing benefits in such wise as to violate section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?
Setting aside then as not raised, and as not capable of arising, on the facts, the matter of notice and of opportunity afforded for a hearing, was the inhibition of section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution violated in that, by the assessment made, plaintiffs are deprived of their property without “due process of law?”
In the case of French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324, which was an action to enforce a tax bill for paving, the assessment for the cost of which, it was contended, was void as violating the section of the 14th Amendment under discussion, in that the assessment was based on the front-foot rule without regard to benefits accruing, the Supreme Court of the United States said: “It was also said that the class of lands to be assessed for the purpose may be either determined by the Legislature itself, by defining
It was also said in the French v. Asphalt Co. case, supra:
“In Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, was involved the validity of the Irrigation Act enacted by the Legislature of the State of California. One of the objections urged against the act was that it permitted the whole cost to be levied by a board of directors of the district upon all of the real estate of the district according to value, with no reference to the degree of benefit conferred. As to this it was said by this court, through Mr. Justice Peckham:
“ ‘Assuming for the purpose of this objection that the owner of these lands had by the provisions of the act, and before the lands were finally included in the district, an opportunity to be .heard before a proper tribunal upon the question of benefits, we are of opinion that the decisions of such a tribunal, in the absence of actual fraud and bad faith, would be, so far as this court is concerned, conclusive upon that question. It cannot be that upon a question of fact of such a nature this court has the power to review the decision of the State tribunal which has been pronounced under a statute providing for a hearing upon notice. The erroneous decision of such a question of fact violates no constitutional provision.”
Clearly the case of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, cited by learned counsel for plaintiffs, is not upon
Bearing in mind the status and effect of the charter of Kansas City, it would seem that the principles enunciated in the case of Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, indicate clearly the position of necessity taben by the Supreme Court of the United States upon questions of local assessments for improvements. In this case the court said:
“ ‘The Act of 1881 determines absolutely and conclusively the amount of the tax to be raised, and the*293 property to be assessed and upon which it is to be apportioned. Each of these things was within the power of the Legislature, whose action cannot be reviewed in the courts upon the ground that it acted unjustly or without appropriate and adequate reason. . . . The Legislature may commit the ascertainment of the sum to be raised and of the benefited district, to commissioners, but it is not bound to do so, and may settle both questions for itself; and when it does so, its action is necessarily conclusive and beyond review. Here an improvement has been ordered and made, the expense of which might justly have been imposed upon adjacent property benefited by the change. By the Act of 1881, the Legislature imposes the unpaid portion of the cost and expense, with the interest thereon, upon that portion of the property benefited which has thus far borne none of the burden. In so doing, it necessarily determines two things, viz., the amount to be realized, and the property specially benefited by the- expenditure of that amount. The lands might have been benefited by the improvement, and so the legislative determination that they were, and to what amount or proportion of the cost, even if it may have been mistakingly unjust, is not open to our review. The question of special benefit and the property to which it extends is of necessity a question of fact, and when the Legislature determines it in a case within its general power, its decision must of course be final.’ ”
If it be insisted (as we do not think it can be successfully done under the charter provision and the facts here), that' a benefit direct and presently in existence must always be shown to accrue, we hold that such benefit was in existence in the instant case. That it was not unreasonable and oppressive for the city through its Common Council, after giving (before the right to alter the district was foreclosed) due notice of a hearing to plaintiffs, and all others interested, to assess against the lands of plaintiffs a part of the cost
Cases cited from other jurisdictions by learned counsel do not seem to have had under consideration the feature of immutability of area and boundary of the sewer district arising here. Be that as it may, to hold the tax bills in question invalid, under the fact's here and upon the attack here, would be but to hinder
We rule the last point and the whole case against appellants, and hold that affirmance should be ordered, which is done accordingly.