McDOUGALL et al., Appellants, v. SMITH, Appellee.
No. 11-10-04.
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Paulding County.
Decided Dec. 13, 2010.
[Citе as McDougall v. Smith, 191 Ohio App.3d 101, 2010-Ohio-6069.]
Robert B. Fitzgerald and Angela M. Elliott, for appellee.
WILLAMOWSKI, Presiding Judge.
{3} On July 16, 2009, McDougall and Rager filed a complaint in their individual capacities and as administrators of the estates of their wives, Heidi and Kelly. The complaint alleged that Smith‘s negligence in causing the first accident resulted in the injuries arising from the second accident. Smith filed his answer on September 14, 2009. An amended answer was filed on February 17, 2010. On March 22, 2010, Smith filed a motion for summаry judgment. McDougall and Rager filed their response to the motion on April 12, 2010. On May 4, 2010, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. McDougall and Rager appeal from this judgment and raise the following assignments of error.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court committed reversible error by holding, as a matter of law, that [Smith] did not proximately cause injury.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court committed reversible error by holding, as a matter of law, that [Smith] owed no duty under the common law rescue doctrine.
{4} When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must proceed cautiously and award summary judgment only when appropriate. Franks v. Lima News (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 408, 672 N.E.2d 245. ”
{5} McDougall and Rager allege in the first assignment of error that the trial court erred in finding that Smith‘s actions in causing the first accident were not the proximate cause of their injuries. “Proximate causе” has been
Whether an intervening act breaks the causal connection between negligence and injury depends upon whether that intervening cause was reasonably forеseeable by the one who was guilty of the negligence. * * * The causal connection of the first аct of negligence is broken and superseded by the second, only if the intervening negligent act is both nеw and independent. The term “independent” means the absence of any connection or relationship of cause and effect between the original and subsequent act of negligence. The term “new” means that the second act of negligence could not reasonably have been foreseen.
(Emphasis omitted.) R.H. Macy & Co., Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co. (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 108, 110-111, 554 N.E.2d 1313. “The test * * * is whether the original and successive acts may be joined together as a whole, linking each of the actors as to the liability, or whether there is a new and independеnt act or cause which intervenes and thereby absolves the original negligent actor.” Cascone v. Herb Kay Co. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 155, 160, 6 OBR 209, 451 N.E.2d 815.
{6} Here, the question is whether the second accident was a reasonably foreseeable outcоme of the first accident or whether it was a new and independent act. One is permitted to assume that others will follow the law and exercise ordinary care. Hicks v. Prelipp, 6th Dist. No. H-03-028, 2004-Ohio-3004, 2004 WL 1293999, ¶ 10, quoting Swoboda v. Brown (1935), 129 Ohio St. 512, 2 O.O. 516, 196 N.E. 274. As a matter of law, one need not anticipate that another driver will violate the law and that a collision will occur. Id. Thus, such a collision is not foreseeable. Id. If the second collision is not a foreseeable consequence of the first accident, then the сausal chain is broken and Smith is not liable for the injuries to McDougall and Rager. The first assignment of error is overruled.
{7} In the second assignment of error, McDougall and Rager allege that the trial court errеd in finding that the rescue doctrine did not apply. Since this court has determined that Smith‘s actions in causing thе first accident were not the proximate cause of the second action, there cаn be no finding of negligence. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on this basis, and any other determinations by thе trial court are irrelevant. The second assignment of error concerning whether the rescue doctrine applies is moot and will not be addressed by this court.
ROGERS and PRESTON, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.