[¶ 1] Dеlia McGhee appealed from a judgment denying her request for a court order declaring that she holds a life estate interest in a Traill County farmstead. McGhee also appealed from an order denying her post-judgment motion fоr a new trial or, alternatively, for amendment of the findings and judgment. We affirm the judgment and the court’s order denying McGhee’s post-judgment motion.
I
[¶ 2] In 1972, McGhee’s parents deeded the family farm in Traill County to McGhee’s brother, Willard Jennings Mer-genthal (“Jennings”). As consideration for the deed, Jennings paid cash, assumed some of the parents’ debt obligations, and orally promised that he would maintain the property, pay the property taxes, and allow the parents and McGhee to live on the farmstead for as long as they lived. Jennings received a warranty deed, but it did not reserve a life estate or other interest to the parents or grant any interest to McGhee.
[¶ 3] Both parents died in the 1980s, but McGhee continuously lived on the farm until 1997 when flood damage necessitated that she move until repairs could be made to the home. McGhee applied to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) for funds to defray the costs of repairing the damage. That agency required verification of McGhee’s status on the farmstead before issuing funds to her. To help McGhee meet that requirement, Jennings signed a notarized letter stating that McGhee “could live [on the farmstead] as long as [she] lived.” Funds were obtained, the prоperty was repaired, and McGhee resumed living on the farmstead until November 2001, when she moved to an apartment, because the farmstead home became uninhabitable due to mold, bat infestation, and additional flood damage.
[¶ 4] In 2004, Jеnnings and his wife, Mary Mergenthal, deeded the property to their daughter, Rebekah Mergenthal. They issued to her a quitclaim deed, which specifically reserved a life estate for Jennings but did not mention any right by McGhee to reside on the propеrty. Jennings died in October 2004. Rebekah Mergenthal’s attorney then sent notice to interested parties, including McGhee, to remove their personal property on the farmstead because the buildings were going to be demolished.
[¶ 5] After receiving notice, McGhee filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that she has a life estate in the farmstead. After a bench trial, the court concluded McGhee did not have a life estate in the property. The court also сoncluded Jennings’ promise to allow McGhee to live on the farmstead was not a covenant running with the land which would obligate Rebekah Mergenthal to honor the promise. The court held that the 2004 deed conveyed to Rebekah Mergеnthal a fee simple title, and judgment was entered *870 denying McGhee’s request for declaratory relief.
[¶ 6] McGhee filed a post-judgment motion seeking a new trial or, alternatively, amendment of the findings and judgment to state that she has a lifetime right to reside on the farmstead. In support of the motion, McGhee argued she was entitled to equitable relief under theories of implied trust and unjust enrichment. McGhee had not raised these arguments during the trial, but in deciding the post-judgment motion the court discussed the merits of McGhee’s equitable claims and issued аn order denying McGhee’s motion.
II
[¶ 7] On appeal, McGhee raises the following single issue:
Whether the trial court erred because [McGhee] was the beneficiary of an implied trust allowing her to live on and enjoy the farmstead for as long as she lived?
[¶ 8] McGhee raised the theory of implied trust for thе first time in her motion for a new trial under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b) or, alternatively, to amend the findings and judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(b).
[¶ 9] The trial court’s decision on a motion to alter or amend a judgment rests in its sound judgment and will not be reversed on appeal unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion.
Woodworth v. Chillemi,
Ill
[¶ 10] An implied trust is one that is created by operation of law. N.D.C.C. § 59-01-05. There are two types of implied trusts: resulting trusts and constructive trusts.
Spagnolia v. Monasky,
A
[¶ 11] In her brief supporting the post-judgment motion, McGhee argued the trial court should impose a resulting trust against Rebekah Mergenthal:
[T]he evidence would clearly indicate a resulting trust under the law. The acts and expressions of the parties have continually indicated an intent that such a relationship existed. Jennings Mergen-thal held title to the land but allowed his sister to remain there. The land bene-fitted from her improvements and her attention. At no time did Jennings Mer-gеnthal attempt to remove his sister from the property. Rebekah Mergen-thal voluntarily assumed the relation of personal confidence with Delia McGhee when she accepted delivery of the deed.
In denying the motion, the trial court reasoned:
[McGhee] makes several new arguments in support of [her] post-trial mo *871 tion. [McGhee] argues that Delia is a third party beneficiary of Jennings Mer-genthal’s promise to [Willard] and Lillian Mergenthal that Delia could live on the farmstead for the rest of her life. The Court agrеes. However, this was Jennings Mergenthal’s promise, not Rebekah Mergenthal’s promise. Jennings Mergenthal’s promise did not run with the land, and therefore, Rebekah Mergenthal cannot be held responsible for any promise that Jennings Mergen-thal made.
[¶ 12] Whether or not a resulting trust has been created is primarily a question of intention.
Zundel v. Zundel,
[¶ 13] McGhee did not try this case on a theory of implied trust and did not present argument at trial that Willard and Lillian Mergenthal’s intentions were to create a trust relationship between Jennings and McGhee when they deeded the property to Jennings in 1972. The trial court found that although Jennings had made a personal promise tо allow McGhee to reside on the farmstead, his promise was not a covenant running with the land and did not create a trust relationship. In a case like this, an implied trust would contradict the record title to the property, and the evidence to create an implied trust must be clear and convincing.
Durward v. Nelson,
B
[¶ 14] In support of her motion, McGhee also argued the trial court should impose a constructive trust:
Furthermore, the facts clearly support a finding of a constructive trust. The confidential relationship is clearly established. Even prior to the deeding of the land to Jennings Mergenthal, he was greatly involved with his рarents and his sister in maintaining and farming the land. After he received the deed from the land he continued to ensure and protect his sister’s right to live on and use the property. Rebekah Mer-genthal would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Deliа McGhee if she were allowed to remove Delia from the property after Delia’s contributions, maintenance, and improvements of the property. Delia would be impoverished, losing the valuable right to the use of the property in which she made great investments, financially, physically, and emotionally. And there is no justification for the enrichment or the impoverishment.
[¶ 15] In denying McGhee’s motion, the court reasoned in its memorandum opinion:
[McGhee] cites N.D.C.C. § 59-01-06(2), arguing that one who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, or the violation of a trust or other wrongful act is an implied trustee of the *872 thing gained for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it. Here, however, Rebekah was not a рarty to any promises that Jennings made.... If some provision should have been made to allow Delia McGhee to continue to reside on the property after Jennings!’] death, this was Jennings’ responsibility. This responsibility cannot be passed on to Rebekah Mergenthal.
Finally, [McGhee] argues unjust enrichment. This also was a new theory presented in the post-trial motion.
In any event, at the trial of this case there was no evidence presented on what the value of the house and buildings were at the time of trial, compared to what the value of the house and buildings were at the time Delia began living on the property after her parents passed away. The testimony at trial was that Rebekah planned on destroying the hоuse and the outbuildings. The Court concludes that [McGhee] has not proved that Rebekah Mergenthal was unjustly enriched.
[¶ 16] A constructive trust has two essential elements: an unjust enrichment and a confidential relationship.
Spagnolia v. Monasky,
[¶ 17] We agree with the trial court that McGhee failed to present clear and convincing evidence of a constructive trust. The evidence does not demonstrate an unjustified enrichment to Rebekah Mergenthal or an impoverishment to McGhee within a confidential relationship between the two. Having reviewed the record evidence submitted at the trial by McGhee, we conclude the trial сourt did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial or amended findings on a theory of constructive trust.
C
[¶ 18] McGhee also asserts an implied trust should be imposed against the property held by Rebekah Mergenthal under N.D.C.C. § 59-01-06(3), which provides:
An implied trust arises in the following cases:
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3. Each оne to whom property is transferred in violation of a trust holds the same as an implied trustee under such trust, unless the person purchased it in good faith and for a valuable consideration.
McGhee argues Jennings held the farmstead in trust for McGheе to live there for her lifetime and Jennings’ transfer of the property to Mergenthal violated that trust. She asserts Mergenthal received the property as a gift knowing it was encumbered and is not a person who purchased the propеrty “in good faith and for a valuable consideration.” McGhee asserts Mergen-thal is, therefore, obligated under N.D.C.C. § 59-01-06(3) to allow McGhee to continue residing on the property.
[¶ 19] We have concluded the trial court did not err in deciding Jennings did not hоld the property with an implied trust *873 to allow McGhee to reside on the farmstead. Consequently, Jennings’ transfer of the property to Rebekah Mergenthal was not in violation of a trust, resulting in any obligation upon her under N.D.C.C. § 59-01-06(3).
IV
[¶ 20] We conclude the trial court did not err in deciding- McGhee failed to meet her heavy burden in this case of proving by clear and convincing evidence the existence of an implied trust. We, therefore, conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McGhee’s post-judgment motion for amended findings or, alternatively, a new trial, and we affirm the judgment and the order denying the post-judgment motion.