119 Iowa 321 | Iowa | 1903
The allegations of the petition are substantially as follows: That prior to July 15,1899, a public alley within the limits of the defendant town had been allowed to become obstructed and grown up with weeds and grass; that cn said day the defendant employed one Foster to mow and cut down such weeds and grass, and that said Foster, pursuant to his employment, and under the direction of defendant as to the means and manner of said employment, proceeded with the work for which- he was employed, using therefor a mower drawn by a'team of
Conceding, for the purposes of this opinion, that the petition states a cause of action as against Foster, we proceed to the inquiry whether a case of actionable negligence is stated as against the defendant town. It does not appear by whom — that is, by what official board or officer of the town— Foster was employed. Nor is it stated what were the terms of his employment, save that it is said he was under the direction of the defendant as to the means and manner of his
. It is well settled that where an act done by an officer or employe of a municipal corporation is essentially in the line of the performance of an official duty, public in character, the municipality cannot be made liable for a tort committed or wrong done by such officer or employe while engaged as such in the performance of the duty in question. That acts done in the execution of police powers and in the enforcement of police regulations are in the nature of the performance of a service for the benefit of the general'public cannot well be questioned. In this connection it has been hqld that: “The grounds of exemption from liability are that the corporation is engaged in the performance of a public service, in which it has no particular interest, and from which it derives no special benefit or advantage in its corporate capacity, but which it is bound to see performed in pursuance of a duty imposed by law for the general welfare of the inhabitants or of the community; that the members of the fire department, although appointed by the city corporation, are not, when acting in the discharge of their duties, servants or agents in the employment of the city, for whose conduct the city can be held liable, but they act rather as public officers, or officers of the city charged with a public service, for whose negligence or misconduct in the discharge of official duty
So it has been held that a city cannot be made liable for the personal torts or wrongs committed by its police officers (Calwell v. City of Boone, 51 Iowa, 687); or its sanitary officers (Ogg v. City of Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495); or its firemen ( Wilcox v. City of Chicago, 107 Ill. 334 [47 Am. Rep. 434]; Grube v. City of St. Paul, 34 Minn. 402 [26 N. W. Rep. 228].) The general doctrine is that, unless the charter of the city, or some general statute of the state, impose a liability upon the city for the torts or wrongs of its officers and agents engaged in the execution of police powers or regulations, then no such liability exists. Hafford v. City of New Bedford, 18 Gray, 297; Fisher v. City of Boston, 104 Mass. 87 (6 Am. Rep. 198); Dillon, Municipal