OPINION
Appellant Georgiana McElwain commenced this action seeking compensation for injuries suffered when she fainted during emergency treatment of her younger brother. Respondent Allen Van Beek brought a mоtion for summary judgment. The motion was granted and the case was dismissed “in its entirety” by order dated January 13, 1989. Shortly after an order for trial was filed, appellant’s attorney requested a clarification as to the status оf the action against respondent medical center. On February 29, 1989, the trial court issued an amended order stating that “no action remains against either defendant.” This appeal followed.
FACTS
On October 2, 1986, appellant’s younger brother cut the bridge of his nose and was taken to Minneapolis Children’s Medical Center emergency room by appellant and her mother. Both appellant and her mother were permitted to remain in the emergency room while he was being treated. Appellant was standing next to her brother and holding his hand when the physician, Dr. Allen Van Beek, administered a local anesthetic. Appellant subsеquently fainted and fell to the floor. As a result of her fall she sustained a fractured skull and permanent loss of hearing in her right ear. No evidence was presented which linked appellant’s sudden faint to anything in the emеrgency room. Appellant stated that she is not squeamish at the sight of blood nor has she ever fainted upon seeing blood.
ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment because in a medical malpractice action a physician does not owe a duty of care to a non-patient?
2. Did the trial court err in failing to determine whether appellant had a cause of action against respondents based on а theory of general negligence?
3. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment sua sponte to respondent Minneapolis Children’s Medical Center, Inc.?
ANALYSIS
On appeal from summary judgment, it is this court’s function to determine whether there are any genuine issues of fact or whether the trial court erred as a matter of law.
Betlach v. Wayzata Condominium,
1. Summary judgment оn medical malpractice claim against respondent Van Beek.
Appellant brought this action based upon medical malpractice. Medical malpractice is “the failure of a physiсian and surgeon to exercise the care and professional skill usually exercised by the ordinary member of his profession in good
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standing in the same or similar locality.”
Manion v. Tweedy,
We find no Minnesota case that is controlling of the facts and issues presented by this appeal. However, other jurisdictions have addressed the issue of a physician’s duty to a third party. The majority of the jurisdictions surveyed found no duty in the absence of a physician-patient relationship.
Keene v. Wiggins,
A duty to a third party non-patient has been recognized only in a limited number of situations. One circumstanсe in which a duty has been recognized is where the physician’s patient poses a danger of harm to an identifiable third person. The “duty to warn” cases have generally followed the decision in
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,
Physicians have also been found to have a duty to control their patients wherе they present a danger to a third party. The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed this duty to control in
Lundgren v. Fultz,
We find that the facts of this case do not meet the requirements of either a “duty to warn” or a “duty to control.” Dr. Van Beek had no duty to warn appellant of any danger because such a duty is limited to cаses in which the threat of danger originates from the patient. On these facts, the patient posed no threat at all. Similarly, Dr. Van Beek can have no liability for failure to control his patient because thе patient was not the cause of the injury claimed by appellant. Thus, we find that appellant’s reliance on the decision in Lundgren is misplaced. The facts of Lundgren are so unique that extrapolation of a physician’s duty to a third party is unwarrаnted.
Appellant argues that Minnesota has recognized a duty owed by a physician to a third party non-patient in
Skillings v. Al
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len,
Under the facts of this case there was no relationship between appellant and Dr. Van Beek. Appellant was not a patient of Dr. Van Beek so as to impose liability under a theory of medical malpractice. There was no contractual relationship between appellant and Dr. Van Beek as to the emergency treatment of her brother. Therefore, appellant may not rely upon the decision in
Skillings
to impose liability. The trial court was correct in holding as a matter of law that Dr. Van Beek owed no duty to appellаnt and therefore dismissal of the claim by summary judgment was proper. Our decision is in accord with the only other decision involving substantially similar facts and circumstances.
See Sacks v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital,
2. Summary judgment on negligence claim against respondent Van Beek.
Appellant’s argument that a physician has an affirmative duty under general negligence principles to a third person who is not a patient is raised for the first time on appeal and is not properly before this court. Appellant alleged a medical malpractice claim in the complaint and argued a malpractice claim in opposition to respondent’s motion for summary judgment. This court need not consider issues which were not presentеd to the trial court.
Benedict v. Benedict,
3. Summary judgment as to respondent Minneapolis Children’s Medical Center, Inc.
Appellant contends that the hospital is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Van Beek, or in the alternative, the hospital remains negligent for failure to exercise reasonable care in protecting the safety of its visitors. In Minnesota, a hospital can only be held vicariously liable for a physician’s acts if the physician is an employee of the hospital.
See Moeller v. Hauser,
The issue of the medical center’s independent liability for failure to maintain safe premisеs was not alleged in appellant’s claim. Nor could such a cause of action be reasonably implied from the complaint. “A reviewing court must generally consider ‘only those issues that the record shоws were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.’ ”
Thiele v. Stich,
Appellant claims her procedural rights were violated by the trial court’s dismissal of her action against the medical center, absent the medical center’s motion for summary judgment. It is clear under Minnesotа law that a trial court may grant summary judgment
sua sponte
where there remains no genuine issue of material fact.
See Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Obermoller,
*447 Unless an objecting party can show prejudice from lack of notice or other procedural irregularities, or was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to oppose summary judgment, the court’s judicious exercise of its inherent power to grant summary judgment in appropriate eases should not be disturbed.
Id. at 255.
Here, appellant does not show that she was prejudiced by the court’s actions. Appellant’s ease was premised on showing the physician had committed medical malpractice. Nowhere in appellant’s complaint does she allege independent liability on the part of the medical center. Thus, it follows that if the physician is not liable as a matter of law the medical center cannot be found liable. Under these facts, it cannot be concludеd that summary judgment was inappropriate or improperly prejudiced appellant’s rights.
DECISION
The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment as to both Dr. Van Beek and Minneapolis Children’s Medical Center because under these facts a non-patient cannot assert a claim of medical malpractice as a matter of law.
Affirmed.