102 So. 38 | Ala. | 1924
Appellee brought her action at law against the Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Company on a policy of life insurance. The insured was plaintiff's (appellee's) husband at the time of his death; but she was his second wife, and the policy had been purchased during the life of the first wife who was then named therein as beneficiary. It provided as follows:
"The insured, upon presentation of this policy for proper indorsement, may, with the written approval of the president or vice president, and while this policy is in force, change the beneficiary hereof. Such change shall take effect upon the indorsement of the same on the policy by the company."
In pursuance of this provision, after the death of the first wife and after the marriage of plaintiff and the insured, the policy was changed and plaintiff was named therein as sole beneficiary, and so the policy read at the death of insured. Meantime insured and appellee, his second wife, became estranged, separated, and at the time of his death his bill for divorce and her claim for alimony were pending. In the meantime, also, insured notified the company of his desire and intention to have the names of his son and daughter by his first wife substituted in the policy as beneficiaries and by his attorneys *140 requested — such is the effect of his communication to the company — that the change be made, but was unable to present the policy for the company's indorsement to that effect, because it was in the possession of the plaintiff in this cause, and it was therefore impossible for him to present the policy to the company. To this, so far as appears by the record, the company made no response; and so the policy remained without further change until the death of insured some months afterward. Before issue joined in plaintiff's suit, defendant insurance company filed an interpleader suggesting that Kenneth M. McDonald and Aleta McDonald Berry, son and daughter of insured, individually and as administrator and administratrix of his estate, claimed the money due on the policy, and paid the amount thereof into court with a prayer that said claimants be given notice, and that it be discharged of all further liability in the premises. Claimants interposed their claim in two aspects, to wit: They claimed the fund in court as beneficiaries under the policy; they claimed it "as executors of the will of Thomas C. McDonald, deceased," alleging themselves to have been so appointed by the probate court of Jefferson county. Plaintiff demurred to each claim, alleging various and sundry objections thereto, after which claimants moved the court to make an order transferring the cause to the equity side of the court for further consideration. Plaintiff's demurrer was sustained, the motion to transfer the cause was overruled, and, claimants having nothing further to say, judgment was rendered for plaintiff. Claimants, individually and as executors, have appealed.
The facts have been stated as they appear in the pleadings. If it appeared from the pleadings that a case proper for interpleader was not presented — which is to say that the interpleader conferred no jurisdiction on the court — or that clearly plaintiff was entitled to the fund, there was, after claimants declined to plead further, no course open to the court but to render judgment for the plaintiff.
In limine appellee (plaintiff) insists that the pleadings made no proper case for interpleader because the statute does not authorize the substitution of more than one claimant, and it is suggested that the language of the statute (section 6050 of the Code of 1907), only authorizes a defendant to make affidavit "that a person * * * claims the money in controversy" and provides means of bringing in "such person." To this objection the first section of the Code provides a sufficient answer: "The singular includes the plural." But it is urged that, if as many as two intervening claimants are authorized under the statute, there may as well be a dozen, and it is said, obviously, endless confusion would follow in a trial by jury where a plurality of claims are presented, and so that the right of trial by jury would be seriously impaired. In the first place this proceeding is an innovation upon the common law, and, no provision for trial by jury being expressed, it may safely be denied that the right exists. 15 R. C. L. 237, § 19; Clark v. Mosher,
Nor do the pleadings show that the claims of the substituted defendants arose out of any wrong of the original defendant, in which event interpleader would not be allowed. The pleadings disclose that the controversy has arisen out of the fact that the insured was unable to procure the substitution of the names of his children, the claimants, by reason of the fact that plaintiff had possession of the policy, whereas, for aught appearing, insured was entitled to such possession. This was no fault of original defendant which then had a right under its contract, reasonably construed, to insist upon the production of the policy, or, according to the authorities to which we shall refer, a showing that such production was without *141 the power of insured, as a condition to a formal change of beneficiary — this to save itself perchance from the annoyance of such complications as have arisen in this case.
The trial court appears to have proceeded upon the theory that, since the policy at the death of insured in terms and on its face was payable to appellee, the definitely expressed will of insured that appellants be substituted as beneficiaries — of which the insurance company had formal notice, though the policy was not produced — availed nothing, and the contract of insurance remained in legal effect unchanged. In this we think the court erred.
In the first place, had the contract been changed for the benefit of appellants in such sort that a court of equity would recognize and enforce their rights? It may be conceded that the insurance company had a right to stand upon the letter of its contract so far as the provisions thereof affected its interests until a change was made according to the method stipulated in the policy or until proof was forthcoming that it was without the power of the insured to comply in some respects with its stipulations. The provisions of the policy requiring presentation of the policy, the consent of the company to a change of beneficiary, and that such change should take effect upon the indorsement of the same on the policy by the company, might, as matter of course, to the extent they affected its interests, be waived, and were waived when the defendant company brought the fund into court for an adjudication between the plaintiff and appellants as to the merits of their respective claims. These propositions are fully sustained by the authorities cited in appellants' brief. Knights of Maccabees v. Sackett,
"The rule requiring the surrender of the old certificate, and indeed most of the rules of procedure in effecting a change of beneficiaries, are intended only for the benefit of the association, and may therefore be waived by it," and numerous cases are there cited.
The cases referred to for the most part arose out of policies in mutual benefit societies; but where, as here, the insured in an old-line company has in the terms of his contract the express right to make a change, no reason occurs to us why the rule should be different. Mutual Life v. Lowther,
But, of course, such waiver could not impair any right of the true beneficiary which became vested upon the death of the insured. Vested, in this connection, must mean that appellee had a right to the proceeds of the policy according to the law of the land, a right which could not be destroyed, impaired, or divested by any authority whatever. According to Judge Thomas M. Cooley:
"A right cannot be considered a vested right unless it is something more than such a mere expectancy as may be based upon an anticipated continuance of the present general laws; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property." 40 Cyc. 199.
As we have said in effect, the interest of the named beneficiary in a policy of insurance providing for a change of beneficiary at the will of the insured is a mere expectancy. The named beneficiary in such a policy has no vested interest during the life of the insured — 4 Cooley's Briefs, p. 3755. But the right of the named beneficiary, no change having been made in fact or legal effect, becomes fixed, vested, at the death of the insured, and it is freely conceded that such right cannot be affected by any subsequent acts of the insurance company. Payment of the fund into court for the benefit of the party who may be declared to be entitled to it in no way improves or prejudices the legal position of either the original or substituted beneficiary as that position was at the death of the insured. L.R.A. 1915A, 580.
But the question recurs: What was the true content of the contract at the death of the insured, if that content may be evidenced by the intent of the insured, as that intent, under the facts in evidence, must be presumed to have affected the concurrence of the company? Appellee's contention comes to this: That the face of the policy at that time must be taken as conclusive. On the one hand, insured had the right to change the beneficiary — an absolute right according to some authorities, of which we may cite Lahey v. Lahey,
There are numerous cases, based on quite similar facts, which go to sustain our conclusion that insured was entitled to have the name of the beneficiary changed in the policy, and that now a court of equity would decree that appellants are entitled to the proceeds. Isgrigg v. Schooley,
There are some cases to the contrary, but the burden of the argument for appellee is rested upon the decision in Freund v. Freund,
The briefs present the further inquiry whether the court of law, on a statutory interpleader, will take into judgment the considerations which would lead a court of equity to award the fund in question to appellants. Appellee's position is in substance that the principles of equity pleading and practice are due to be observed until the proceeding has conferred jurisdiction upon the law court; that is, until it be ascertained "(1) that two or more persons have a claim against the plaintiff; (2) that they claim the same thing; (3) that the plaintiff has no beneficial interest in the thing claimed; and (4) that he cannot determine without hazard to himself to which of the defendants the thing of right belongs" (15 R. C. L. 229, § 12), after which the substantive rights of the parties remaining before the court are to be determined according to the strict rules of law, no regard being had for the principles of equity, that the law court will not recognize nor enforce equitable rights — this, as we understand the argument, because such was the plan of procedure and theory of decision on interpleader at the common law and because, as we suppose the argument contemplates, equity jurisdiction is not by the terms of the statute conferred upon the law court. The remedy at the common law was not allowed in any personal action except detinue, and then only when it was founded either in privity of contract or upon a finding. Story Eq. Jur. (14th Ed.) § 1114. "In at least one jurisdiction the statute" — meaning the modern statute of interpleader at law — "is held to be broad enough to determine equitable rights and interests." 15 R. C. L. 235, § 18, citing Brierly v. Equitable Aid Union,
"A substitution effected under the statute changes an action, legal in its nature, into an equitable suit, and the principles which govern the remedy in equity then apply." *143
There are decisions to the contrary. As applied to cases like this they do not appeal to us; but, whatever may be thought of the broad statement of the text last quoted, our judgment is that in cases like that presented by this record, ownership of the money may be determined on equitable principles.
It will be observed that under the statute (section 6050 of the Code of 1907), such rights only may be litigated as arise out of contracts for the payment of money. After the order for an interpleader is made, the money in controversy deposited in court, and the original defendant discharged, two parties (two at least) are before the court, neither of whom has any semblance of a right of action at law against the other. In Clark v. Mosher, supra, a like case, in which, as Judge Stone observed in Nelson v. Goree,
"No agreement is necessary; assumpsit will lie wherever the circumstances are such that the law, ex debito justitiæ, will imply a promise. Nor is any privity in fact between the parties necessary. Where one man has money which ex equo et bono belongs to another, if there be no contract modifying the general liability, the person entitled to the money may recover it in an action for money had and received, and this although he knows nothing of the party who has the right; the law itself creates the privity and the promise."
If the original defendant were in court opposing appellants' claim, there might be some technical difficulty; but as between appellee and substituted defendants there are no technical difficulties. The simple question is to whom in good conscience should the money be awarded. And so in garnishment, a statutory proceeding, but administered upon equitable principles. Allen v. Woodruff,
Otherwise, it would have been the duty of the court on appellants' motion to transfer the cause to the equity side. Appellee while conceding this (subject, of course, to her contention that appellants showed no equitable right), now insists that the statute providing for the transfer of causes from one jurisdiction to the other allows no appeal in case the application for a change is denied, and therefore that such denial could not be considered for error on this appeal, if it were necessary to go that far with the case. This court considered the propriety of an order denying transfer in Briggs v. Prowell,
The authorities are greatly confused, but on the whole this court is of the opinion that the facts shown by the record, as it now *144 stands, authorized and required a judgment in favor of appellants.
Reversed and remanded.
ANDERSON, C. J., and GARDNER and MILLER, JJ., concur.