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McGeechan v. Sherwood
760 A.2d 1068
Me.
2000
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*1 1068 issue self-defense. He is: entry contends findings of fact made after re- Judgment affirmed. satisfy mand are insufficient to M.R.Crim. 23(c).4

P. Whether findings factual issued

prior to remand are void as to issues out- scope

side the of the remand order is a

question of law we de review novo. State O’Connor, 475,

v. 476 A.2d contention, support [¶7] To his Ricky 2000 ME 188 Michaud, 251, relies on v. State 1998 ME Raymond et al. McGEECHAN A.2d which the trial court issued fact. findings detailed The hold- Michaud, ing however, support does not Mary H. et al. SHERWOOD

Ricky’s argument. We stated Michaud that: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 23(c) requires Rule a trial court to make Argued 2000. Jan.

specific findings upon of fact request. 23(c) However, Decided Oct. 2000. Rule not require does specify court to all the it evidence relied

on in making findings its of ultimate

fact. the contrary, To a court need only

find as fact each of the elements of the

offense, satisfy in order to require- 23(c).

ments of Rule

Michaud, 251, 22, 1998 ME (citations omitted). findings

[¶ 8] The fact the first

judgment the District Court issued in

Ricky’s clearly case set forth court’s

finding of each element of manslaughter. findings later made the court after

remand were directed at the issue of self-

defense, left all undisturbed other fac-

tual findings previously issued. Accord-

ingly, the court did not err failing to

provide findings additional fact and con-

clusions of law. findings previ- The factual

ously provide issued the court a suffi-

ciently detailed recitation the facts on

which all the court relied to find the ele- crime, and, coupled

ments of the with the remand,

findings satisfy made after 23(c).

requirements of P. M.R.Crim. 23(c) opinion M.R.Crim. P. "In a or states: case tried memorandum of decision is jury Court filed, without the Court findings be it will sufficient if the of fact general finding shall make and shall in appear therein.” request addition specially. find the facts If *3 Carolyn McGeechan. Sher-

mond and im- trial court contends wood for decided properly judgment quiet declaratory (1) failing properly apply claims the lo- rules construction standard lines, in- cation correctly concluding that the McGeechans the Pa- the area of land known as contends per Mill Road. Sherwood also finding the court erred in *4 an parcel by benefitted McGeechans’ is In a property. over Sherwood’s easement cross-appeal, the contend McGeechans J.) (Marden, in that the trial court erred summary in favor of granting judgment a Bangor and Real Sherwood co-defendant claim inter- Estate on their of intentional relationship an ference with economic part arising purchase out of Sherwood’s of family. her land from Ellis of agree with the McGeechans We [¶2] and properly that the trial court identified the east-west declared which be- boundary properties between the two affirm location of gins, and we the court’s boundary line that runs from the east-west Baber, “point beginning” to the northern Brett D. Esq., (orally), Baber & the two Weeks, P.A., boundary terminus of the between Bangor, plaintiffs. trial We affirm the properties. also Cuddy, (orally), Kevin M. Esq., Pamela court’s conclusion that McGeechans’ Chute, Cuddy Lanahm, Esq., Bangor, D. & by across land is benefitted an easement for defendants. as Mill is identified the Old Grist what Paper agree We Road and the Road.1 WATHEN, C.J., Panel: and Sherwood, however, court that with CLIFFORD, DANA, SAUFLEY, (1) Paper erroneously concluded ALEXANDER, CALKINS, JJ. Road, along parties’ which lies CLIFFORD, J. boundary, north-south shared title,2 chain of McGeechans’ Mary H. a appeals Pa- title does include the Sherwood’s entered in judgment Court Mill Road. per J.) (Penobscot Mead, County, that de- cross-appeal, boundary proper- two On the McGeechans’ clares the between parcel judgment in entered Hampden, summary located one we vacate the ties Sherwood, claim of Ray- their by by against the other the McGeechans on owned only that survey prepared Paper Mill Road. We affirm concluded a entire 1. The court Avery, professional recognizing a sur- Michael licensed court’s determination part of the depicted boundary veyor, lines by prescription to McGeechans' title properties. that encom- section of driveway. passes their 2. The trial court also concluded prescriptive were owners of the Finally, although parties agree intentional interference with economic relationship title to genuine because there exist that Sherwood retains known Grist Mill issues of material fact that must be re- the road Old along which runs shared solved a factfinder. east- boundary, west the McGeeehans claim also the benefit of an easement in that road. I. BACKGROUND assert, alternatively McGeeehans 1800s, road formed the they the event are not determined to be boundary entire southern western the owners of the parcel, what is now the Sherwood located property their benefits from deed ease- north and east of ment in the Mill Road. With this McGeeehans.3 The road single mind, general background we now turn continuous, but was identified different ap- to this gave events which rise names, commonly most the Old Grist Mill peal. Road and the Mill Road.4 purchased McGeeehans [¶ 5] The have established the Hamp- twenty-five-acre land location segment of the road as it July den 1981. In learned runs west the southern *5 adjacent parcel that an four acre was be- parcel, the Sherwood forming parties’ ing family and that Ellis David sold shared boundary, frequently north-south Bangor Caliendo of Real Estate was the to in litigation referred this as the listing agent. They contacted Caliendo disagreement, Mill Road. There is howev- and informed him of their interest in the er, as to segment who owns that of the old property. parties roadway, claiming both Paper Mill Road is in their chain of title.5 Raymond [¶ 9] McGeechan obtained parties agree property also on the seller’s disclosure for the Ellis Sherwood, northern They terminus of the road. dis- a real estate broker with however, Estate, agree, as to where that Bangor road Real and Sherwood listed turns from the boundary prospect southern of the McGeechan on the sheet for the north, parcel and property,6 Sherwood heads Sherwood did not inform she, too, being disputed “point begin- McGeechan was interested ning” located trial They property. court. also the informed Sherwood Calien- road, disagree precise path property do of her interest in the and generally Mill arranged property referred to the Old Grist to view the at the same northerly travels as it runs from the time as the McGeeehans. Neither Calien- point of beginning agreed to reach the do nor Sherwood disclosed to the McGee- upon repre- potential pur- northern terminus. That line ehans that Sherwood was a sents their shared east-west chaser. purchasing parcel, they

3. Prior to the Ellis Sher- 5. The McGeeehans also claim that have parcels wood had obtained two south of and acquired by ad- title to the adjacent one parcels to the Ellis Those three possession. verse property abut the McGeeehans’ comprise what we refer to as "the Sherwood purchase 6. The issue of whether Sherwood's parcel.” parcel gives rise to a action cause of against was decided the McGeeehans on a 4. There some name of confusion as to the summary judgment. Accordingly, motion for the road. both and the Because although disputes many Sherwood of these so, generally trial court have done we refer to facts, purchase the facts are set out in a part parties’ of the road that forms the light See most favorable to McGeeehans. boundary as the shared north-south Althenn, Estate Althenn v. part and that of the road that boundary forms the shared east-west as the Old Grist Mill Road. Avery conclud- property. survey their to allege that Sher- The McGeechans their hearing distance ed that remained within wood also pole. After He property. utility driveway viewed while McGee- inaccu- property, Raymond survey had touring Day’s concluded any were if there boundary chan asked Caliendo the western rately located offers on the Caliendo other ignored and had the Sherwood negative. in the McGeechan responded of the road to that fact that title the terms with openly discussed Caliendo Mill Road was as the identified $30,000, and proposed offer of of their by the McGeechans.8 held thought that he the offer stated Caliendo complaint filed The McGeechans acceptable to the seller. McGee- would be declaratory for a Court that the offer chan also informed Caliendo between judgment to define dialogue negoti- was intended to start complaint includ- properties. the two family regarding the Ellis ate with trespass9 quiet and to a claim for ed purchase. The McGeechans terms of the also The McGeechans property. signed submitted a offer that Sherwood and co-defendant alleged that Sherwood signed as a witness.7 also inter- intentionally Bangor Real Estate day One after ad- economic fered with the McGeechans’ offer, prepared her signed their Sherwood relationship with the Ellis vantage $35,000. did own offer of Caliendo attempt purchase family in their of- inform the McGeechans of Sherwood’s property. Ellis fer, inform Mr. Ellis that nor did Caliendo discovery, Following pay prepared the McGeechans were summary judgment, partial moved for a $30,000 property. more than for the Cal- *6 could not the McGeechans arguing $30,000 iendo submitted the McGeechan with an intentional interference establish $35,000 to offer and the Sherwood offer evi- relationship absent some an economic Ellis, accepted offer. and Ellis Sherwood’s fraud, was no fraud. and there dence of Subsequent pur- to 12] Sherwood’s [¶ J.) (Marden, conclud- Superior The Court property, survey of the chase of the Ellis had failed to ed that the McGeechans property conducted for Sherwood Rich- inter- evidence to show present sufficient Day, professional a licensed land sur- ard relationship be- an economic ference with veyor, concluded that McGeechans’ law, cause, alleged as a matter of driveway utility pole and encroached on did not of Sherwood and Caliendo Conduct sent a parcel. the Sherwood Sherwood concealment” to the level of “active rise informing them letter to the McGeechans prove fraud. Accord- required that is to per- giving of the encroachments and them summary judg- entered a ingly, the court property mission to continue to use claim, on that ment in favor of Sherwood only. purposes those subject of the McGeechans’ is the which Believing driveway that the [¶ cross-appeal. property, on their own utility pole were in Decem- A trial was held bench Avery, hired Michael boundary to resolve surveyor, ber of 1998 professional land also a licensed making an offer that he was told Mr. Caliendo claim that Sher- McGeechans do not 7.The $30,000 property.” for the Ellis of the amount of their offer wood learned of Rather, they reading the offer sheet. it from part the McGee- utility pole and of remained within 8. The that Sherwood contend driveway Paper Mill located on the chans' are were hearing distance while the McGeechans Road. including when the property, on the Ellis offer, “[i]t and that McGeechans made their appear have trespass Sher- claim does reasonably inferred that Mrs. 9. The may be pursued. when he been Mr. McGeechan wood overheard surveyors title claims. In the The and their have February J.) (Mead, on agreed Court concluded that the location of historic D, Avery Survey, “Plaintiffs’ Exhibit between Lot 24 have boundary and 25 and appropriately boundary, the location road along more establishes located the now incorporat- common known as the Road. boundary,” generally however, survey judgment. They agree, ed into its The have been unable to Avery survey point identifies the entire bound- on the location of the at which the (now between ary parcels generally and shows the road known as Old Road) boundary McGeechans as the owners Grist Mill leaves the which runs the southern Lots 24 25 and turns to the north along boundary parcel. Lot dividing point of the Sherwood 25. This has been re- in agreed Avery litigation court also with ferred as “the property beginning” McGeechan benefits and is essential to the location along easement the Old shared east-west boundary which runs the western history Also of the title is the parcel. appealed the Sherwood fact that the eastern 25 was of Lot judgment. subdivided, later smaller creating several parcels. parcels, including Those most re- II. THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE parcel, the Ellis reunited cently were later THE A. SHARED EAST-WEST comprise and now the Sherwood

BOUNDARY parties rely two deeds 17] The [¶ issue this case chain of title to Sherwood’s establish lots, originally part designated two proper- boundary east-west between their early 1800s as Lots 24 and 25. Both parties agree ties. The deed an 1822 rectangu- Lot and Lot 25 were roughly Gray Crosby Benjamin from William in shape lar and the between their shared bound- describes east-west straight them ran-east-west line. Lot reads, ary.10 part: That deed 24 is now owned and is Beginning at the north east corner directly located to the south of Lot 25. Crosby Brick store owned John 1800s, Jr. on side of the road early Crosby 18]. John *7 Mill, 1820, to the leading owned all of Old Grist thence Sr. Lot 25. he southerly the side of said till it divided a road to mark road using strikes said Grist Mill Pond. boundary properties. the between the two That road is same the road the are leading The “road to the [¶ 22] Old seeking dispute. to locate in this The road same at the begins Mill” is the road begins southeasterly the corner of Lot northeasterly corner of Lot 24 and the westerly along boundary 25 and runs the 25, southeasterly corner of runs Lot Lots 24 and 25. At the point of some road of boundary north-south those shared that boundary northerly, leaves and runs north, lots, ultimately and turns to the dividing Lot 25 and west- into eastern Lot 25 into an eastern and a dividing parcel. property ern The Sherwood lies part.11 western Because the McGeechans 25, Lot portion within the eastern of part Lot 24 and the of now own western the western own much of 25, eastern Lot and Sherwood owns the 25, 24. portion of Lot as well as Lot 25, of the part “southerly of Lot side” leading to Mill” as physical 19] Most of the characteris- “road the Old Grist disappeared. of in the 1822 deed tics the road have since described is a monument conveyance, appears Gray William 11. At time of the it 10. obtained title yet of the known as that no road Crosby from John Sr. Paper Mill Road.

1075 they “are not the extent that at least to the north-south only defines with the inconsistent parties’ properties manifestly or boundary between the absurd boundary. from the face apparent common east-west but also their intentions parties’ ” Haagen, v. 679 Snyder the deed.... of not locate the The court could [¶ 23] (Me.1996). 510, The rules of A.2d deed, in the 1822 monument described to establish require a court construction leading to the “southerly of the road side descending order of control “in boundaries Mill,” however, relied on the Old Grist monuments, courses, distances locate later 1875 deed to description Id. quantity.” parties’ road that forms the of the obtaining After east-west The location of monuments 1822, 25 in part of Lot to the eastern fact, the earth is an issue of on the face of convey- Benjamin Crosby made several to such findings and “the trial court’s ances, part two of are now which appeal disturbed on will not be locations death, parcel. After his Sherwood Har clearly erroneous.” they are unless conveyed Benjamin’s will trustees under Pinard, Ass’n borview Condo. of the east- Emery Barker what remained 872, physical disap “The part of Lot which later became ern does not end its of a monument pearance parcel, and is now the western most Ellis if former its defining use the entire parcels comprising of the three Theriault v. location can be ascertained.” That de- 1875 deed (Me.1991) The A.2d Murray, 588 boundary by the east-west refer- scribes determine, if duty to trial court “has a as the 1822 ence to the same road ...” possible, original location[ ] and the court determined the location of Id. monument. parties’ boundary by locating east-west point beginning described The initial call point by connecting 1875 deed and that can refers to several monuments deed sweeping agreed means of arc to beginning. point locate the be used to northern terminus of the bound- of “the refers to the intersection The deed ary.12 Paper Mill road” and southerly side of the “[determination Major Crosby.” heirs of “the land of the from a property boundaries as ascertained begin locates the The deed also law.” question Baptist deed is Youth side ning along Robinson, 175, 7, 714 Camp v. 1998 ME west of the General Mill Road 1074 feet ^io “If language Crosby old store. brick ambiguous, and the intention of the deed is trial court found doubt, may the court then parties is the road had characteristics of physical may resort to rules of construction *8 was insuffi- disappeared, and the evidence light deed in of extrinsic cir examine the the road intersect- cient to indicate where surrounding its execution.” cumstances Major heirs of “land of the ed with the Corp. First v. Kennebec Water Hartford (Me.1985). that monu- Dist., Crosby,” and concluded here, could not be located. applied ment rules of construction must be reads, the old Grist Mill road part: line of deed 12. The 1875 Grist Mill Thence across said Mill road. beginning southerly parcel on the side One and land line thereof road to westerly feet of the Mill road 7io westerly by Thence [Lot 24]. of J.R. Holt Crosby store at the the Geni. old brick from begun at. point Holt land to Major Crosby .... said [de- of land of the heirs boundary.] scription of the northern Crosby” Major heirs of The “land of the Hodg- southerly by ... the heirs of [TJhence portion of Lot now the western refers to Hodgman corner and the southwest man to by the McGeechans. Thence the north old Grist Mill road. found where Sher- for the wheel tracks The MeGeechans introduced ex- evidence, including physical deeds evidence of tensive several wood claims there was Moreover, photographs, and historical to establish surveyor, their a road bed. testified, store, leading of the old location brick Avery, that he could find Michael proven its court to find that had of the road. physical no evidence Such precision.” location “with some We find loca- evidence casts doubt on Sherwood’s finding. no clear error in that factual See road, part of the and the trial tion of that Emerson, Harmon compelled accept court was not Sher- point beginning wood’s of location. locating after the brick 29] Even [¶ Because the trial court’s determi- store, however, the court was unable point beginning reflects a nation of the of point using monu beginning locate of proper application of the rules of construc- Accordingly, ments alone. the court tion, giving descending effect order adopted Avery survey conclusion that call, monuments, the and located distance call gave effect to the distance and course call, finally the course we affirm that de- westerly feet of “1074 the Geni. 6/io connecting line termination as well as the Crosby point to locate the old brick store” northern terminus of agreed it to the of referred to in the 1875 deed. beginning properties between the two point along That is located the historic to establish the east-west boundary line of Lot 24 and Lot 25. Us ing point beginning, this the court also THE PAPER B. OWNERSHIP OF adopted approach Avery taken in the MILL ROAD survey and established the western bound the road is the 1822 ary parcel by connecting of the Sherwood only as “the road to the Old described point beginning agreed upon and the time, Grist Mill.” It is clear that at using sweeping arc. northern terminus fully within Lot 25. road was contained contends that the court [¶ 30] Sherwood The eastern of Lot 25 was subse- point begin- erred in location of the its quently subdivided. ning. She contends that the intersection “southerly side of the parcels Three created Major Road” and “the land of the heirs of division, parcel, including the Ellis Crosby” beginning, is the true and comprise parcel now the Sherwood is a monument she has located property. The border the MeGeechans’ through surveyor. Her con- her evidence parcels lying to the east of the Ellis two prior surveys properties of her sists Benjamin conveyed by Crosby were abutting parcels, maps as well as historical lifetime, conveyances during his and those evidence, physical such as wheel ownership part of did not include area. claims tracks Sherwood also along Mill Road that runs their indicating evidence to have found other his respective southern boundaries. Until presence roadway, including a stone death, Benjamin Crosby remained wall, fencing.14 wire barbed (1) of Lot 25 that was owner of Ellis, MeGeechans, however, Grist Mill later owned Old of- that runs the western border Raymond Road fered evidence that McGeechan *9 parcel to where the road responsible in the area and was of the Ellis cut trees finding erred in that argues point begin contends that the court 14. Sherwood that the of ning by point. call "1074 described the distance the same We are both calls describe 5/io contentions, westerly Crosby brick feet from the Geni. old unpersuaded by and con her point with the of store” is not coincident court did not err in deter clude that the trial beginning by described the intersection of the single mining only point a there was Paper "southerly side of the Mill road” and beginning the 1875 deed. described in Major Crosby.” She the "land of the heirs of

1077 ” Pierre, at 1370 513 A.2d Road, grantee.’ St. Paper Mill identified as the now Co., Power Kinney runs v. Central Me. Paper (quoting Mill Road that all of the 350). 24 north-south border of Lots along the 403 A.2d deed, By the 1875 the Estate and 25. Further, reviewing

Benjamin Crosby conveyed par- the Ellis the deed, placed only court rebanee is Emery. cel to Barker The trial deed, “the but also on conveyance language found that the did not include may properly be drawn Paper to the Mill Road. The court inferences which title ” undisputed the McGeechans own facts.... stipulated further found or Paper Mill Road. A.2d at 350. Our review Kinney, 403 the record leads us to conclude parties both claim title to [¶ 35] Because in the deed conveyance described 1875 Road, Paper bear the each in title includes predecessor Sherwood’s establishing burden of title to the Paper Mill Road. Hills, 215, 217 662 A.2d See McGrath (Me.1995). boundary description [¶38] disputed point of begins deed with the 1. SHERWOOD’S CLAIM OF OWN- side of the beginning “southerly on the BY DEED ERSHIP Mill road” 1074 feet from the Paper % claim of [¶ 36] Sherwood’s store, point Crosby old brick a General Paper Mill Road is based on the properly trial court located. conveyance of what became the north, point, boundary From that runs Ellis, Sherwood, bought from Ellis east, then and then: described in the 1875 deed from the Estate Hodgman ... the heirs of southerly Benjamin Crosby Emery. to Barker south-west corner and the Hodgman We review for clear error the court’s de Mill road. Thence old Grist that the termination boundaries described old Mill road to north line of the Paper the 1875 deed do not include the Mill road. Thence across said Paper Grindle, Mill Road. See Coombs v. 1998 southerly line Grist Mill road to the 230, 7, 1107, ME In 718 A.2d thereof and land of J.R. Holt. Thence give a construing we seek to effect point westerly by said Holt land to the intent of the to the deed. St. begun at.15 Grondin, Pierre v. 1370 (Me.1986). intention, “To ascertain that correctly trial court deter- [¶ 39] The whole, take the instrument we as the location of mined from the 1875 deed positive rules apply the of deed construc beginning, but whether Co., Kinney Me. tion.” v. Cent. Power in that deed includes the description The rules of analysis. Mill Road involves different require “every construction call that the 1875 con- concluding [¶40] description premises in the deed answered,” include the veyance did not Hopkins, Herrick v. must be final (1843), disregarded the the trial court Me. unless absurd re deed that describes Kinney, 403 call the 1875 thereby. sults are achieved run- boundary southerly contains com A.2d at 350. When deed land to the calls, “westerly by said Holt ning are resolved peting ambiguities all “ at.”16 point begun grantor and in ‘against favor of part of the give title to at least 24 now owned 15. Holt was the owner of Lot the McGeechans. it establishes because (now by the northerly Lot 24 line of runs 16. Because the McGeechans) line of of Lots the entire north-south conveyed. boundary of the land as the road 25, giving call would effect to the final *10 final call in meaning to the Avery gives and that adopted The trial court the [¶ reading the takes into account plan depicts the deed. That the referred to conveyance crossing roadways as what is in the years that over the the northerly the Mill Road from its by as Grist known a number of area have been point of southerly directly to the to its side different names. conveyance, the excluding from beginning, roadway continuous single, [¶46] ownership, the and thus from Sherwood’s are now the Sherwood that divides what Paper Mill portion of the Road entire properties originally and McGeechan survey depicts lying east Avery the the Mill Road. Over known as Old Grist beginning. the time, road were referred to portions the the deed reading Such a construes by and records different names: deeds deed’s against grantee, disregards the Road, Road, Paper Mill Mill call, with what the final and is inconsistent There is another road the Town Road. apparent other evidence shows to be similar name that borders the Sher- with a grantor. intent with the road parcel and intersects wood only nothing there 43] Not is differing names. That other with the grantor to indicate that the would record road, “a new to in an 1834 deed as referred intended the final call the 1875 have road,” as the Little had become known strong meaning, to have no there are deed depicted Paper Mill Road and is it have been the indications would Paper Little Avery survey as “The Benjamin Crosby’s estate to con- intent Paper Mill Road.” The Little Paper Mill Road in that

vey title to the south, runs north and and intersects with deed. Paper Mill now referred to as the what is parcel conveyed by the 1875 Road, at the corner of the Sher- southeast without access deed would be landlocked wood road, yet the deed makes no refer- natural in Recognizing that any easement across the reserving ence to convey would be to grantor tent of road, leading to an inference that strip along of road that ran what entire convey the road grantor intended to shared bound has now become parcel. That conclusion finds fur-

with the plausible reading of the last ary, the most Benjamin support in the fact that ther Mill in the deed to the reference parcel until his Crosby, who owned the north where the line runs death, adjacent par- conveyed had the two and crosses line of the Old Grist Mill Road explicitly and had excluded the road cels the north to the south side of Old conveyances. At the time of from those the reference was Mill is that death, Crosby’s the land con- Benjamin Little intended to be to the only par- by the 1875 deed was the veyed Piere, at 1370. In Road. See St. he along the entire road that still cel words, grantor the true intent of the other It would make little sense for his owned. being deed read as reflected convey parcel without also estate to follows: to, or at least an easement conveying use, Accordingly, Road. southerly beginning on the One grantor of the 1875 likely intent of feet Paper Mill Road 1074 side of the 6/io would be to include deed Crosby old westerly from the Geni. conveyance. Road the land of the heirs of store at brick [Description of the Major Crosby .... to the deed given The construction boundary], [T]hence northern likely ignores court intent by the trial Hodg- is, Hodgman ... the heirs of final There disregards the call. and the old Grist man southwest corner however, the de- plausible reading line of intent, Thence the north Mill road. that is consistent with that scription *11 Mill Road Paper in title established road to the [Little] the old Grist Mill establish In order to possession. said adverse Thence across Paper Mill road. the McGee- possession, line title adverse Mill road to the they that evidence present Holt. Thence had to and land of J.R. chans thereof twenty year peri- for a land to the the land westerly by possessed said Holt “actual, od, possession that begun at. notorious, hostile, a visible, under open, the deed re- reading a [¶48] Such continuous, exclusive.” right, claim of in in the deed favor ambiguity solves the 137, 19, ME Morency, 1999 Dowley v. prede- in grantee, this case Sherwood’s omitted). (footnote 1061, 1068 title, to each call in gives in effect cessor “acts of domin- the McGeechans’ Whether what the evi- and effectuates by ad- to create title were sufficient ion” to be the intent of strongly suggests dence of law. See question is a possession verse grantor. reading gives That id. Road, strip Paper title north- road that runs support their claim for adverse To south Paper Mill possession of the (1) they that offered evidence McGeechans that Although we realize no con- driveway, which runs across their used fully this deed resolves all struction of to the McGee- part of comports result with the ambiguities, this (2) they plowed grad- property; chans’ ambiguities at law that be requirements (3) area; driveway they in installed in of the and best ed grantee construed favor culvert; predecessor in title their reflects what the evidence indicates to be Company granted Bangor Hydroelectric grantor the intent of the and harmonizes pole. place utility an easement all the calls the deed. had suf- that the McGeechans court found 2. THE MCGEECHAN CLAIM OF pos- ficiently title adverse established BY DEED OWNERSHIP Paper Mill Road. to the entire session that The McGeechans contend evi Although the direct 53] [¶ Road derives their title to the went presented by the McGeechans dence from a deed or deeds in their chain of title. area since the driveway use of the to their Although the deeds the McGeechans’ the land in they purchased time language chain of title contain could infer that the drive properly could court ownership conveying be read as when the way was existence they point to no deed Chiaparas family, by the was owned expressly conveys into their chain of for a purchased, whom the McGeechans ownership any part requi to reach the period of time sufficient evidence, Lacking such Mill Road. v. Blackmer period. time See site rely cannot on “extrinsic sur- (Me.1981). Williams, A.2d prove ... con- rounding circumstances trial court’s we affirm the Accordingly, expressly includ- veyance something have ac conclusion State, Cushing [a] ed deed.” possession to by adverse quired title 486, 497 The McGeechans Road, i.e. the Paper Mill ownership proving in their burden of failed the evidence most of driveway, to which of the road. by deed to was directed. CLAIM OF 3. THE MCGEECHANS’ however, is driveway, TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSES- Paper Mill Road. part of the only a small SION Ban pole placed by Except utility Electric, scant evidence there is Hydro gor also The McGeechans Paper Mill Road the entire of the use of contend, agreed, and the court *12 (Me.1979). 984, by anyone the McGeechans or else. The types 987 There are two trial finding implied court’s that the McGeechans may easements. “An easement proven have by possession title adverse to impliedly pre- also be created without a Mill Paper the entire support existing Road lacks when use access to the Dowley, 988, evidence. See 1999 ME conveyed requires trespass.” Id. at n. 137, 20, 737 at (allowing implied A.2d 1068 title 3. An may easement also arise by possession when, adverse to limited area of at conveyance, the time of “existing driveway and parking area used without is portion use made of the servient to area). granting title to entire Accordingly, benefit the portion....” dominant Id. Such judgment court’s must be amended to use is termed a quasi-easement. Where a exists, reflect acquired quasi-easement have an easement over by possession only adverse when, the area implied servient estate will be at Paper of the Mill Road over which the time the dominant por- and servient have a driveway. severed, maintained tions of the property are “it is reasonable to infer that Accordingly, we por- vacate that conveyance had regarded the continuation tion of the judgment that declares owner- of the use as go so obvious that it would ship Paper entire Mill Road Andrews, without saying.” Bowers v. McGeechans. We remand to the 606, (Me.1989); LeMay, 397 A.2d Court for a declaration that the area on at 987. Relevant to inquiry this is the Avery survey referred to as the nature of the the quasi-easement use of Town by Road is owned a/k/a prior to severance from the dominant es- Sherwood, except portion tate and whether the continued use of the area, Mill Road in driveway which quasi-easement “important is for en- portion, by possession, reason of adverse is Bowers, joyment” of the retained by owned the McGeechans. 557 A.2d at (quoting 3 Powell on Real ¶ 411(2) (1985 PropeRty Supp.1988)); & THE III. DISPUTED EASEMENTS LeMay, 397 A.2d at 988. trial [¶ 56] The court found that 1800s, In early John McGeechan property is by benefitted an 1820, Crosby owned all of Lot 25. he easement over the Old Grist Mill Road and parcel, divided that retaining the western Mill Road. Deeds in the McGee- portion trial, At Michael himself. chans’ chain of title refer to an easement Avery testified that parcel the western running across the Mill Road as Lot 25 only by could be accessed the Pa well as the Old Road. The ab- per Mill and Old Grist Roads and the any sence of deed in granting the record trial court parcel found that the western express McGeechans an easement to such, Lot 25 was landlocked without access. prevent use either road not finding does Because the use of the road to access that an easement was by created either western apparent of Lot 25 was implication estoppel. or Frederick See v. open conveyances, the time of Inc., Servs., Consol. Waste 573 A.2d parcel because that was carved out of the (Me.1990). The McGeechans have of- larger parcel containing all of Lot fered estop- no evidence of an easement by trial finding parcel court’s that the western pel, but the trial court found an easement supports of Lot 25 was landlocked de its by implication benefitting the McGeechans. parcel termination that the benefitted “An easement by implication. over con an easement reserved veyed easement, property, although expressly not re That although expressly served, may impliedly ap nevertheless be cre contained in original has grantor peared ated favor of the subsequent conveying servient all deeds Anderson, LeMay estate.” parcel v. 397 A.2d the western Lot Sher- Gamester, duty Fitzgerald no evidence indicate disclose.” wood has offered 1065, 1069 been the easement has terminated. “ the court’s conclusion that the Accordingly, concealment ‘Active 25, currently Lot western a defendant steps taken truth’ connotes McGeechans, is benefitted affairs to hide the true state of easement over the Old Grist Road Assocs., plaintiff.” Kezer v. Mark Stimson *13 appear Road as those roads 898, ¶ 24, 184, 742 A.2d 905 ME 1999 adopted by trial Avery survey on 1069). Fitzgerald, A.2d at In (quoting 658 clearly court is not erroneous. to Fitzgerald, plaintiff sought recover claim that the seller for fraud based on the plain induced the property of certain had IV. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE concealing buy property by tiff to AN ECONOMIC WITH had property fact that a well on the been RELATIONSHIP Fitzgerald, contaminated and was unsafe. The McGeechans’ cross- Upholding judg A.2d at 658 1068. appeal summary judgment from a entered plaintiffs, in favor we conclud ment to allow against their claim for ed there was evidence a them on tortious sufficient Id. at finding of active concealment. 1069. relationship. an economic interference with “(1) Those factual included: [a elements summary judgment, a When we review we (2) disclose; the material fact to] failure light “view favor the evidence most due that the well had been abandoned to able to party against judg whom the (3) contamination; knowledge with ment granted, has been review the (4) non-disclosure; purpose for [and] trial for error court’s decision of law.” purchase inducing plaintiff] to [the of Althenn, Estate 609 A.2d at 714. If the Ultimately, farm.” Id. we also concluded nonmoving favoring party evidence “ finding a supported that the evidence colorable, ‘merely significantly or is not ” plaintiff justifiably relied on the had probative, summary judgment’ may be disclose, damage failure to and suffered as appropriate. v. Am. Bouchard Orthodon consequence. a Id. tics, 1143, (Me.1995) (quot 661 A.2d 1145 Inc., ing Liberty Lobby, 477 alleged Anderson facts in a Taking 249-50, McGeechans, 2505, U.S. 91 most to the light S.Ct. favorable (1986)). property present Sherwood was as the was L.Ed.2d 202 She al being shown to the McGeechans. In order to demonstrate herself be identified to the lowed to tortious interference with an economic re broker, rather McGeechans as another lationship, the claimant must show either potential purchaser, and than as a she Petit, or fraud.17 intimidation 688 A.2d signatures on witnessed McGeechans’ fraud, If the claim is based on present within their offer. McGeechan, claimant that the hearing must also show claimant of Mr. distance shortly a offer for came justifiably upon representa relied false her position was in to overhear the after she a tion. Id. genuine is a offer. There is McGeechan here, plaintiff, a as 61] When [¶ present fact as she was sue of to whether “alleges rising a failure to disclose potential a identify and failed to herself as misrepresentation, plaintiff level of a in order buyer to induce (1) prove must active concealment of verbally either would discuss the offer truth, specific relationship addition, or a the McGeechans have make. to whether generated an a factual issue as the defendant affirmative imposing on Key Bank Petit v. 17. To for tortious interference with anee evidence. recover Me., (Me.1996). The relationship, plaintiff es- must economic by a make no claim of intimidation. preponder- McGeechans tablish fraud or intimidation ALEXANDER, J., poten- Sherwood knew that her concurring status as a buyer might tial materially have affected dissenting. the decision of the McGeechans to discuss I concur in all of the Court’s care- place their offer where she could fully opinion except considered Finally, may overhear it. it reasonably be which reverses the trial court’s determina- inferred that Caliendo failed to disclose the tion that the Sherwood deed and title his- true presence reason Sherwood’s tory does not include the Mill Road. attempt order to aid purchase her From opinion, of the Court’s I

property, and that the justifi- respectfully dissent. ably representation relied on Caliendo’s Hills, Citing McGrath v. present merely them that Sherwood was (Me.1995), recognizes the Court discuss, openly broker to to their title, detriment, party claiming their with that the offer Caliendo in the this issue *14 presence Sherwood, of Sherwood. bears the burden of establish- ¶ ing Determining proper title. Estate, Bangor 64] Both Real the sell- owner of the Mill Road is a mixed broker, Sherwood, er’s employee as an question of law and construing the Estate, of Bangor subject Real were ato fact— law, a question of then locating statutory duty to treat land described the Court’s construction honestly. Although the duty of a seller’s earth, on the face of the a question of fact. seller, agent real estate generally is to the Wells, Eaton v. Town 13273(1) See 2000 ME (1999), § 32 M.R.S.A. the seller’s ¶ 19, particular- 760 A.2d 232. In this case agent also has a duty prospec- to “treat all buyers ly, tive ... deed construction honestly knowing- is effected how ly give buyer],” conflicting false information 32 one resolves [to views about the 13273(2)(A) (1999). § M.R.S.A. From the regarding facts the shared east-west McGeechans, presented by evidence genuine there is a issue of fact as to [¶ 67] While the Court’s statement of the whether the defendants have breached this questions issues makes the for decision statutory duty. Accordingly, the court clear, relatively presented seem case in granting summary judgment erred on the trial court was but anything clear. the McGeechans’ claim for tortious inter- given great court was volume of ference, and we part vacate that confusing and conflicting evidence. From

judgment. record, developed this the Court a general entry is: result, ly reasonable its including finding That part judgment involving that Sherwood had failed to establish title Counts I and III declaring the common Mill Road. The trial court properties east-west between the Sherwood, having against found who had defendant, plaintiffs and that proof, only can burden of the result be plaintiffs’ property benefitted compels reversed if the record the conclu easement over Old Grist Mill Road and Hughes sion that Sherwood has title. See ap- as those roads Bros., Contractors, Inc. ME v. A & M pear on survey adopted by the land 175, 2, 997. This confused court, plaintiffs, by and that virtue of ad- compel and conflicted record does not such possession, verse own that of the Pa- I Accordingly, a conclusion. would not per driveway the area of their the trial disturb court’s determination is affirmed. I Judgment on Counts point. this III is respects. vacated all other Sum- mary judgment as to Count IV is vacated. fur-

Remanded Court for proceedings opin-

ther consistent with this

ion.

Case Details

Case Name: McGeechan v. Sherwood
Court Name: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Date Published: Oct 30, 2000
Citation: 760 A.2d 1068
Court Abbreviation: Me.
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