120 Minn. 380 | Minn. | 1913
This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action brought by plaintiff to vacate and cancel a decree entered December Id, 1897, in the district court of Meeker county, dissolving the marriage relation theretofore existing between plaintiff and her husband, on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction to render the -decree and that it was procured through the wilful perjury and deception of the husband. From the pleadings and findings the following facts appear:
In 1887 plaintiff and W. C. McElrath were married in Meeker county, Minnesota, and lived on a farm -together until April, 1891,
A few months thereafter this action was brought against the legatees named in the will of McElrath to set aside the divorce decree. The court found “that the said decree of divorce was by the said McElrath obtained by and through, deceit, perjury and corruption, and by gross fraud practiced by him upon the court,”’ but granted no relief to plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that on the findings she is entitled to relief, first, on the ground that the divorce decree is and always was a
The return made by the party who served the summons in the-divorce suit shows on its face legal service. The court finds as to the service that it was made by the person who made the return handing to the defendant therein,' this plaintiff, at her parents’’ home, a copy of the summons and complaint, inclosed in a plain,, sealed, and unaddressed envelope, and stating that her husband had requested him to hand the same to her. Although she immediately gave the envelope to her mother without opening it, it is found that, she acquainted herself with the contents of the papers, and on the> day the papers were so served upon her wrote to her husband, denying that she had deserted him, and in substance stating that the-charge of desertion made by him in his complaint was wholly false- and untrue. We entertain no doubt of the legal sufficiency of the-service.
The complaint, after stating the residence of the plaintiff in the-suit, the age of the parties, their marriage, and that there was no. issue, alleged:
“That some time in the month of April, 1891, the said defendant then and there wilfully abandoned and deserted her said husband,, this plaintiff, wilfully abandoning and deserting the home he had provided for her, against his wishes and without his consent, and contrary to his express desires; that said defendant has never since that time returned to this plaintiff, but has ever since continued to reside apart from him; that soon thereafter said defendant removed or caused to be removed from the home of this plaintiff all of her personal effects and belongings.”
The complaint is not a model pleading, but an attack now, 14 years after judgment, comes top late if a cause of action can reasonably be spelled out of the allegations. Smith v. Dennett, 15 Minn.
“A judgment is never void for error, if the court has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and the subject-matter of the action; Therefore defects in the pleadings in a civil action — for example, the failure of the complaint tó state facts constituting a cause of action — do not render a judgment void. It is valid unless reversed or set aside on appeal or by some other appropriate proceeding in the action. An independent action in equity to set aside a judgment cannot be resorted to as a substitute for a demurrer to a defective pleading. 1 Freeman on Judgments, § 135; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. (2d ed.) 1069.”
It must be admitted that in this divorce suit' the wilful desertion of the defendant in April, 1891, was alleged with legal accuracy. The contention is that the subsequent allegations do not show that the wilful desertion continued up to the commencement of the suit, and that, conceding that the leaving her husband’s home was a wilful intention to desert, the desertion could immediately be terminated by the parties, as in fact was done, for by mutual consent the wife was to remain with her parents to receive needed care. But we are of opinion that it is fairly inferable from the allegations that the pleader intended to charge a continuous wilful desertion from April, 1891, up to the institution of the suit.
Plaintiff also contends that the findings bring her within the provision of R. L. 1905, § 4277. As that section has been construed, it does not apply to the fraud and perjury whereby the issues tendered by the pleadings are established at the trial. Hass v. Billings, 42 Minn. 63, 43 N. W. 797; Colby v. Colby, 59 Minn. 432,
But it is urged that in vindication of its own honor and integrity the court must purge its records of judgments and decrees obtained through practices such as herein found, no matter at what time it is apprised thereof, and it is said this is especially true in divorce suits, wherein the state is so vitally interested. It is often said that in every divorce action the state is the third party, whose rights the court must zealously protect. The welfare of the nation depends in a great measure on the stability and permanency of the marriage relation. We also grant that upon an application to vacate a decree of divorce, because wrongfully obtained, where such vacation results in reinstating the marriage, the court should be equally solicitous in promoting the interest of the state. But where the court is not invited to act until the marriage in question is irrevocably dissolved by a power beyond the control of any court of justice, we have a different situation. Such is the present case — a mere property controversy, based on the existence or nonexistence of a valid divorce decree. Therefore the equitable principles which ordinarily rule property rights should be applied.
True, there is much in plaintiffs case which strongly inclines a
Although the finding is that it does not appear that plaintiff ever ascertained the exact perjured testimony by means of which the decree was obtained, or to what extent the true situation was concealed from the court who tried the divorce suit, still we may not shut our eyes to the fact that plaintiff and her parents knew and appreciated that the allegations in the complaint were false, and that necessarily perjury and deception would have to be used in order to obtain a divorce.
We have found no case holding that a spouse, with knowledge that the other, through fraud or perjury, not going to the jurisdiction of the court, has obtained a decree of divorce, may sit idly by for years, until the death of the one guilty of fraud, and then successfully invoke the equity powers of the court to secure property rights. When the spouse wronged by the decree, or any one claiming under such an one, comes into court asking relief, so that property may be reached, it must be done within a reasonable time after knowledge of the fraud, or of facts from which a person of ordinary prudence would proceed to ascertain the true state of affairs. The application in Olmstead v. Olmstead, 41 Minn. 297, 43 N. W. 67, was
In Sammons v. Pike, 108 Minn. 291, 120 N. W. 540, 122 N. W. 168, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1254, 133 Am. St. 425, the majority opinion concedes the law to be in effect that, where a decree of divorce is voidable because of fraud, the victim of the fraud, may, by unexplained delay lasting until after the death of the perpetrator of the fraud, or by other conduct operating hy way of waiver or estoppel, be prevented from asserting a right to the distributive share of the property left by the wrongdoer, but holds that, where a decree is rendered by a court without jurisdiction, it is a nullity, and may be attacked either collaterally or directly at any time. It is, however, to be noted that the present Chief Justice dissented, in which dissent Chief Justice Start joined, being of the opinion that long acquiescence hy a party to a divorce decree valid on its face, though void in fact, would prevent the assertion of property rights based on the existence of the marriage relation after the rendition of the decree.
The case of Zoellner v. Zoellner, 46 Mich. 511, 9 N. W. 831, is quoted with approval in the majority opinion in Sammons v. Pike, supra, where nine years’ unexcused delay was held fatal to the right to vacate a divorce decree. In Evans v. Woodsworth, 213 Ill. 404, 72 N. E. 1082, a delay of less than 2½ years after knowledge of the divorce was held a bar to the right to have a decree vacated for fraud. So in Nicholson v. Nicholson, 113 Ind. 131, 15 N. E. 223, where the proceeding to vacate was instituted during the life of both, the court held that a lapse of 4 years after the plaintiff had been fully informed of the alleged fraudulent decree showed laches which prevented redress. The court says: “A court that has been imposed on by a party, who has obtained its decree in his favor by fraud and imposition, will not be slow to vindicate the administration of justice by setting aside a decree so obtained, provided the injured party is diligent in invoking its aid in that behalf.” Earle v. Earle, 91 Ind. 27.
In the divorce suit here in question the court acquired jurisdiction
Judgment affirmed.