delivered the opinion of the court:
Plаintiffs Constance McEvers and James McEvers appeal from the December 17, 1990, order of the circuit court of MсLean County dismissing with prejudice the plaintiffs’ complaint against defendant Jeffrey Stout. The original and the amended cоmplaints alleged medical malpractice.
The original complaint was filed on August 2, 1989, and was filed on behalf of plaintiffs by Wisconsin attorney Mark Seidl, who was not licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois. The wrongful act allеged in the complaint occurred on August 18, 1987, which would result in the expiration of the statute of limitations on August 18, 1989. The trial court еventually held the initial filing was a nullity because it was filed under the signature of an attorney not licensed to practicе law in the State of Illinois.
After the original complaint was filed, counsel for defendant corresponded with Seidl and, оn October 10, 1989, entered their appearance for defendant, requesting a jury trial. The discovery process began and, on November 2, 1989, Seidl filed an amended complaint, sending a copy of the complaint to the attorneys for defendant. Defendant’s answer to the amended complaint was filed on November 8, 1989, and a copy of the аnswer was mailed to Seidl. Defendant’s discovery process commenced soon thereafter.
On February 23, 1990, Gary B. Pasek, an attorney licensed to practice law in Illinois, filed proof of delivery of documents to the defendant and listed himself as attorney for plaintiffs. On March 2, 1990, Pasek’s motion to be substituted as plaintiffs’ counsel was filed, and the motion was аllowed on March 5,1990.
On June 1, 1990, defense counsel filed a motion “pursuant to Illinois Code of Civil Procedure §2 — 615” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, pаr. 2 — 615), requesting dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint because it was barred by the statute of limitations. The motion stated the comрlaint filed by Seidl was a nullity, citing as authority Fruin v. Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation, Inc. (1990),
Defendant was subsequently allowed to withdrаw his answer and file a motion to dismiss, pursuant to section 2 — 619(a)(5) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 — 619(a)(5)), asking for the same relief requested in the June 1, 1990, motion. The order of dismissal followed.
The facts in Fruin are similar to those in the рresent case, with the exception that here defendant entered his appearance and filed an аnswer prior to filing the motion to dismiss. The Fruin opinion states, “Generally, a pleading signed by a person not licensed to рractice in Illinois is a nullity.” Fruin,
The plaintiffs in the present case, as did the plaintiff in Fruin, argue that the exception to the gеneral rule set forth in Janiczek v. Dover Management Co. (1985),
Due to the harshness of the result of the dismissal in the present case, we have critically examined the decision in Fruin. In doing so, we have examined the cases cited therein and recognize that most dealt with voiding judgments and involved corporations being represented by nonlawyers. In Leonard v. Walsh (1966),
The Janiczek decision sets forth the rule, “Under Illinois law, a person is privileged to appear in court on his own behalf, but he has no such privilege or authority to represent other persоns unless he is admitted to the practice of law.” (Janiczek,
“That rule is intended to protect litigants against the mistakes of the ignorant and the schemes of the unscrupulous and to protect the court itself in the administration of its procеedings from those lacking the requisite skills. (City of Chicago v. Witvoet (1973),12 Ill. App. 3d 654 , 655-56,299 N.E.2d 128 .)” Janiczek,134 Ill. App. 3d at 546 ,481 N.E.2d at 27 .
While the words “ignorant” and “schemes” do not apply in the prеsent case, we recognize, due to the different procedural and evi-dentiary requirements of the various Statеs, that there is good reason to restrict the practice in Illinois to those persons licensed by our supreme сourt. However, we find the Fruin rule provides a result that is too harsh.
Our supreme court has adopted Rule 707 (134 Ill. 2d R. 707), which allows Illinois сourts, in their discretion, to permit attorneys “from any other jurisdiction in the United States, or foreign country *** to participаte before the court in the trial or argument of any particular cause.” This rule recognizes that attorneys not licensed in Illinois may well have the requisite expertise to practice in specific cases. Lawyers praсticing in Illinois without an Illinois license are subject to the contempt powers of our courts. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 13, par. 1.) In light of thе relative ease with which an out-of-State attorney may obtain permission for limited practice in Illinois and the existence of the contempt powers, we find unnecessary injustice will occur if we follow the Fruin decision.
Underlying our decision is the recognition that a nullity rule appears to punish the litigant rather than the offending attorney. This might be advisable, if we could legitimately assume that litigants are aware of the rules relating to the practice of law. Assuming such would bе unreasonable. The suggestion that plaintiffs should have known of attorney Seidl’s problem with practicing in Illinois is somewhat ludicrous, in light of the fact that defense counsel evidently did not recognize the problem for more than six months after the сomplaint was filed. The contempt powers provided for the proper placement of penalty. Thе nullity rule results in an improper placement of that penalty.
We conclude that the filing was not a nullity, and plaintiffs should now be allowed to file an amended complaint signed either by them or by their Illinois attorney.
Reversed and remanded.