A jury found appellant guilty of assault with bodily injury. Tex.Pen.Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1) (Supp.1987). The trial court assessed punishment at incarceration for one year and a $750 fine, but suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on probation. In a single point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss the information for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. Tex.Code Cr.P.Ann. art. 32A.02, § 1(2) (Supp.1987).
The assault for which appellant was convicted occurred on March 9, 1985. On
On June 12, appellant failed to appear for trial. On June 14, an information was filed in the county court at law charging appellant with the offense for which he was ultimately convicted, and the original complaint was dismissed. On June 18, a warrant for appellant’s arrest was issued, but this warrant was never executed. On July 2, 1985, appellant was arrested after he voluntarily turned himself in to the police.
At the hearing below, the assistant county attorney testified that the State had been ready for trial on June 14, 1985, the day the information was filed. Appellant countered by arguing, as he does now in this Court, that this claim of readiness was rebutted by the fact that the State did not use due diligence to secure appellant’s presence for trial after the information was filed. Appellant points out that his address was known and that he made no effort to avoid arrest. Nevertheless, appellant was not arrested for over two weeks following the filing of the information, and then only after he voluntarily presented himself to the police on July 2. Appellant relies on Lyles v. State,
With certain exceptions not relevant to this cause, a criminal action commences for the purpose of the Speedy Trial Act
when an indictment, information, or complaint against the defendant is filed in court, unless prior to the filing the defendant is either detained in custody or released on bail or personal bond to answer for the same offense or any other offense arising out of the same transaction, in which event the criminal action commences when he is arrested.
Tex.Code Cr.P.Ann. art. 32A.02, § 2(a) (Supp.1987). The phrase “when an indictment, information, or complaint ... is filed in court” refers to a charging instrument upon which the accused may be tried in the court in which it is filed. Rios v. State,
A felony criminal action does not commence within the meaning of § 2(a) with the filing of a complaint in justice court; such an action commences when an indictment is filed in district court or when the defendant is arrested. Rios v. State, supra; Davis v. State, supra. A valid information is a prerequisite to a misdemeanor prosecution originating in a county court. Tex.Const.Ann. art. V, § 17 (Supp. 1987); Mayberry v. State,
It appears from the record before this Court that, prior to July 2,1985, appellant was not detained in custody or released on bail or personal bond to answer for any offense arising out of the assaultive transaction of March 9, 1985. The filing of the municipal court complaint on March 18, 1985, commenced the class C misdemeanor action for assault by physical contact over which the municipal court had original jurisdiction. The State timely announced ready for trial of this action on April 29, 1985.
The trial court did not err in overruling the motion to dismiss. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Notes
. A defendant may in most cases waive his right to indictment. Tex.Code Cr.P.Ann. art. 1.141 (1977). To that limited extent, "information" may also refer to felony prosecutions.
. Had the State failed to establish its timely readiness in this action, and had appellant successfully moved to dismiss the complaint as a result, appellant’s prosecution in the county court at law would also have been barred. Tex. Code Cr.P.Ann. art. 28.061 (Supp.1987); Kalish v. State, 662 S.W.2d 595 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).