141 Iowa 286 | Iowa | 1909
Plaintiff is the widow, and defendant the mother, of G. J. McDowell, who died intestate and
Defendant argues the case as if plaintiff were relying upon an oral will made by deceased during his lifetime, but that is not her position. She is claiming the property as. the widow of the deceased and pleads as against defendant, the mother of the deceased, an estoppel, based upon her statements and conduct just prior to the demise of Gr. J. McDowell. While there is a conflict in the testimony regarding a conversation which took place between the deceased, his mother, and his wife just prior to his decease, we think the preponderance thereof shows that deceased intended that his wife should have all of his property; that when he realized death was at hand, and within three or four hours of the time it
The better procedure, of course,-to have been pursued by the deceased was to have made a deed and bill of sale of his property, running directly to his wife, or, better still, he could easily have made a will. But he did neither, and the ultimate question here is, may an heir or successor in interest to a decedent’s property so conduct himself as that he will be barred from claiming any interest therein? Unless our statutes of descent are to be regarded as absolute and as inflexible as the laws of the Medes and Persians, the facts recited should estop the defendant from claiming any interest in her son’s estate. And the ultimate question in the case is, may one be estopped by declarations or conduct from claiming under the statutes of descent? The general rule announced by the decisions is that a property right, created in favor of one by an estoppel, is superior to the statute of frauds and the statutory provisions with reference to the execution of wills and conveyances of real estate and personal property. Cooley on Torts (2d Ed.) latter part section 569. As supporting this rule, see Dowd v. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197;
No case to which our attention has been called is exactly in point, although the Dowd case, supra, is like it in principle. There was a statement by testator that he wished and intended a particular person to have his property, or a part thereof, and a devisee under the testator’s will, who would take if the will were not changed, was informed of this desire, and consented that the party named should have it. On the strength of the promise testator did not change his will by codicil, as he might have done, and died leaving his original will unchanged. The Connecticut court on this state of facts held that the devisee under the will was a trustee for the benefit' of the person to whom the testator wished to give the property, and ordered the devisee to make a conveyance thereof to the party to whom the testator intended the property to go. This case seems to announce the correct doctrine. The deceased was induced not to make a will or deed on the strength of defendant’s assurance that plaintiff was to have all the property. On the faith of the agreement he permitted a title to one-half of the property to vest under the statutes of descent in his mother. After his death the mother asserts title absolute to one-half of the property under the statutes of descent. Dnder such circumstances it is not difficult to find a trust, either expressed or implied, either in virtue of the promise, or by reason of the fact that to allow defendant to disregard it would constitute a fraud upon plaintiff, and thus create a constructive trust for her benefit. Whether this be worked out by estoppel, or upon the theory of- a trust, is entirely immaterial.
Appellant’s counsel do not seriously contend that such an arrangement as is claimed by plaintiff may not be enforced in equity, but she insists that no such arrangement was made, and that whatever the agreement, it did not
The decree is therefore affirmed.