120 Ga. 1003 | Ga. | 1904
Lead Opinion
The public demands rapid transit, and passengers can not recover for damages occasioned by the jolts and lurches inevitably caused by running around curves at a proper rate of speed. Augusta R. Co. v. Renz, 55 Ga. 126; Macon R. Co. v. Moore, 99 Ga. 230; Ball v. Mabry, 91 Ga. 783; Crine v. E. T. Ry. Co., 84 Ga. 651, 657; Wynn v. City & Suburban Ry., 91 Ga. 357; Ayers v. Rochester Ry. Co., 156 N. Y. 104; Hite v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 130 Mo. 132; Wilder v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 41 N. Y. Supp. 931, affirmed, 161 N. Y. 665; Reber v. Pittsburg Traction Co. (Pa.), 36 Atl. 245. But for a street-car to round a curve at a rate which threw three passengers from their seats into the aisle proclaims that, regardless of ordinance or estimates, the speed was at that point improper. Acts speak louder than words. The undisputed physical facts declare the speed to have been unsafe, in terms too certain to be disproved by mere opinion evidence of non-experts as to the rate at which the car was moving. Patton v. State, 117 Ga. 230 (5). It is true that several of the witnesses said they did not know how fast it was running; others that “it was not unusual;” another, “at a jog trot;” another, “not more than six or seven miles an hour;” others, “ pretty lively,” “ very fast,” and “ unusually fast; ” and another, “ fifteen miles an hour, possibly more.” If there were nothing except these contradictory estimates, a verdict finding that the car was running more than fifteen miles an hour or less than six could have been sustained. Or, if no one had fallen except the plaintiff, it might have been concluded that her injury had been due to a fall occasioned by her previous sickness, some sudden accession of weakness, or by some cause other than the negligence of the company. But when another passenger on the same seat and next to the window, and still another in a different part of the car, were likewise thrown into the aisle, there remains no room for doubt that the speed was improper- and unsafe.
Judgment reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
In my opinion, there was evidence to authorize the verdict, and the discretion of the trial judge in refusing to grant a new trial should not be disturbed.
Dissenting Opinion
If it be conceded that the falling of the passengers into the aisle of the car was caused by the speed of the car, and that onty an excessive and negligent rate of speed could have had that effect, the decision of the majority in this case is undeniably correct. This, however, was for the determination of the jury. The only “ physical fact ” apparent was that the passengers fell; the cause of that fact was the real point in issue. Passengers on a street-car rounding a curve are frequently thrown off their balance through no fault of the employees in charge of the car, and while the car is running at a lawful rate of speed. I agree with the trial- judge that “ the question involved was one of pure fact; ” and my views in this case are based upon those expressed in the dissenting opinion in Patton v. State, 117 Ga. 239.
