273 F. 113 | 8th Cir. | 1921
In the year 1914 the United States brought this suit against those who it alleged were claimants as or under the full-blood Indian heirs' of Barney Thlocco, a deceased full-blood Creek Indian, to whom or to the heirs of whom the lands in question in this case had been duly allotted, patented, and conveyed with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior prior to 1904, for the purpose of having such allotment, patent, and conveyance avoided. Many claimants as or under these heirs to the title to this land, and to the oil and gas derived from it, became parties to the suit, either as defendants or interveners. The Black Panther Oil & Gas Company had an oil and gas lease under a claimant to this heirship who proved to be successful, and has been operating under that lease and under the direction of the court upon and in this land, and paying the royalties to a receiver and to the court below.
In May, 1915, that court rendered a decree upon the merits against the United States, which was ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court, and a decree of its dismissal from this suit, based upon the mandate of the Supreme Court, was rendered in the District Court below in February, 1918. By that time the. amounts received from the royalties under the control and subject to the disposition of the court below aggregated more than $1,000,000, and that court proceeded to hear and adjudge the claims to this fund and to the land of the defendants and interveners. The hearing of these issues was commenced in December, 1918, and final decrees adjudging the rights of the respective parties’ were rendered in 1919, and have been brought to this court for review by the appeals of several claimants.
Counsel for Mr. Knight found this motion upon the Act of Congress of June 14, 1918, 40 Stat. 606, U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1919, §§ 4234a and 4234b, which provide that:
Section 4284a: “A determination of the question of fact as to who are the heirs of any deceased citizen allottee of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians who may die or may have heretofore died, leaving restricted heirs, by the probate court of the state of Oklahoma having jurisdiction to settle the estate of said deceased, conducted in the maimer provided by the laws of said state for the determination of heirship in closing up the estates of deceased persons, shall be conclusive of said question: Provided, that an appeal may be taken in the maimer and to the court, provided by lav/, in eases of appeal in probate matters generally: Provided further, that where the time limited by the laws of said state for the institution; of administration proceedings has elapsed without their institution, as well as in cases where there exists no lawful ground for the institution of administration proceedings in said courts, a petition may be filed therein having for its object a determination of such heirship and the case shall proceed in all respects as if administration proceedings upon other proper grounds had been regularly begun, but this proviso shall not be construed to reopen the question of the determination of an heirship already ascertained by competent legal authority under existing laws. * * * ”
Section 4234b: “The lands of full-blood members of any of the Five Civilized Tribes are hereby made subject to the laws) of the state of Oklahoma, providing for the partition of real estate. * a * ”
The contention of Mr. Knight’s counsel is that, as the answer to the question who were the heirs of Thlocco necessarily conditions the rights of each of the claimants in this suit, the court below had no jurisdiction, after the passage of the act which has been recited, to adjudge their claims or rights, or to render the decrees below by which it determined them. In support of this position they have cited, and the court has read and considered, the opinions of the courts in Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U. S. 506, 507, 508, 36 Sup. Ct. 202, 60 L. Ed. 409; Pel-Ata-Yakot v. United States (D. C.) 188 Fed. 387, 389; Parr v. Colfax, 197 Fed. 302, 304, 317 C. C. A. 48; McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 466, 467, 469, 27 Sup. Ct. 346, 51 L. Ed. 566; Ross v. Stewart, 227 U. S. 532, 537, 33 Sup. Ct. 345, 57 L. Ed. 626; United States v. Kagama, 138 U. S. 375;
All parties to this suit claim under the heirs of Barney Thlocco and concede: (1) That all the claimants derive their rights from full-blood restricted heirs of a deceased citizen allottee of one of the Five Civilized Tribes; (2) that an answer to the question who were the heirs of Thlocco was indispensable to the just adjudication of the claims of the parties to the suit; (3) that the jurisdiction to adjudge the answer
Again, the Act of June 25, 1910, not only conferred the power, but it imposed the duty, upon the Secretary to hear and decide who were the heirs of each decedent named therein, its command was the Secretary “shall ascertain the legal heirs of such decedent and his decision thereon shall be final and conclusive,” and that command -was an injunction against the subsequent effectual determination of such heirs by any other tribunal. On the other hand, the Act of June 14, 1918, contains no command to the probate courts to ascertain the restricted heirs of the decedents described in the act and no injunction against their ascertainment and determination by other tribunals which had jurisdiction of that issue. Moreover, the Act of June 25, 1910, declared the determination of the Secretary final and conclusive in each case. It made no exception and provided no method of review. But the Act oí June 14, 1918, excepts from the jurisdiction of the probate court “an heirship already ascertained by competent legal authority under existing laws,” declares that “the lands of full-blood members of any of the Five Civilized Tribes are hereby made subject to the laws of the state of Oklahoma, providing for the partition of real estate”' — • laws which confer jurisdiction of such partition upon the district courts of that state — and declares that the determination of the probaf.e court shall be conclusive, not final, and allows an appeal from every such determination to the proper district court of the state. When all the terms and provisions of the act are read together and given their proper effect, it is in legal effect a simple provision that, if tile proper court having probate jurisdiction determines who the restricted heirs of one of the deceased allottees described in that act are, after the notices have been given and the proceedings have been taken as prescribed therein, and if that heirship had not been already determined by legal authority under existing laws, and if no appeal is taken from the probate court’s determination, but not otherwise, it shall be conclusive.
And if a broader view be taken, if the situation of the restricted heirs at the time of the passage of the act and flic practical operation thereof he considered, one cannot fail to see that the effect of it must be, and that the purpose of it doubtless was, to open another and a more facile, convenient, and comprehensive avenue of approach to a final and conclusive adjudication of the question it treats by the federal and state district courts by means of the probate proceedings authorized in the act against all the world and by the appeals from the decisions of the probate court to the federal and state district courts.
In State v. Huser, 76 Okl. 130, 184 Pac. 122, 124, Judge Rainey in
The radical difference between the objects and terms of the Act of June 25, 1910, upon which the decisions in Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U. S. 506, 507, 508, 36 Sup. Ct. 202, 60 L. Ed. 409, Pel-Ata-Yakot v. United States (D. C.) 188 Fed. 387, 389, and Parr v. Colfax, 197 Fed. 302, 304, 117 C. C. A. 48, are based, and the objects and terms of the Act of June 14, 1918, deprive the opinions in those cases of persuasive, much more of controlling, authority in the consideration of the proper construction and effect of the latter act.
There is no express repeal, nor is there any indication in the Act of June 14, 1918, that Congress intended thereby to repeal or to terminate the effect of the laws which gave jurisdiction to the federal and state district courts to ascertain who were the restricted heirs of the decedents described in that act,' and such a repeal or termination thereby may not be presumed and ought not to be implied. A contruction of this act that by it Congress intended to vest and did vest only concurrent jurisdiction in the probate courts of Oklahoma with the jurisdiction already vested in the federal and state district courts is consonant with all the terms of the act with the demands of the time and the situation under which it was passed with reason and authority. And the result is that a deliberate consideration of the jurisdiction of the federal and state district courts to determine who were the restricted heirs of the decedents described in the Act of June 14, 1918, prior fo the time of its passage, of the uncertain and doubtful condition of titles and rights of such heirs and of those claiming under them, of the evil at which it was aimed, of the purpose of its enactment, of the carefully guarded and limited terms of its grant of jurisdiction to the probate courts, of the exceptions from that grant, of the fact that all the decisions of thosé courts under it were made reviewable by the federal and state district courts, and of the general scope and tenor of this legislation, have left no doubt that it was not the intention of Congress by that act, nor was it the legal effect thereof, to deprive the federal or state courts of the jurisdiction vested in them before its passage to adjudge who were the restricted heirs of the decedents de
Since no proceedings have ever been had in the probate court of the state of Oklahoma to ascertain, and no determination has ever been made by any such court, who were or are the restricted heirs of Barney Thlocco, and since that question has long since been adjudged by the final decrees of the court below, there is no logical or reasonable way of escape from the conclusion that that court had full jurisdiction to hear and adjudge that question of heirship, and that this court has had and still has jurisdiction to review that adjudication. The motions of Mr. Knight to dismiss these appeals and to remand the cause in which they were taken to the court below, with directions to vacate its findings and decrees therein, and to hold the funds in its control until the probate court of Okfuskee county, Okl., determines who the restricted heirs of Thlocco were, or to dismiss the cause outright, must therefore be and they are in all things denied, with costs against Mr. Knight.
6 Sup. Ct. 1109, 30 L. Ed. 228.