(after stating the facts as above). In passing, we note a question as to the sufficiency of the indictment. The statute is unfortunately ambiguous in its use of the alternative. The оffense is defined with reference to “any alien not duly admitted by an immigrant inspectоr or not lawfully entitled to enter or to reside within the United States under the terms of this act.” Is it necessary, in making out the offense, that the alien should have both attributes, viz. should neither have been admitted hor be entitled to enter; or is it sufficient if the alien has eithеr disqualification, viz. either has never been admitted or is not entitled to enter? Either construction falls back upon a doubtful intent; but we think the question not now necessarily to be decided, because, with either meaning, there is an insuperable difficulty in aрplying section 8 to the facts of this situation.
What John McFarland did was to aid and prоmote another’s attempt unlawfully to pass the inspection line. Is this “to bring into or land in the United States”? From its context this language seems to refer to persons who аre like the master of a vessel, although by the words “or otherwise” it reaches tо other conveyances. The verbs in question are appropriate to a relatively active conduct which affects a relatively passive immigrаnt. They are appropriate to one who transports, and are distinctly inаppropriate, although not necessarily inapplicable, to one who persuades or aids the immigrant to take himself by public conveyance up to the inspection line for examination, whether or not he gets through. Their unsuitability is emphasized by the complete association — to “bring into the United States” any alien not duly admitted by an immigrant inspector. Only by great stretch will this reach one who only helps, or, in a sense, “brings,” an alien up to the inspector for admission.
An alien may gеt into the United States in either of two ways: He may come up to the established рoint of inspection and submit himself for examination, and for admission or rejection, or he may endeavor to- avoid this examination and come into or land in thе United States surreptitiously. The statute has its full normal field of application, if it is restricted to entry at other than the inspection points, to that “landing” or “bringing” which escapes inspection. One who merely crosses the international line on a boat, and then crosses the dock to the immigration office for examination, hаs not come into the United States. He has neither been landed in, nor been brought in, undеr any accuracy of definition. He is subject to exclusion, not deportatiоn. Even if he is then passed and walks in, so that he has fully entered, he has not been brought in. He is the actor, not the object of another’s action.
Upon the whole, and considering also the general rule that presumptions are against the creation by ambiguous language of a new crime, we conclude that John McFarland did not “bring into” or “land in” the United States his alien son, within the meaning of this section 8. It is true that, since this section penalizes an attempt as well as an accomplishment оf the act, and since there may be therefore a conviction of an attempt under an indictment charging only the act (U. S. Code, tit. 18, § 565; U. S. Comp. St. § 1701), we should not overlook the somewhat closer question which might arise upon a new trial, whether the furnishing of the aid to enable Matthew to get past the inspector was an attemрt to bring him in. If the act, completed as intended, would not have been the act forbidden by the statute,.and we'think it would not, the unsuccessful effort cannot be the statutory аttempt. Due application of the rule of strict construction of penаl statutes, and the fact that certain acts of this class, aiding the intent to decеive the inspector, have been selected and specifically pеnalized *807 (section 16 [Comp. St. § 4289*4i] — perjury), convince us that the facts of the casе do not show any attempt to violate section 8.
The judgment must he reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.