54 P. 487 | Okla. | 1898
Action by Harry C. C. Stiles against William R. McDonald. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Reversed. *328
Opinion of the court by This was an action begun as unlawful entry and forcible detainer before a justice of the peace. The defendant in the justice's court filed his answer, denying the allegations of unlawful entry, and of plaintiff's right to possession, and also set up equitable title in himself, and that the plaintiff held the real estate in question in trust for him. The answer was verified, and the justice certified the cause to the district court, under the provisions of section 7, article 1, chapter 67, Statutes Oklahoma 1893. In the district court, McDonald, the defendant below, filed a cross-bill in equity to have Stiles declared a trustee for him, and to have the legal title to the lots in controversy conveyed to him. To this cross petition Stiles filed a plea of res adjudicata, to which plea McDonald demurred. The demurrer was overruled, and McDonald replied, denying the allegations of the plea. Trial was had, and judgment rendered for Stiles, and that the defendant McDonald was estopped by the former adjudication to set up the matters pleaded in his cross-petition. From this judgment McDonald appeals to this court.
It is the first duty of an appellate court, on the examination of a record, to look to its own jurisdiction, as well as the jurisdiction of the court from which the appeal was taken. Under our statutes, (article 13, ch. 67, Statutes 1893,) justices' courts are given exclusive original jurisdiction in actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer of lands or tenements, and the district courts of the Territory have no original jurisdiction in such actions. Under our statutes governing the action of unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful detention, the action *329
is purely a possessory action, and the title to the real estate in question cannot properly be put in issue. Deeds and other evidences of title may ordinarily be offered in evidence as proof of the right of possession, (Oklahoma City v. Hill,
In the case of Chisholm v. Weise,
We are satisfied that it was never the intention of the legislature that any question other than that of the right to possession should be tried in this class of cases. It was the purpose to provide a speedy and inexpensive mode of restoring possession of real estate to the one rightfully entitled to the same. By putting title in issue, and certifying the case to the district court, all the purposes and ends to be attained by this form of remedy, and the evils to be corrected, are defeated, and the action becomes one to try legal and equitable titles, and delays the determination of possessory rights. Upon neither sound reason nor principle can the practice be sustained of converting a possessory action into one of ejectment, *330 or one in equity to declare a resulting trust and decree conveyances of legal titles. There are appropriate forms of action and proper forums provided for the trial of all this class of cases, and the ends of justices will be much better subserved if the remedy intended to be provided for the unlawful withholding of possession of real estate is confined to the purposes for which it was originally designated.
It may be suggested that our statute was adopted from the state of Kansas, and that the courts of that state had adopted a settled construction of this law prior to its adoption by our legislature. We have found but one case involving the question here presented, viz. McNamara v. Culver,
The true test in such cases is, is the cause one in which the question of the title to real estate may be properly set up as a defense to the cause of action set forth in the bill of particulars? The district court having been without jurisdiction in this cause, its proceedings were void, and the judgment is reversed, with directions to dismiss the cause in the district court, and remand same to the justice's court, with directions to strike from the files that portion of the answer which sets up that the title and boundaries of the lots in controversy are in dispute, and to fix a day, and proceed with the trial of the cause; and that each party pay the costs made by him, both in this court and the district court.
All of the Justices concurrring. *332