McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432

McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital

120 Mass. 432 | Mass. | 1876

Deveíts, J.

The ground upon which the plaintiff seeks to maintain this action is that the defendant undertook, through its agents and servants, to treat his broken leg, and that this was done so negligently and unskilfully that he was permanently injured. It does not become necessary to consider whether the defendant, as it contends, consented only to provide for the plaintiff a hospital bed, food and other comforts, while the attendance of the house pupil and surgeon was of such a character that they had the direct and exclusive professional charge of the patient, and are the only persons who can be made responsible for any neglect or want of professional skill and care. We are satisfied that, for other reasons, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover upon the case made by him.

The defendant was a public charitable institution under the laws of the Commonwealth. The object for which it was incorporated was to provide a general hospital for sick and insane persons. St. 1810, c. 94. Its funds are derived from grants and donations made by the Commonwealth from profits which it is entitled to receive from the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company and other companies incorporated in the Commonwealth, and from the grants, devises, donations, bequests and subscriptions of benevolent persons, and from the board of paying patients. While the price of board is placed as low as the funds of the hospital will permit, patients who are there received *435are expected to pay as nearly as possible according to their own circumstances and to the accommodations they receive. In addition to the accommodations provided for such patients, a certain number of free beds are furnished from the general funds of the institution and from donations made especially for this object, the occupants of which are not expected to pay anything. Regulations of Hospital, c. 15, §§ 1-4. Of one of these beds the plaintiff was an occupant.

The corporation, has no capital stock, no provision for making dividends or profits, and whatever it may receive from any source it holds in trust to be devoted to the object of sustaining the hospital and increasing its benefit to the public, by extending or improving its accommodations and diminishing its expenses. Its funds are derived mainly from public and private charity; its affairs are conducted for a great public purpose, that of administering to the comfort of the sick, without any expectation, on the part of those immediately interested in the corporation, of receiving any compensation which will enure to their own benefit, and without any right to receive such compensation. This establishes its character as a public charity. Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539. The fact that its funds are supplemented by such amounts as it may receive from those who are able to pay wholly or entirely for the accommodation they receive does not render it the less a public charity. All sums thus obtained are held upon the same trust as those which are the gifts of pure benevolence. Gooch v. Association for Relief of Aged Females, 109 Mass. 558.

Nor does the fact that the trustees, through their agents, are themselves to determine who are to be the immediate objects of the charity, and that no person has individually a right to demand admission to its benefits, alter its character. All cannot participate in its benefits ; the trustees are those to whom is confided the duty of selecting those who shall enjoy them, and prescribing the terms upon which they shall do so. If this trust is abused, the trustees are under the superintending power of this court as a court of equity, by virtue of its authority to correct all such abuse, and the interest of the public therein, that is to say, of the indefinite objects of the charity, may be represented by the attorney general. Sanderson v. White, 18 Pick. 328. Attorney General v. Old South Society, 13 Allen, 474.

*436It might well be questioned whether any contract could be inferred between the plaintiff and defendant. It has offered to him freely those ministrations which, as the dispenser of a public charity, it has been able to provide for his comfort, and he has accepted them. It has no funds which'can be charged with any judgment which he might recover, except those which are held subject to the trust of maintaining the hospital. If, however, any contract can be inferred from the relation of the parties, it can be only on the part of the corporation that it shall use due and reasonable care in the selection of its agents. Where actions have been brought against commissioners of public works serving gratuitously, for negligence in carrying on the work, by which injury has occurred, it has been held that they were not liable if proper care had been used by them in selecting those who were actually to perform the work. Holliday v. St. Leonard’s, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 192. The liability of the defendant corporation can extend no further than this; if there has been no neglect on the part of those who administer the trust and control its management, and if due care has been used by them in the selection of their inferior agents, even if injury has occurred by the negligence of such agents, it cannot be made responsible. The funds intrusted to it are not to be diminished by such casualties, if those immediately controlling them have done their whole duty in reference to those who have sought to obtain the benefit of them. There was no attempt to show that the trustees had in any respect failed in the performance of their duty. If they had made suitable regulations, had selected proper persons to fill the position of surgeons, then, whether lhose persons neglected to perform their duty, or whether another person, as the house pupil, not selected for the office of surgeon, assumed without authority to act as such, and injury has thus resulted, the plaintiff has no remedy against the corporation. Judgment on the verdict.