471 U.S. 1009 | SCOTUS | 1985
Lead Opinion
Sup. Ct. Mo.;
C. A. 4th Cir.;
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;
Sup. Ct. Ga.;
Sup. Ct. Fla.;
Sup. Ct. N. C.;
Sup. Ct. S. C.;
Sup. Ct. S. C.;
Sup. Ct. Ala.;
Sup. Ct. S. C.; and
Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 83-6298, 661 S. W. 2d 497; No. 84-6006, 748 F. 2d 852; No. 84-6036, 682 S. W. 2d 301; No. 84-6098, 676 S. W. 2d 364; No. 84-6131, 253 Ga. 604, 323 S. E. 2d 150; No. 84-6167, 458 So. 2d 226; No. 84-6183, 312 N. C. 92, 322 S. E. 2d 110; Nos. 84-6186 and 84-6189, 285 S. C. 21, 328 S. E. 2d 464; No. 84-6223, 459 So. 2d 948; No. 84-6230, 285 S. C. 13, 328 S. E. 2d 53; No. 84-6254, 680 S. W. 2d 141.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.
