*1 McELROY v. UNITED STATES Argued January No. 80-6680. 1982 Decided March *2 O’Connor, J., Court, Burger, opinion in delivered the Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, J., C. and Rehnquist, Stevens, JJ., J., post, joined. dissenting opinion, filed a p. 659. argued petitioner. the cause
Thomas White for With S. GeorgeE. him the brief was Schumacher. on argued Phillips the cause for the United States. Carter G. Lee, him the brief were General Assistant With on Solicitor Attorney Jensen, and M. General Joel Gershowitz. O’Connor delivered the of the Court. opimon
Justice transporting petitioner two The was convicted of counts of forged security in interstate commerce in violation of 18 § challenges ground 2314. He his convictionon the U. S. C. proof, concededly requires lacking at trial, that the statute forged being the securities had been before taken across among of a conflict the Circuits on this state lines. Because granted statutory we certiorari. 454 construction, issue below, affirm For the reasons stated we U. S. 815 petitioner’s conviction.
HH McElroy was indicted a federal Charles Petitioner charged grand jury 1 and 3 that on on three counts. Counts transported petitioner in interstate com- two occasions falsely to Penn- securities from Ohio merce made sylvania the National §2314, in of 18 C. violation U. S. McElroy charged Property with trans- Act.1 Count Stolen pertinent part: §2314 provides in Title 18 U. S. C. intent, transports in “Whoever, or fraudulent with unlawful altered, made, any falsely forged, or counterfeited se- foreign commerce porting Pennsylva- car in a stolen interstate commerce from in 2312.2 nia to Ohio violation 18 U. S. C.
According proof trial, to the several blank were checks3 from Local 125of the Laborers’ in stolen Youngstown, International Union early April in
Ohio, late March or After theft, it closed the the Union discovered account on which months later, the checks were drawn. Seventeen Octo- petitioner ber ordered a used Corvette from Agency Pittsburgh, Don Allen Chevrolet Pa., $6,706. Using petitioner Jones,” the name “William told the Heights, Ohio, salesman that he lived Warrenville but Pittsburgh petitioner area. worked returned the day paid next for the car with one of the stolen Union *3 signature forged. checks, on which a had been After learn- day ing following the from the drawee bank in Ohio dealership closed, account had been made no effort to ne- gotiate the check. This transaction for formed basis (transportation forged count 1 of a check in interstate com- merce) (transportation 2 and count of a stolen vehicle, the commerce) Corvette, of the indictment. petitioner sought purchase In December . a boat and trailer from the Rini Marine Falls, Sales Co. Beaver previously Adhering Pa. to his successful he used scheme, gave the fictitious name “WilliamJones” and an Ohio address inquiry paid for his residence. One week after his initial he for a boat and trailer one of the stolen on checks, Union stamps, knowing falsely made, curities or tax the same to have been .,. altered, forged, or counterfeited . $10,000 imprisoned “Shall be fined not more than or not more than ten years, or both.” 2 provides: §2312 Title 18 S. C. U. transports foreign in interstate or
“Whoever commerce a motor vehicle aircraft, knowing stolen, same to have been shall be fined more or $5,000 years, imprisoned than not more than five or both.” that, §§2311-2318, §2311 states as used in term Title U. S. C. any . . includes . check.” “[s]eeurities forged. signature Philip had been Too late, Rini, suspicious Sales,
the owner of Rini Marine became and tele- phoned Youngstown, only Ohio, bank to learn that the signature forged. and the He, too, check had been stolen negotiating hope check, abandoned turned to the Investigation help. Bureau of Federal Count arose from this transaction. petitioner case,
At the conclusionof the Government’s judgment acquittal on all three counts on the moved for a ground that the had not submitted sufficient evi- Government jury. go petitioner con- dence for the case to acquittal he was entitled to an on count because tended that any showing failed to submit evidence the Government transported Pennsylva- petitioner had Corvette nia and on counts 1 and because the Government Ohio, showing petitioner that the had not adduced evidence through brought inter- the stolen checks to be caused Pennsylvania. The trial court denied state commerce into motions.4 these petitioner the trial court instructed the rested,5
After the jury petitioner guilty on counts and that in order to find the transported con the check a it must find that he and that such commerce,” dition in “interstate Pennsylvania place entirely if could take within *4 began out of movement that it was a “continuation the unsuccessfully objected petitioner state.” Tr. 164A.6 The 4 Tr. 68A-78A. 5 petitioner introduced no evidence. 6The entire instruction on this issue was as follows: “Well, transportation of means movement or [interstate commerce] another, forged it includes all continu- these checks from one state into and state, in in this case ing forged movements of said check while the second Pennsylvania, forged until the movement of said check has ceased.
“Now, transported in show that the checks were Government must However, forged transportation in interstate commerce a condition. here, may Pennsylvania, be considered trans- within the destination state Govern §2314 the that under contending instruction, to this in was the check of proving the burden ment had to Penn state line across transported it was Ohio before all on was convicted 92A. The petitioner Tr. sylvania. on each of seven years to serve counts, and sentenced three on all the sentences 2, five on count years 3 and and counts concurrently. run three counts vacated the banc, judg- en sitting of Appeals, The Court had presented that the Government 2, holding on ment count 644 F. 2d a conviction.7 to sustain evidence insufficient on banc). (CA3 1981) (en judgment The court affirmed the Government however, holding that counts movement if it is a continuation commerce in interstate portation began of state. out that the every possibility speculative not exclude need “The Government point, nor need interrupted some may at have been transportation interstate security’s movement in step in the show each Government commerce. shown that the Defendant has “Now, you that the Government if believe forged condition within they in while were checks transported the if that are satisfied of the law requirements Pennsylvania, words, the In other interstate commerce. part was been trans- had to have in Ohio at originate sometime check had to commerce. effect interstate Pennsylvania in order in ported at sometime the checks transported prove this Defendant must Government So the be- interstate in the indictment 1 and 3 of involved Counts place Ohio prove need Pennsylvania, but tween Ohio and Id., at started.” where Defendant or from started which the checks 164A-165A. in- further lawyers, judge with the at bench some discussion
After jury: structed that con- with evidence prove must the Government “As to Counts the trans- Defendant caused that the doubt a reasonable you beyond
vinces 3, the check is, in Counts and question, checks the two portation of commerce, from Chevrolet, Rini, to Don Allen check Id., 181A. Pennsylvania.” toOhio on vacating the judgment conviction Appeals’ the Court part of That Court. this 2 is not before count
presented sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions, and that the trial judge had correctly instructed the jury that the Government need not that the prove stolen checks had been before forged crossing lines. “It is immaterial whether were signatures forged Ohio or If at Pennsylvania. in the interstate movement point the check was in a Id., condition, forged statute was satisfied.” at 279. All but one judge agreed the majority’s construction of “interstate §2314.8 commerce” as phrase used
II this case is one question presented by con- statutory struction.9 The claims petitioner that the language leg- §2314 islative history of demonstrate congressional intent limit the reach of that provision those who persons transport forged securities across state lines. As a fallback position, §2314’s contends that petitioner use expression commerce” is sufficiently ambiguous Adams, Judge joined by Judge Seitz, majority Chief concurred in the opinion on counts but dissented from holding the court’s that the Although agreed conviction on 2 should count be vacated. he that the trial judge correctly jury 3, Judge had instructed the on counts 1 and dis Garth counts, arguing sented from the affirmance on those that the Government presented Judge insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions. Higginbotham majority opinion concurred with the on count but dis holdings § sented from its on counts 1 and 3. He reasoned that 2314 was ambiguous, lenity consequently principle required and that the court strictly against to construe the statute and hold that the Government only security forged statute if crossing was violated had been before state lines. petitioner authority 9 The concedes that has under the Com (which Clause, I, 8,§ provides “Congress
merce cl. in part Art. shall States”), regulate among have Power... To Commerce . . . the several prohibiting a criminal enact statute in interstate com security crossing merce of a that was not until after state lines. present Consequently, meaning the issue case is the phrase ascribed to the “interstate commerce” in 2314. *6 lenity apply principle and con-
require of Court this favor,10 petitioner’s provision in the strue the A Congress’ argument of use on his bases initial Petitioner urges § “forged” he us past from which tense transporta- only prohibit intended that infer entering forged stream that before securities were tion of crossing lines. before state commerce, is, that of interstate argument petitioner’s is the unarticu- Fundamental in the as used assumption commerce,” that “interstate lated security has after the crossed continue does not section, subsequent of the movement However, if border. state com- interstate constitutes in the destination check move- forgery in the course of that the check then a merce, forged security in inter- of a ment involves validity § Thus, in violation state commerce statutory argument whether the petitioner’s turns on comprehends of a movement phrase commerce” security forged destination State. within the petitioner §2314 was paragraph under which the The “transportation] for or prohibits convicted any. . know [of] ., . . . securities . eign . . commerce forged.”. Title 18 . . . U.S.C. ing to have the same in this as used commerce,’ ‘interstate provides the “term that . . another one State . between title, includes provisions limited are these two face, their State.” On crossing borders, occur while activities to unlawful particular, In the lan seemingly reach. broader have a but sufficiency of the on evidence challenged the petitioner Although the certiorari, limited the this Court petition for writ 3 in his counts Thus, accept we issue. statutory construction to, the grant of certiorari to sustain was sufficient the evidence Appeals’ conclusion the Court of trip from made a petitioner] [the “on occasion jury’s finding that each forged either was carrying with him a check Pennsylvania, Ohio (CA3 1981). 274, 279 F. 2d Pennsylvania.” Ohio state lines not the sole crossing §of 10 guage suggests commerce.”11 of “interstate manifestation §of 2314 “interstate commerce” element origin Act),. Theft Act (Dyer Motor Vehicle was the National “severe was enacted 1919 to 324,12 provide pun- Stat. *7 11 2(b) Act, Dyer § S. 10 was of predecessor of 18 U. C. transportation “shall include that the term “interstate commerce” stated 41 to another State.” Stat. from one State ... part: provided
12 TheAct
“Sec. 2. That. . . :
“(b) foreign used in this Act shall or commerce’ as The term ‘interstate . . . . one ... to another State transportation include transported in in- transport or cause to be 3. That whoever shall “Sec. vehicle, knowing the same to have foreign commerce a motor terstate or $5,000, by or stolen, punished by a fine of not more than shall be been years, both. imprisonment of not more than five or barter, sell, conceal, store, dis- receive, or That whoever shall “Sec. 4. of, vehicle, as, part is a or which con- moving or which pose of motor commerce, have knowing the same to been foreign interstate or stitutes $5,000, by imprison- or than stolen, a fine of not more punished shall be years, or both.” ment of not more than five property, stolen types of expanded in 1934 to cover other The Act was 794, Act, in 1939to cover 48 and Property National Stat. see Stolen 3 and 4 were 3,1939, Aug. 53 Stat. 1178. Sections See Act of securities. respectively. None of the §§ and 2313 18 U. S. C. 2312 later codified as amendments, however, concerning these Reports or debates See requirement. commerce” any explanation of the “interstate contains (1934) Sess., (stating that the new 1462, Cong., 2d 2 Rep. 73d H. R. No. transportation property, of punish stolen “designed to Act was language of the securities, money,” that it was “drafted follow or upheld in the constitutionality frequently which has Dyer Act, of (1934) Sess., 538, Cong., (approving 1 courts”); 73d 2d Rep. No. Federal S. purpose Act is stating that the of the memorandum Department a Justice transporting property in inter- knowingly penalty a provide “to 422, Sess., Cong., 1st commerce”); Rep. No. 76th H. R. foreign state or Prop- (1939) scope of the National Stolen “widens the (stating that the bill prop- applicable embezzled by making provisions its erty Act of 1934... Sess., Cong., 76th 1st money”); Rep. No. erty, S. securities (1939) Attorney stating part General (approving a letter from the stealing guilty in inter- of automobiles those ishment of Rep. 66th foreign H. R. No. commerce.” state or Cong., Rep. 202, 66th Cong., No. S. Sess., 1st See (1919) “punish designed (describing as bill Sess., 1st in interstate motor vehicles of stolen commerce”). sponsor Dyer, Representative foreign authority Congress’ defended enacted, the bill was upheld noting a proposed courts had that the law, enact variety regulatory Commerce enacted under the statutes declaring including unlawful the criminal statute Clause, “[ljarceny goods transported being in in- cars from railroad (1919).13 In Cong. re- Rec. 5472 commerce.” terstate Representative con- Anderson sponse question from ato meaning possible cerning differences in Representative §§2 Act, commerce” replied: *8 any see, the I do not
“[I]f there, which difference there is by Supreme Court, by the be construed would matter many upon meant passed what is times has foreign Ibid.14 commerce.” existing to law pending bill are to extend purposes of the “principal embezzled, counterfeited also to property .has securities”). crime would be Dyer that a federal believed Obviously, Representative exact moment that larceny not occur at the though the did even committed this exam It is fair to conclude from a line. car the railroad crossed Act, commerce,” Dyer to as used understood ple that he transportation across state lines. meaning than broader have a Representatives Dyer is as and Anderson colloquy between The entire follows: gentleman will ask the committee I whether ANDERSON. “Mr. commerce in section 2 as in its definition of interstate thing the same meant 4? in section meant it gentleman point will wherein it dif- If out so. I think DYER. “Mr. glad. fers, shall be I under section interstate com- the definition In ANDERSON. “Mr. another, you to if refer while from one transportation means merce
65i bill, the chief of the Dyer, sponsor Plainly, Representative of “interstate commerce” the statutory meaning believed that Court decisions Supreme using could be found previous you constituting vehicle or motor car inter- you4 find there have a section commerce, you scarcely have section. foreign a sensible state or any is say gentleman to the that if there difference “Mr. DYER. I will by there, see, Supreme construed which I the matter would be do is interstate and Court, passed many upon times what meant which has necessary put definition in really I it is not foreign commerce. think some of the members of the com- request this bill. It was done at the many times what is interstate Supreme has decided mittee. The Court myself any necessary.” I think definition commerce. do not (1919). Cong. Rec. 5472 Dyer course, Representative refers stated that the definition to which Of transportation one State ... “shall include from interstate commerce added). dissenting opinion (emphasis another 41 Stat. 325 State.” Act, “include” in the 1919 choos- entirely ignores Congress’ use of the word only “objective . . . was to Congress’ as if ing instead to read the definition to an- automobile from one State proscribe transportation a stolen Post, at other.” Act, 794, Congress ex- Property Stat. In the 1934 National Stolen 2(a) Act, provided Dyer “[t]he and in panded coverage of the one State mean . . . commerce’ shall term ‘interstate “bill is clear that the drafted Report The House makes ... State.” Act, constitutionality which has language to follow 1462, 73d Rep. H. R. No. upheld in the Federal courts.” frequently been [statutory] language is Sess., Although “change of Cong., 2d States, 225 change purpose,” v. United of a Johnson some evidence change only “a workable (1912), inference of a of intent is U. S. intent, construction, guide and cannot not an infallible rule of Dickerson, 310 v. persuasive evidence.” United States overcome more *9 (1940). history no indica- contains 554, Because the U. S. 561 meaning “inter- language changed in the the of variation tion that the importantly, Report House states commerce,” more because the state and language of the 1934Act was drafted to follow the language of the that the by change in Congress nothing intended the Act, that we conclude 1948; in Moreover, Congress made an additional modification language. commerce,” resubstituting the word this time of “interstate the definition “transporta- substituting word “commerce” for the word the “include” and Rep. H. R. connotation” of the latter word. the narrower tion” to “avoid Sess., any can be drawn If inference 304, Cong., 1st A7 No. 80th 652 under authority congressional of scope define the to
phrase 312, 66th R. No. Rep. also H. See Clause. the Commerce to (1919) authority Congress’ (justifying 3-4 Sess., 1st Cong., decisions this Court’s reference to by Act the Dyer enact the Com- power under has plenary that holding commerce). interstate regulate to Clause merce as well bill, the accompanying Report House Although debates, stated during of Congress Members as several auto stolen of prevent Act would the more general use of lines,15Congress’ state across mobiles Congress in- only it is 1934 changes, both these from meaning of “interstate commerce.” change no substantive tended (1919) Sess., (noting that 1 Cong., 1st Rep. No. 66th H. R. 15 See to another and them one State take from steal automobiles “ttlhieves the stolen ma and sell crime who receive in this have associates ofttimes pun (“The law and to Congress to enact this power of the chines”); id., at 3 an removing of them into and the in one State theft of automobiles ish the (“No why id., good exists at reason questioned”); be can not State other among the sev regulate to commerce power with Congress, invested polluted should not be such provide that commerce States, should eral another”); Cong. to from State property one carrying stolen of bill is for the (remarks Dyer) (stating that “this (1919) Rep. of Rec. and auto stealing automobiles for those punishment purpose providing of State”); id., at to another one State taking them from trucks and mobile a punishment (“Section of (remarks provides for Dyer) Rep. of another”); id., at one State transporting it from stealing a car thief bill Reavis) support a broader would (remarks (stating that he Rep. any kind transport property “felony stolen it make would ibid, (“The (remarks sought to Igoe) offense Rep. another”); one line, taking across transportation, it act is the in the be reached (remarks id., of Sen. Cum- another”); one State taking it from giving the Federal courts purpose of is for mins) the “bill (stating that carry automobiles who thieves of’ punishment jurisdiction lines). state across statutory however, to limit the defi- purports statements, these None crossing lines. state Nor act of to the nition phrase used com- believe basis there “ . transportation’. ‘interstate . interchangeably in the statute merce” Stevens, J., dissenting, lines.” focusing on phrase such or some
653 and its reliance on this Court’s “interstate commerce” phrase of “interstate com defining scope decisions constitutional intended statutory Congress phrase indicate that merce” had used that Com phrase as this Court as broad to be decisions, In 1919.16 those decisions before merce Clause commerce begins clear that interstate made this Court had when move crossed, only are and ends lines well before state has the destination ceased the item in question ment of State.17 in §2314 therefore, that in conclude, We principally concerned Congress may have been While at 663-664. post, cars, it not so limit the with stolen did borders cross thieves who state with comprehensive Instead, Congress a more drafted statute. language of the to avoid de- channels who use interstate reach criminals that would statute punishment. tection Congress used explanation alternative dissenting opinion’s —that “ source of its merely indicate the to commerce’ ‘interstate expression Although supporters of unpersuasive. also authority,” post, at 665—is statutory lan- constitutionality, nothing in the its justify to were careful bill constitu- Congress used the history indicates guage or merely point the bill commerce” in term “interstate tionally significant infer- Rather, rational the most legislation. authority enact such to its pro- types of activities specify the term used ence is as that term involving “interstate commerce” by the Act —thefts scribed by this interpreted Court. 16 “inter statutory phrase indicated that have even Some Circuits authority under the congressional is coextensive commerce” (CA9 879, Roselli, F. 2d 891 v. 432 States See United Clause. Commerce upon use of (“The prohibitions 1970) conditioning [§2314’s] sole reason for the exercise basis for provide a constitutional is to (1971); v. Lud denied, States S. 924 United U. power”), cert. federal (CA8 1975) (same), denied, 423 U. S. 705, cert. wig, F. 2d (1903) (illustrating that a Ames, 188 U. S. Champion v. See take the form Clause can under the Commerce enacted regulatory statute Congress, “it cannot be doubted stated that the Court prohibition, of a commerce, be] may provide [cattle . . . regulate power its under Terminal Co. begins”); Southern before inspected Pacific (1911) . commerce . . (goods are ICC, 219 U. v. S. another transportation to course of ‘actually in the they started have when *11 654 security of a forged transportation the to proscribe
tended in inter its movement the course times during and all interstate stream of commerce that the commerce, state Conse has been crossed. border after a state continue may the instructed correctly in this case judge the trial quently, within forged check the McElroy’s that jury that if the found jury §2314 would violate Pennsylvania that began movement be a “continuation movement Tr. 164A.18 out of state.” us to con- §2314 leads underlying
Moreover, purpose federal prosecu- intend to require did clude that cross- before the securities tors to prove States Sheridan, 379, United 329 U. S. v. In lines. state ing “con- §2314 Congress that in observed (1946), 384 this Court in detecting aid of states coming templated under state are complete offenses criminals whose punishing of interstate the channels who utilize' law, but detect- the state’s and thus make getaway make a successful omitted). (footnote impotent” processes punitive ing ”) Coe v. transportation’ (quoting to carrier State, delivered [are] Tram R. Co. v. Sabine 517, (1886)); Texas & N. O. 525 Errol, 116 S.U. Fuentes, v. 236 (1913); R. Co. Illinois Central 122-123 Co., 227 U. S. has been (1915) this interstate character (“generally when 157, 163 U. S. point where load until the reaches at least acquired it continues end”). finally should the movement intended that parties originally Ames, supra, v. Champion cited Dyer Act Report on the House Dyer H. R. Act. authority to enact Congress’ constitutional justify Sess., 4 Cong., 66th 1st Rep. No. 18 meaning of “interstate com not address the though Congress did Even Act, there is no reason and 1939 extensions 1934 merce” fact, meaning. In because original its Congress abandoned to believe that define 1919 and continued between Supreme Court lines, see, crossing merely as commerce broadly than commerce more (1922); Brattleboro, U. S. Carson Realty v.Co. g., Champlain e. ample to believe (1929), reason Vial, there S. v. U. Petroleum Co. predecessor as its reach to have same Congress intended Dyer Act. section believe, we find it difficult to this broad ab- purpose,
Given indication in the statute itself or the his- sent some have undercut sharply would tory, pur- federal their effort to combat prosecutors pose by hobbling in interstate commerce. Under petitioner’s pro- crime could evade the construction, easily a patient forger posed in the channels of interstate law, yet operate reach of federal brief, As the out its points commerce.19 Government *12 19 point. petitioner, this The who present case illustrate The facts checks, 16A, brought forged he the Union see Tr. lived in Ohio at the time Pennsylvania. forged un He them an the stolen checks from Ohio into Requiring prosecutors a car. place purchase to a boat and known time and checks, forged the when petitioner the prove on which side of the border in of a transported forged the checks continuation petitioner in the had fact addition, support purpose. In as the longer journey, serves no authority may necessary to in be recognized, Act federal ers of the compel witnesses from other States vestigate fully the crime and to Newton) (“all (1919)(remarks Rep. the testify. Cong. Rec. 5475 See 58 appear compelled can be anywhere in the States witnesses from United investigation complete grand jury], and a full and testify [before and trial, ease, the barrier of case is called for every and when a can be had in compelled to away, the witnesses will be having swept line court”). may it jurisdiction, testify open Absent federal appear and difficult, compel extraordinarily at the least impossible, have been or court testify Pennsylvania from Ohio to and bank officials Union stolen, when the bank stolen, they had been when checks had been that the forged, checks had been closed, signature on the that the account had been authority to write those checks. no petitioner and that opinion dissenting expressed in the fear for the There is no foundation jurisdiction in crimi- of federal today expansion is a broad that our decision by the limited of this case are Post, implications at 660. nal law. in interstate transported forged check was holding its facts and longer of a a continuation transportation was only because obtaining and If the entire journey began out of state. transaction — returning checks boat, checks, purchasing the car forging the Ohio, clear it seems solely within occurred to the bank for collection—had com- in interstate “transport[ed] have been would not that the checks suggestion holding, the dissent’s today’s limited light In merce.” 674, resources, post, at prosecutorial federal overburdening limited we are misplaced. is produces petitioner’s anoma- construction
moreover, committed have been lous result that no federal crime would forged checks to the victims returned this case until payment. Brief for United drawee bank for the out-of-state have written the n. could 18, 11.20 While States adopt produce basis for us to result, this there no statute to reading.21 limited such a (1954) 1, States, (holding that v. 347 U. S. also Pereira United 20 See fraudulently checks had to be sent to an out-of-state obtained since the § collection, guilty violating 2314 because he petitioner was
bank for
“
commerce”).
transported in interstate
check]
‘caused’
to be
[the
position
his
do not dis
petitioner
support
The cases cited
conclusion,
holding on
of the cases based its
an
our
for none
suade us from
history,
§2314.
In
language, legislative
purpose
analysis of the
(CA5 1972),
example,
Owens,
F. 2d
v.
United States
held,
§
without
pertinent
language of 2314
simply quoted
court
authority,
prove
that it “is obvious that to
com
analysis
or citation
portion of section 2314 the Government
under this
mission of an .offense
interstate in its
or altered
the instrument traveled
must show that
(CA8
(cit
1976)
Hilyer,
F. 2d
v.
condition.” See United States
requires proof
that the secu
only
proposition that 2314
ing
Owens for the
*13
lines);
Sparrow,
v.
635
rity
crossing state
United States
forged
was
before
(en
1980)
banc)
(CA10
Hilyer
(citing only
for its
794,
Owens
F. 2d
796
meaning
requires
prosecution
to show
plain
[§2314]
“the
holding that
at the time of its in
security
a'forged
altered condition
was in
or
that the
denied,
1004
passage”),
450 U. S.
terstate
cert.
construing
today
with other cases
holding
that our
is consistent
We note
in the channels of inter
designed to combat theft
similar federal statutes
(CA2 1980),
Ajlouny,
657 B even if a reading alternatively argues petitioner the pro- his interpretation, not clearly support §of 2314 does by be resolved and the should ambiguity is ambiguous vision the checks to have narrowly require reading provision state line. For support, crossing before Bass, States (1971), cites United 336 v. 404 U. S. petitioner a under a to conviction challenge considered where this Court felon a convicted 1202(a), prohibits § 18 App. U. S. C. in com- or transporting] “receiv[ing], possessing], The issue . . . firearm.” commerce affecting or merce vehicles, com- using same “interstate of stolen terstate 2, rejected supra. § n. The court in 2314. See language as used merce” he failure to show that the Government’s argument the defendant’s “[A]ny driv- required acquittal. a state border car across driven the destination, fromor origin, wholly the state of state within ing, whether inter- of the intended step the furtherance to, if done as a substantial 2d, 939. See United think, act.” 229 P. at is, within the we journey state 1978). (CA5 740, Lambert, F. 2d v. States statutes, com slightly different reviewing other Cases today. In result that we reach at the same arrive provisions, merce” denied, (CA5), 439 U. S. Tobin, cert. F. 2d 687 v. States United sell receiving conspiring to convicted (1978), were the defendants of, inter which constitute as, part a which are or “moving goods rejected § The court S. C. 2315. in violation of U. . . . commerce” state inter taken out of goods had been that the stolen argument the defendants’ long as its movement rest, holding “[s]o coming to move can be considered continuation the destination state within §2315 is satis of U. S. C. prerequisite state the began out of ment that 152, 155 Luman, 624 F. 2d v. 2d, States See United F. fied.” 576 Licavoli, 604 F. 2d (CA10 1980) (18 v. §2315); States United U. S. C. (1980); (18 denied, 446 U. (CA91979) §2315), S. cert. U. S. C. 624-625 1980) (CA3 (construing simi 1144, 1148 Garber, 626 F. 2d v. States United “[djelays enroute do court held that in 18 S. C. language lar U. *14 foreign or as interstate characterization shipments of continued deprive not denied, destination”), cert. yet their reached goods have long so as the 297, 299-300 Maddox, 394 F. 2d v. (1981); States United U. S. Hiscott, F. 2d (18 (CA4 1968) 659); § v. States United U. S. C. Goble, 512 F. 2d 1978)(18 2313); v. (CA8 States United U. S. C. 2313). (18 (CA6 1975) §C. U. S. “in or affect- whether commerce was framed the Court “transports,” “possesses” as as ing well commerce” modified charged respondent, had been felon, convicted a since the shotgun, possession had made the Government but possessed with of a firearm “in com- no effort to he show that affecting found both The Court merce or commerce.” history ambigu- legislative language provision and its of the grounds read the question, on two and decided on this ous affecting narrowly, “in read is, to statute “transports.” modifying “possesses” as as well as commerce” concerning ambiguity the reach of a reasoned The Court by reading statute be resolved statute should criminal speak clearly, Congress encourage narrowly in order to warning” populace giving of the line between “fair thus Leg- activity, to have the and lawful order criminal activity. Id., at criminal courts, not the define islature, purpose statement Also, a clear 347-348. absent unwilling Congress, a federal criminal to read the Court was way traditional area of on a that would encroach statute jurisdiction. criminal significant ques present does not raise however, case, statutory language ambiguity, tions Congress history defined the indicate that of the Act petitioner broadly than the more commerce” “interstate term use the term intended to hold We contends. using it as this Court had commerce” 1919. As we observed in before Clause cases Commerce (1955), 503, 509-510 Bramblett, 348 U. S. v. States United strictly . . . although are to be construed statutes “criminal given every must be criminal statute not mean this does disregard complete meaning possible narrowest omitted).22 (footnote legislature” purpose today holding suggestion that reads our reject petitioner’s We authority of the Federal Gov “expand the if intended § 2314 as Brief for Petitioner of criminal fraud.” over the entire field ernment congressional purpose expressed Rather, holding is our consistent
¶ HHHH r— § Through has sought aid the States in their detection and punishment criminals who evade state authorities by using channels of interstate commerce. Based on this congressional the trial purpose, judge present case correctly instructed the jury they could find the petitioner § if guilty violating found they that the forgeries occurred during course of interstate commerce, which includes a “continuation of a movement that out began even state,” though movement of the forged checks was re- stricted to one State. we affirm Accordingly, the judgment of the court below.
So ordered. Justice Stevens, dissenting.
The words “transportation interstate or com- foreign merce” appear a host of federal criminal statutes.1 These statutes prohibit of stolen motor vehicles, forged checks, prostitutes, explosives, ob- materials, scene victims, kidnap counterfeit phonograph records, numerous other In items. all of these statutes the predicate for federal jurisdiction might be reasonably identified either of two ways: first, as I read the statutory it language, might require subject be transported apprehend forgers who use state boundaries pun- to evade detection and ishment petitioner authorities. Had the not used interstate chan- pass forged checks, nels to his he would not have subject punish- § ment under §844(d) g., 1 See, §924(b) (1976 e. (explosives); 18 U. S. C. 18 U. S. C. IV)
ed., 1201(a)(1) (1976 Supp. (firearms); IV) § 18 U. S. ed., C. Supp. (lotter § (kidnaping); 18 (strikebreaking); § U. S. C. 1231 18 U. S. C. 1301 ies); (1976 §1465 (obscenity); 18 U. §§2251, S. C. 18 U. ed., S. C. IV) (sexual (stolen Supp. exploitation children); 18 U. S. C. 2312 motor (other aircraft); §2314 vehicles and 18 U. S. C. property); (1976 IV) (counterfeit §2318 ed., Supp. U. S. C. phonograph records); 18 2512(1) (elec §2421 (prostitution); §§2511(l)(b)(iii), U. S. C. S.U. C. eavesdropping). tronic language, reads this second, as the Court line; a state across *16 during transported subject may merely require be that the it journey. an interstate petitioner trans- indicates that evidence
In this case the Pennsylvania. ported We must into checks from Ohio peti- contrary evidence, that insufficient assume, because of Pennsylva- forge until he was on the the checks tioner did not journey. holds that this The Court nia side of his in proves §2314, which of 18 U. S. C. evidence a violation pertinent part proscribes in interstate According forged Court, a to the checks.2 commerce of long transported as forged commerce as in interstate check is during point forged at some the check was in a condition journey to another. Consistent defendant’s from one State necessary that the even Gov- rationale, this it was not proved lines.3 checks crossed state ernment analysis, petitioner have violated would Under Court’s forged picked up a Ohio, in if left his home 2314 he had negotiated Pittsburgh, it in Beaver Falls.4 check consistently ap- language reading this is If the Court’s jurisdictional plied the same in which to all of the statutes extremely important predicate appears, case. If this is an holding in which a check is limited to the situation the Court’s forged in the line and then a state carried across has been that the trans requires proof that the defendant knew also Section not at issue here. forged. This element is were ported checks required proof that the check had of the trial court The instructions ante, 645-646, Pennsylvania, see at n. but from Ohio moved apply equally the statute would to a check interpretation Court’s State. For the Court the test is whether destination up in the picked of the contraband “within the destination State.” was “movement” there Appeals’ position Ante, is unclear. See 644 F. 2d The Court at 648. 1981) (CA3 (Garth, J., concurring dissenting). 274, 282, n. 1 Pittsburgh who hitchhiker stole a car Likewise, a transcontinental have violated the would Act. Philadelphia it in and abandoned
66i very holding significant. Al- is not State, the destination holding way, illogical though limit the would be it history will demonstrate of the relevant review logical holding be extended to its conclu- should not that the today’s demonstrates, believe, I also That review sion. holding Congress. faithfully intent of reflect the does I meaning present is the “[T]he in the case issue phrase commerce’ ‘interstate ascribed question specifically, §2314.” More n. 9. Ante, statutory phrase commerce’com- ‘interstate “whether *17 [wholly] forged security within the prehends of a movement petitioner is cor- or whether State,” ante, at destination provi- that “to limit the reach of intended that rect transport forged persons across securities who those sion to question, answer to this at 647. For the lines,” ante, §3 history correctly legislative of of looks to the the Court § precursor com- Dyer The interstate of 2314. the Act, the Dyer § language Act as 3 of the that was enacted merce § purposes, subse- the 2314;for our retained in 1919has been merely expanded the cov- quent in 1934and 1939 enactments property types and to erage of stolen 3 to other respectively. securities, para- proscribes, in accurate Act
Section of stolen in interstate commerce phrase, the standing phrase, 325. The 41 Stat. See motor vehicles. 2(b) §by admittedly ambiguous. It is clarified is alone, “[t]he provides ‘interstate term statute, same transporta- include Act shall used in this as . . . commerce’ Any lin- Ibid. ... to another State.” from one State tion history. by dispelled ambiguity gering legislation, House gave problem rise to “[tjhieves auto- reported, steal Judiciary was that Committee oft- and to another one State them from take and mobiles sell and receive who in this crime have associates times Cong., 1st Rep. 66th No. R.H. machines.” 312). (hereafter (1919) Rep. In a discus- No. H. R. Sess., Clause, power the Commerce congressional under sion only proscribe this its intention manifested Committee enact this law and power theof problem: “The removing and in one State of automobiles punish theft id., 3; questioned,” not can be another State into themof why Congress, invested good exists “[n]o reason among States, several regulate power to polluted not be provide commerce should such should an- property one carrying from State by of stolen Rep- introducing House, bill to the In id., at other,” by stating “this bill Dyer opened remarks his resentative stealing punishment providing for those purpose of is for taking one them and trucks automobile and automobiles Cong. He de- Rec. another State.” State precursors C. §§3 of 18 U. S. Act, the 4 of-the and scribed §§2314 follows: 2315, as things. only Section gentlemen, two provides,
“It stealing a car punishment a thief provides for the Section transporting to another. State it from one in an- receipt thieves car of the stolen provides for the disposing selling of it.” purpose for the other *18 Cong. Rec. 5472 sought be “[t]he to Igoe offense stated Representative taking it across transportation, act is the in the reached Id., at 5473. to taking another.” from one State it line, introducing Sen- bill the House Cummins, Senator transportation punish the purpose “to be its described ate, foreign commerce.” or in interstate vehicles motor explained: He Id., favorite bill is. know what
“I Senators want vehicles line, where a is near State place such thefts for there is line, State quickly across are carried very great difficulty securing punishment of the purpose giving The bill is for the offender. Fed- jurisdiction punishment for the of such an eral courts of- Ibid,.6 fender.” Representative objected
Representative like Bee, Reavis, “single[d] special it out the bill because automobiles” Representative at 5473. Reavis stated Id., treatment. very glad making that would “be indeed to vote for a bill it he property any felony transport stolen kind from a one Ibid. to another.” interpretation expansive of the interstate com- The Court’s Dyer phrase Act is far than merce in 3 of broader expressed by the and the Members of that was Committees Congress. The offers several reasons for its the 66th Court analysis. reading statute, but none withstands of the A by using phrase “trans- that, first reasons The Court portation vehicles” commerce of stolen motor proscribe have intended to more must statute, “transportation state lines of stolen motor ve- across than the motor vehi- of stolen hicles” or the “interstate reasoning text, however, from the cles.” The Court’s respects. flawed in two Report and the Members of the House
First, proscription the “interstate Act as who described 5Later, the House bill: further described Senator Cummins line run it across automobile close to a State practice “The is to steal an anyone who does punish section is intended to the State line. The first practice The further thing, knowing the vehicle to have been stolen. or is, dispose party, if the vehicle to some other confederate possible, to line, pur- otherwise, gets it and section is for the when across the State property punishing disposes man who or sells or pose of barters thereof, if he conceals deprive possession owner with intent to probably I embrace knowing it it to have been stolen. think would *19 (1919). Cong. every could be reached.” Rec. 6434 case that transportation phrase of stolen motor vehicles,” or some such focusing phrases interchangeably lines, on state used these phrase “transportation with the in interstate commerce of stolen vehicles,” motor which was the formulation included proposed point and enacted bill. The is illustrated Dyer’s Representative descriptions of the interstate com- example, paragraph merce element of the bill. For the final Report begins of the House that he submitted with the sen- purpose proposed suppress tence, “The law is to crime Rep. in interstate H. commerce.” R. No. 312, at 4. Two Report urges Congress, later, sentences however, pursuant power regulate “provide to its commerce, should polluted by carrying that such commerce should not be property Repre- from one State to another.” Ibid. Dyer opened sentative his remarks to the House with the purpose providing pun- statement that “this bill is for the stealing ishment for those automobiles and automobile trucks taking Cong. them from one State to another State.” 58 Representative Rec. 5470 It is inconceivable that Dyer any legislators interchange- of the other who used ably phrases6 the various nevertheless intended the statu- tory “transportation formulation in interstate commerce of stolen motor to mean more than vehicles” “transportation of stolen motor vehicles” or “transportation across state fines of stolen motor vehicles” or of stolen motor vehicles from one State to another.” analysis flaw in second the Court’s textual is its refer- ence to 18 U. S. C. for the definition of “interstate com- provides merce.” ante, See at 648-649. Section “[t]he commerce’, term ‘interstate as title, used this in- cludes between . . one State . and another State.” It merits reiteration, however, that “interstate commerce” is narrowly much defined more in the Act and the Na- id., 6 See, g., (Rep. Reavis); id., id., e. (Rep. Igoe); at 5472-5473 at 5473 (Sen. Cummins). Newton); id., (Rep. at 5474—5476 at 6433-6434 *20 2(b) Dyer the of Property of Section Act tional Stolen transportation from “shall include provides the term Act (emphasis Stat. State.” another ... one State added). 2(a) provides the 1934enactment of the Section ... to an- transportation from one State mean “shall term added). (emphasis Con- When Stat. State.” other it 1948, in consoli- Code Criminal gress Federal the revised §10. into commerce” of several definitions dated slight “[i]n only that, addition Notes state The Reviser’s was style, substituted ‘commerce’ the word improvements in connota- the narrower ‘transportation’ to avoid in order obviously ‘transportation’ ‘commerce’ since the word tion of following 18 ‘transportation.’” Notes than more includes divining Con- intent of purposes the of 10. For C. U. S. Stolen Dyer National the enacting Act gress the thereto the amendments Property 1934, and Act in Congresses by which those definition to the refer must we statutes. those criminal of . reach the understood B unarticulated explanation logical an ais There —albeit arguably formulation broader Congress’ use of one—for clearly ambitious. less sowas its intent when statute part of from explanation is derived This Dyer proposed constitutionality history in which expositions by Court’s justified to this reference Act was power under the Commerce congressional scope legisla- part such from one infers The Court Clause. statutory phrase “Congress intended history tive phrase in Commerce had used as this Court broad be as legisla- If the Ante, at 653. 1919.” before decisions Clause through instead lenses history is examined tive supportable only con- however, decades, six distance com- phrase “interstate Congress used the is that clusion pro- authority to of its merely source indicate merce” scribe conduct that had previously regulated solely by the States. words,
In the Court’s House Report “justif[ied] Con- Act gress’ authority enact reference to this Court’s decisions holding Congress has plenary power *21 under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate com- Ante, at 652. From this merce.” discussion in the House the Report, Court draws conclusion that meant statutory as the definition of the term adopt this Court’s of the constitutional term construction com- does not merce.” That conclusion follow from its logically and is without premise any support history. The the House cited Report of the Court part by begins with this paragraph: the Congress
“The of to enact this and to power law theft of automobiles one State and the re- punish of them into another State can not be moving ques- of similar tioned, view of laws nature en- heretofore and the decisions of by Congress acted the Supreme same.” touching Court of the United States H. R. Rep. No. at 3. (1)
This statement establishes that stat- objective of the' ute was of a stolen automobile proscribe (2) another, from one the House State Com- Judiciary. this could objective mittee was confident be accom- Clause, as under Commerce this plished interpreted by discussion this Court’s Court. of decisions Report’s jus- in the of tifies the Committee’s confidence constitutionality Indeed, the Act. penultimate paragraph Report how far can act under the Commerce just explains Clause;7 sentence, in the which the paragraph’s closing
7“Congress regulation enacted various laws for the of interstate com has uniformly by Among the courts. them merce which have sustained safety appliances, employ use of of labor of relating are those to the hours accidents, ees, between monthly reports of arbitration of controversies employees, impure goods and lot- and their the exclusion of railroads states that even “[lar- Report ante, Court quotes, in inter- being transported railroad cars ceny goods act of a crime Con- by declared . . . been has commerce 4. But the Committee 312, at No. H. Rep. R. gress.” Act. objective proposing limited more a much linked its it expressly of the Report, closing paragraph In the with the Clause cases Commerce this Court’s discussion Congress, why exists reason “No good objective: statutory among to regulate the power invested should such commerce not provide should States, several from one stolen property carrying by not be polluted Ibid. to another.” constitutionality in the confidence The Committee’s Repre- of Congress. Members all shared was not Act of automo- the practice in detail described sentative Newton across state them driving cars stealing thieves of bile *22 of the by police the be pursued could they where lines (1919). After Rec. 5474-5475 Cong. See first State. to turned he legislation,8 for federal the need summarizing constitutionality: of its the question may be made reference Specific liability, etc. tickets, employers’ tery are railroads act, commerce interstate wherein interstate commerce rates, and of the maintenance pools or for combinations to form forbidden combination every contract wherein July 2,1890, act the antitrust also or of trade com- in restraint otherwise, conspiracy or form of trust punish- crime, made a and was declared States among the several merce transported being cars railroad goods from Larceny of as such. able Congress.” by act of a crime declared also been has commerce interstate 4. Rep. No. H. R. growing evil rapidly this relief from crying for is a need “That there effectively unable have been the States That question. can no be there but I no doubt have fully demonstrated. has problem with the deal cross recovered State and not stolen that are the cars per cent that is thief use which the automobile disposed of. they are before lines beyond the which is sphere a him into takes commerce making of interstate security operate he can where control, a field and into of State reach power by its Congress asserts so until to do continue he will where Cong. Rec. consideration.” now under one as the a bill such passage argued by of this seriously Members has been it “But pass law; a power Congress such no has House rights of the invasion of legislation anis such upon study sub- kindred you laws will But if States. read and will jects enacted heretofore sustaining not be- I do laws such courts of the decisions even mind of in the remain will a doubt lieve powers of States-rights as to advocate most ardent subject.” Id., at upon this of court deci- a number Representative Newton discussed up- laws therein compared federal repeatedly sions considering: Congress was bill held with just read, can I have decisons which face “In the is any question an automobile what but be there line transported a State across State in one profit yielding purpose for into another 'interstate transporting constitutes the same person . . . commerce’? particular vehicle no be observed it will
“Thus the article necessary make order to transportation is necesary that is it nor commerce, transported interstate pur-. specific transported for be should article ..necessary it to become pose. All that transported one State be it shall is that on foot. though driven live stock it be another, even *23 to an- from one State driving cattle diseased of “If the just decision as held in commerce, interstate is other Supreme of the United by Court held as and cited, (95 465), Hus[e]n S.,U. u of Railroad case in the States from one State driving automobile of a stolen then the meaning term. of that certainly within falls another transportation from one State to a woman “If the prostitution, automobile, for an means of another, it be ar- commerce, then how can interstate constitutes driving of a stolen any color, that gued, show profit not in- is one State another from automobile Id., at 5475-5476. commerce?” terstate history legislative the ab- in the statements these Given any legislator intended any indication that sence transportation of stolen auto- proscribe than the more Act to that Con- it is manifest another, into one State mobiles from and referred commerce” gress the term “interstate used construing sim- Clause the Commerce decisions this Court’s authority proscribe the its ply the source to articulate The Court’s transportation of stolen automobiles. interstate incorporated into the statute suggestion that quite is commerce” of “interstate definition constitutional implausible.
C analysis leg the Court’s final Representatives colloquy following history between is the Dyer: Anderson gentleman I ask the will
“Mr. ANDERSON. thing in its defi- the same meant committee whether 2 as it meant section commerce of interstate nition 4? section point gentleman will If the so. I think DYER.
“Mr. glad. I shall be differs, it wherein out section under In the definition ANDERSON. “Mr. one means you you find to section if refer another, while to you constituting inter- car vehicle or motor have there scarcely you a sen- foreign have commerce, section. sible gentleman say if there I will DYER.
“Mr. see, matter I do there, difference *24 by Supreme has Court, would be construed many by passed upon what is meant interstate and times really necessary foreign I commerce. think it is not put request in this It was done at the the definition bill. of the committee. The of some of the members Su- many preme has times what is interstate Court decided myself any I not think definition is commerce. do necessary.” at 5472. Id., upon Representa- places so much reliance the Court
Since parsing Dyer’s ante, 650-652, a careful answer, tive see 2(b) provided “[t]he necessary. of the bill term Section Act, as used in this shall include commerce,’ . . . ‘interstate transportation ... from one State another State.” receipt, proscribed con- of the bill Stat. Section bartering, disposition storage, sale, or sto- cealment, part “moving as, of, or which is a or which len motor vehicle Representa- interstate . . . commerce.” Ibid. constitutes §2 in- tive Anderson’s confusion is understandable: defined transportation; 4, in terms of interstate terstate commerce that the automobile itself consti- however, seemed to indicate apart commerce, from the tuted interstate Dyer obviously Representative did not understand the it.9 perceived he no difference between confusion because meaning commerce” insofar as the of “interstate two sections that this knew what He had no doubt Court was concerned. correctly; § in- and that would be construed the term meant statutory “inter- for the definition of deed, saw no need he Represent- if it could be said that Even state commerce.” willing Dyer to this for the definition was to defer Court ative § that is not what commerce element the interstate Dyer proposed in- Act as and as enacted did. just previously de Representative the section that This is receipt “the of the stolen car punishment for the providing scribed as selling disposing of it.” purpose of for the in another State thieves Id., at 5472. *25 as transporta- commerce” of “interstate definition eluded § which con- Moreover, another. from one State tion commerce, is the to interstate reference confusing tained interprets section Court not the §2315, of precursor Act, which Dyer 3 of the § 2314 is of The precursor today. confusion Anderson’s with Representative do nothing has answer. Dyer’s Representative and Repre- between this one colloquy, another Interestingly, confu- indicates Saunders, also Hastings sentatives bill: § of the meaning of about sion gentleman’s to direct the I want “Mr. HASTINGS. stolen, is an automobile Suppose section attention to and is some one point of Virginia in the State say, Virginia of the State other point some transported that property who knows there one to some and sold under offense be a Federal stolen, would have been 4? section How I not. think Virginia.
“Mr. SAUNDERS has done been has what that point toUp it be? would Fed- offense. of a Federal dignity not reached in inter- movement is a there when begins eral offense commerce. state anyone 4 provides Section
“Mr. HASTINGS. stolen, it to have knowing property receiving lines, across gone it to have not require it does closely. read section if you perceive will you as did The gentleman Virginia. SAUNDERS “Mr. says: which in line language read the consti- which of, or is a part as, or which Moving commerce. foreign tutes difficulty gentleman answers “And that Rec. 5477 Cong. Oklahoma.” asked Dyer Representative colloquy, this after Immediately con- we were bill. If passed House vote, and for a Act, Dyer §to successor §2315, struing § requires the colloquy would seem to indicate then this notwithstanding the lines, crossed to have automobile section confusing commerce” “interstate reference Representative Dyer’s Ander- Representative answer to construing any event, are not In we son’s observation. com- the definition §2314, and §2315, but leg- as well as the statute’s Act, in the merce” included precursor clearly history, §3, the indicates that islative *26 transportation only § lines proscribed across state the 2314, of stolen automobiles.
II merely Property in Act, 1934, enacted The Stolen National transportation Dyer in interstate to the Act extended the property.10 types The Act was of stolen other commerce of history legislative confirms passed debate, but its little they 1919, the Committees points did made above. As the “transportation phrase the used of and Members interchangeably property” stolen of interstate transportation stolen of phrases as “interstate with such prop- “transportation lines of stolen across state property” or Report Judiciary erty.” described Committee The Senate transportation [with] Dyer interstate “concerned Act as the Cong., Rep. 2d 73d 538, No. S. vehicles.” stolen motor of Report Judiciary (1934). Committee The House Sess., punish designed trans- “[t]his bill is that stated money.” H. R. property, securities, portation of stolen (1934). Cong, It noted also , Sess. 2 Rep. 2d 1462, 73d No. Act, adopted slightly a Property National Stolen In the 1934 one the included commerce” than of different definition that term shall 2(b) provides Dyer Act Section Dyer Act. 2(a) State, whereas another from one transportation include mean shall the terms provides the 1934 enactment reason to believe that one There no to another State. from one State see the the other. But than any broader intended be definition was 650-652, 14. n. discussion, ante, at Court’s curious providing Congresses bills “[previous have considered property.” shipment of stolen punishment for interstate “Gangsters who now Ashurst told Senate: Ibid. Senator except the State convey property, vehicles, across stolen gesture their derision, thumb immemorial line, with provisions of the bill extends This at the officers. nose property in the bill.” [Dyer Act] described other stolen history Cong. like the Also Rec. constitu- Reports Dyer in 1934substantiated Act, to the deci- reference tionality time enactment, this of the supra, Rep. Dyer No. S. upholding Act. See sions supra, Rep. at No. H. R. 2; at point that merits consider- Reports an additional made The re- in memorandum Department Justice, ation. explained Report, troubles printed in the Senate extending Act to other attempts previous property faced: had federalizing opposition explanation
“The developed at concern which was crimes such machinery burdening Federal *27 over the time justice. rea- administering was for this It criminal pass in bill a similar failed the Senate son also heavy placed Govern- the Federal burden on The 1930. trans- by Dyer which concerned Act, ment ap- become had then vehicles, portation motor stolen .of supra, 2. Rep. at 538, parent.” No. S. jurisdiction to cases limited federal therefore
The Senate bill involving House The more. property $1,000 worth explanation: with this $5,000, limit to increased the great place burden a too it would “It is believed that it to undertake to ask Department of Justice on violating sub- every person prosecute apprehend and regard without provisions a“Iaw such stantive valuations minimum The property involved. amount give required in the Federal Government fixed the bill jurisdiction figures asked and recommended are Rep. Attorney swpra, H. R. No. at General.” 2. point increase. The to be made is
The Senate acceded to the Congress recognized that federal law enforcement au- recognition This makes it all thorities had limited resources. likely in did not intend 1934to extend more beyond proscription the interstate of stolen its property.
Ill Quoting from v. Sheridan, United States U. S. §2314 [enacting] declares that “in 384, the Court ‘contemplated coming detecting to the aid of the states punishing complete offenses criminals whose are under state who the channels of law, but utilize interstate commerce to getaway make a successful and thus make the state’s detect- ing punitive processes impotent.’” Ante, Ironi- cally, quote actually position. this refutes the- Court’s assumes, must, Court as it that the state offense committed by petitioner forging Pennsyl- a check—was committed — petitioner Ohio, vania rather than in from which commenced journey. case, therefore, his interstate This is not a complete offense was under defendant’s state law getaway. Rather, before he crossed state lines to make his. in which the defendant crossed lines this is case underlying then committed the state offense.11 It is even although meaning in- that, the issue of the more ironic phrase of 2314was terstate commerce not before Court thrice referred to that element as the Sheridan, Court *28 transportation” securities. See Remarkably, today places 387. S., 384, 385, U. the Court statutory significanceupon in- so much formulation of the petitioner where The evidence does indicate traveled after forgeries. referring though even of 2314 element
terstate 1919and Members the Committees element to that repeatedly- Sheridan, Congresses, well this Court as today rejects as too Court that the the formulation used narrow.
IV prosecuted and con- argument petitioner’s he was sympa- may generate wrong little statute under the victed fate of with the however, is not thy.12 primary concern, Our scope identify the is to Rather, our concern this defendant. responsibility for law enforce- Government’s the Federal determine. scope is a matter ment. That n Inthis has allowed the Court me is clear to case, it responsibility and of state an area prosecutor into encroach respect- I drawn. therefore has cross a line fully dissent. §2315, succes C. 18 U. S. he violated concedes 12 Petitioner might Arg. 11. Petitioner of Oral See Tr. Dyer Act. §4
sor to 2d, at 285 F. §2314. See paragraphs other have violated also of Oral Tr. dissenting part); concurring part J., (Higginbotham, Arg.