100 Wash. 215 | Wash. | 1918
The respondent was run over and injured by a jitney bus on a street of the city of Seattle, while it was being operated by one H. F. Krueger under an oral contract with the owner, J. A. Lawrence. An action for the recovery of damages was instituted against the appellants Lawrence and wife and the Pacific Coast Casualty Company, the surety upon the
The various assignments of error made by the appellants are discussed by them under three general heads, the first of which is that the driver of the jitney bus was not the agent, servant, or employee of Lawrence at the time of the accident for which the respondent seeks damages. The only evidence showing the relationship of Krueger, the driver, to Lawrence, the owner of the jitney bus, was the. testimony of Krueger, as follows:
“I was driving for Mr. J. A. Lawrence at the time of the accident, ... I hired the car from Mr. J. A. Lawrence at the rate of $3 per day only. All I did was to buy my own gasoline and oil and Mr. Lawrence had practically no say whatever where I was supposed to run the automobile. ... I had an arrangement with Mr. Lawrence to hire the car at $3 a day. Nothing was said at the time of hiring the car about bonding the car. I did not know how it was bonded, but had an idea that all jitneys were bonded. . . . My only duty was to run the car for my own benefit after 'paying my $3. . . . There was no such agreement at all about depositing $3. We always paid after the shift was in. Never did pay in advance. There was no such thing about my being a partner with Mr. Lawrence. All I did was to hire the car from Mr. Lawrence. I bought my own gasoline and oil. Mr. Lawrence furnished everything else and kept up the car. It was always supposed to be in good running order. ’ ’
It is the claim of the appellants that this evidence shows a bailment or lease of the automobile by Lawrence to Krueger, whereby the appellants would1 be exonerated from any liability for the negligence of
The next contention of appellants is that, conceding that Lawrence may be estopped to deny that the driver of the jitney was his agent or employee, such estoppel would not apply to the casualty company, for the reason that the latter had no knowledge of any arrangement between Lawrence and Krueger as to the operation of the automobile. Their claim is based upon the
Contention is made that the court erred in giving the following charge to the jury:
“If any evidence has been given here tending to show the renting or leasing of the automobile in question by defendants Lawrence to the driver Krueger, you are instructed that any agreement between Lawrence and Krueger which would involve the violation of the statutes of this state regulating the operation of automobiles for hire would to that extent be void on the ground of public policy. And if you find from the evidence that at the time of the accident the automobile was owned by the defendants Lawrence, or either of them, and was being driven by Krueger as a passenger carrier for hire with the consent of said defendants Lawrence, or either of them, then they are both liable for the negligence, if any, of Krueger, and under the
The chief objection of the appellants is to the announcement that any arrangement between Lawrence and Krueger amounting to the renting of the automobile for the jitney business would be a contract in violation of the bonding law and hence void. The objection is not well taken. The object of the law is clearly to deny the right to operate automobiles as passenger carriers in first class cities without the obtaining of a permit from the city authorities and the giving of a bond for the protection of the public against any personal injuries resulting from such operation. Any contract of the licensee tending to shift liability from himself and his bondsman and at the same time allow him to reap a benefit either in rental or a share of the profits must necessarily be construed as a device for evading the effect of the law. As we have said, the permit and bond cover a specific machine, and any contract which would defeat the statute would necessarily be void as against public policy.
Error is further assigned upon the refusal of the court to give certain instructions requested by the appellants upon the matter of contributory negligence of the respondent and upon the question of comparative negligence between her and the driver of the automobile. Inasmuch as these questions were fully covered by the court in its instructions, error cannot be predicated upon the refusal to give those requested by the appellants. The other requests made by the appellants, while appropriate under their theory of the law, were inapplicable under the theory taken by us and need no further notice.
The judgment is affirmed.