164 N.W. 8 | N.D. | 1917
What may be termed the pleadings in this action are composed of a petition for a writ of certiorari and the return to such writ. Omitting the title and formal parts of such writ, the same is as follows, to wit:
To the above-named court and judge thereof: Now come the above-named plaintiffs and upon the affidavit of Hugh McDonald, Henry A. Gordon, George Vettel, and George Wright, four of the above-named plaintiffs, and upon the affidavit of John Cannody, both of which affidavits are hereto attached, petition and pray said court and judge thereof that a writ of certiorari may be issued directed to the above-named defendants and requiring said defendants and each thereof to certify fully to the said court issuing said writ at a specified time and place within said writ to be specified, all the proceedings by you or any of you taken in the matter of the attempt to divide Caledonia school district in Traill county or create or organize a new district consisting of the civil township of Herberg, which now constitutes a part of said school district, and to annex to the writ a transcript of the record and proceedings therein described and referring to them with convenient certainty, and also a statement of all other matters and proceedings pertaining to matters mentioned in said affidavits by them or any of them had, in order that the proceedings had as mentioned in said affidavit to it and that such proceedings may be reviewed by your Honorable Court, and do further pray that by said writ the praties of the defendant and each of them be required to desist from further proceedings from the matters stated in and reviewed in said writ of certiorari and thus your petitioners will ever pray.
Dated this 22d day of July, a. d. 1916.
■ John Cannody,
C. E. Leslie.
Attorneys for the above-named plaintiffs.
The petition for writ of certiorari was supported by the affidavit of Hugh McDonald, II. C. Gordon, George Vettel, and George Wright,
The return to the writ of certiorari is as follows:
The undersigned, Ole I. Hanson, J. H. Johnson, William Carson, A. C. Ulland, and T. B. Tobiason, members of the board of county commissioners of Traill county, North Dakota, and Guri Wambheim, county superintendent of schools of said Traill county, and Neis O. Lindaas, county auditor of said Traill county, pursuant to the command of the writ of certiorari in the above-entitled matter, to us directed, do hereby certify and return to the district court of the said county of Traill;
That on the 6th day of May, 1916, there was filed in the office of the county superintendent of schools of said Traill county, a petition in writing for the organization of a new' school district to be known as “Herberg School District of Traill County, North Dakota,” a copy of which is hereto annexed, marked exhibit “1.” That thereafter the said board of county commissioners and county superintendent fixed the time for hearing said petition for Wednesday, the 19th day of July, 1916, at 2 o’clock p. m., and a notice of the hearing •of said petition was given by the said, county superintendent of schools of Traill county, by publication of said notice in the Hillsboro Banner, a weekly newspaper published in the city of Hillsboro, in said Traill county, said newspaper being the newspaper nearest the said school district, and by mailing a copy of said notice to each of the school officers of said Caledonia school district; that a copy of said
That on the 19th day of July, 1916, the said board of county commissioners met pursuant to adjournment, said meeting being an adjourned session of the July, 1916, meeting. That all members of the said board of county commissioners were present. That the said board of county commissioners, together with the county superintendent of schools, constituting a board to act on the petition for the organization of a new school district, met in session at 2 o’clock p. m. on said day, at the county courthouse, in the city of Hillsboro, North Dakota, in accordance with the notice published and mailed, and marked exhibit “2” herein, and then proceeded to consider the petition for the organization of a new school district to be known as “Herberg School District of Traill County, State of North Dakota,” from the territory embraced in the civil township of Herberg in said Traill county.
That P. G. Swenson appeared as attorney for the petitioners, and that the following petitioners appeared in person, viz.: Grand Baxter, Jalmer Herre, H. D. Reed, Hartvig Lund, Frank Baxter, Gunder Steenerson, B. P. Leirness, J. M. Herberg, Neis Herre, Ernest C. Steenrod, Swan Akason, and Archie Spittler.
That C. E. Leslie appeared as attorney for the school board and parties opposing the granting of the petition, and that the following persons appeared in opposition to the granting of said petition, viz.: Plugh McDonald, H. A. Gordon, and George Wright; that Peter Herbrandson and C. L. Gordon entered a special appearance and objected to the considering of said petition.
That the parties opposing the granting of said petition filed written objections to the hearing of said petition, copies of which are hereto attached, marked exhibits “5” and “6” respectively.
The the petitioners offered in evidence petitioners’ exhibits “A” and “B,” copies of which are hereto attached, marked exhibits “7” and “8.” Petitioners also offered in evidence petitioners’ exhibits “C” and “D,” copies of which are hereto attached and marked exhibits “9” and “10.” Also pages “35” and “36,” book No. 1, of school officers’ record, a copy of which is hereto annexed, marked ex-
.Dated at Hillsboro, North Dakota, this 1st day of August, 1916.
Attached to said return was an affidavit of Neis O. Lindaas, which was and is as follows:
State of North Dakota,
County of Traill.
I, Neis O. Lindaas, county auditor of the county of Traill, state of' North Dakota, and clerk of the board of county commissioners of’ said Traill county, pursuant to the command of the writ of certiorari to me directed,' do hereby certify and return to the district court of’ said Traill county: That I, as county auditor of said county, acted as-clerk of said board consisting of the members of the board of county commissioners and the county superintendent of schools of said Trail! county, on the 19th day of July, 1916, and kept a record of its proceedings; that the petition for the organization of a new school district, notice for hearing same, and all papers, exhibits, and records pertaining to the same, are on file in my office; that the exhibits hereto, being exhibits numbered “1,” “2,” “3,” “4,” “5,” “6,” “7,” “8,”' “9,” “10,” “11,” and “12” are true copies of the original documents, proceedings, and records on file in my office; that I have compared all of said copies hereto attached with the originals on file in my office, and that the same constitute a full, correct, and complete transcript of the records and proceedings in the matter referred to and described in said writ of certiorari.
Given under my hand and seal this. 1st day of August, 1916 a. d_
(Signed) Neis O. Lindaas.
County Auditor of Traill County,
North ¡Dakota-
The propositions of law involved in this assignment of error directly attack the jurisdiction of what is termed the quasi court, that is, the board of county commissioners and the county superintendent of Trail! county acting together, to hear and determine such petition on its merits. The main attack of the appellant in this regard is based upon no sufficient notice for the hearing of such petition for the formation of such new school district, the notice not being a notice of the hearing-to be had at the regular July session or meeting of the county commissioners. We are thoroughly convinced that there is no force in such assignment of error, that such assignment of error is based upon a misconception and misconstruction of the law concerning the matters under consideration in this case. Chapter 135 of the Session Laws of 1915 provides two distinct and separate methods for the organization of new common-school districts. Chapter 135 reads as follows:
“New Common School Districts. How Organized. The board of county commissioners and county superintendent may organize a new school district from portions of school districts already organized, if in their judgment the organization of a new district is desirable and necessary, upon being petitioned so to do by at least a majority of the school voters residing in the districts, whose boundaries will be affected by the organization of a new district, and by at least three fourths of the residents of the territory to be included in the new district. No school district shall be organized under the provisions of this section which shall have less than $20,000 assessed valuation and shall have residing therein less than twelve children of school age; provided, that when the districts from portions of which such new district is sought to be organized, lie in two or more adjoining -counties, such new district shall be organized by the concurrent, action of the boards of county commissioners and county superintendents of such counties; provided, further, that action on such organization shall be taken only at the July meeting of the county com*335 missioners when petitioned by a majority of the voters residing in each of the districts to be affected.
“Provided further, that the county commissioners and county superintendent of schools may organize a new school district from portions of school districts already organized, if in their judgment a new school district is desirable and necessary, upon being petitioned so to do by at least three fourths of the school voters residing within the •territory to be included in the new district, provided, such proposed new district shall have an assessed valuation of at least $120,000, and shall have an area equal to a congressional township or major fraction thereof, and shall have residing therein at least twelve children of school age, provided, that such organization will not leave the district from which such new district is sought to be organized with an area of less than one congressional township and an assessed valuation of at least $150,000.”
The first part of this law, as far as the word “affected” occurring just before the word “provided,” states the first method for the organization of new common-school districts. Commencing with the word “provided” and including the balance of the chapter constitutes the second method for the organization of new common-school districts. When proceedings are had to organize a new common-school district by the first of these methods, the notice prescribed in § 1148 of the Compiled Laws of 1913 shall be given, and the meeting of the county commissioners at which such petition is to be considered shall be the meeting specified in § 1147 of the Compiled Laws of 1913, being the July meeting of the board of county commissioners; and when proceedings are had in pursuance of the first method a failure to give such proper notice and hold such meeting at the proper place would affect the jurisdiction of what may be termed the quasi court, that is, the board of county commissioners and the county superintendent, to hear and determine the matters involved in such petition; but where proceedings to organize a new common-school district are had in pursuance of, and in agreement with, the second method, provided by chapter 135, when the notice is given specified in § 1148, it is immaterial whether such petition is decided upon at the July meeting or any other meeting of the board of county commissioners, so long as this meeting is held by the county commissioners and the county
The line of demarcation between the two methods of organizing new common-school districts under the law in question is definite and plain, the conditions required to exist by each method being entirely dissimilar. By the first method the petition must be signed by a majority of the school voters residing in the districts whose boundaries will be affected by the organization of the new district, and by at least three fourths of the residents of the territory to be included in the new district. The new district under this method and branch of the law shall have at least $20,000 assessed valuation, and twelve children of school age; and nothing is said as to the amount of assessed valuation which shall be left in the old district after the formation of the new. Under the second method or provision of this law, the necessity for the signatures of any petitioners is eliminated except in the territory which is to form the new district, where three fourths of the school voters are required to sign in order to confer jurisdiction upon the board of county commissioners and superintendent of schools, acting .as such board, to organize such new school district. Another provision which is found in the law governing the second method is that the assessed valuation in the new district shall be at least $120,000, and have an area equal to a congressional township or major fraction thereof, and twelve children of school age, and that the old district must also be left with an area of at least a congressional township and $150,000 assessed valuation. It will be seen that there is a wide difference in the requirements of the two methods. It would seem from an inspection of the second method that the public necessity for such new district was so apparent, the old district being so very large, as is shown from the extent of territory required in the new district and the extent to be left in the old, and from the amount of the entire assessed valuation of the old district, and the amount of the assessed valuation required for the new, that it obviated the reqriirement for considering such petition only at the July meeting,
The second and third assignments of error of the appellant herein may be considered together, as they each relate to the constitutionality of the law under consideration, and also include the question of whether or not the statute under consideration was special legislation. We will include the discussion of these questions all in the same analysis. The sections of the Constitution which it is claimed the law under consideration violates are: § 11, which is as follows: “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation;” § 69: “The legislative assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say, ... 12. Providing for the management of common schools;” § Y0: “In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.” Counsel for the appellant then cites numerous authorities to sustain these various propositions. Por instance, that the authorities are agreed that a law “general in its form,” but special in its operation, violates a constitutional inhibition
Appellant uses the following language: “There has not been and cannot be any good reason why two civil townships — one a trifle less than a congressional township and the other a trifle bigger — should not have the same privileges, and why the smaller should have privileges the larger has not; nor any good reason why a civil township can secede from another one just because it has a trifle less than $150,000 assessed valuation, while the other with $150,000 assessed valuation cannot secede.”
We think from an inspection of the law under consideration that the remaining part of the old district could have exercised the same power that the new district did exercise had it done so in time or cared to. The statement in the law that the new district shall have an assessed valuation of at least $120,000, and shall have an area of a congressional township or a major fraction thereof, means a minimum quantity, and is not a limit as to the maximum; that the real significance of such expression is that such new district shall have an assessed valuation of at least $120,000, and shall have an area at least equal to a congressional township or major fraction thereof, and shall have residing therein at least twelve children of school age. These are minimum quantities, but there is no restriction as to the maximum quantities. The law docs not say that the new district may not have more than a congressional township nor more than $120,000 assessed valuation; and there is no doubt but that such new district might have more of assessed valuation and more territory, provided that it does not leave the old district with less than a congressional township, nor less than $150,000 assessed valuation. So long as the minimums are complied with, that is all that is necessary. When the minimums exist under the law the máximums may be as large as may be under the circumstances. We believe this is a proper construction of the language in this section, and, if so, the appellant’s contention is without merit; but even without such con
There is another branch of the case which we will discuss. The appellant, in addition to invoking the provisions of several sections of the state Constitution, has also cited a paragraph from the decision of Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. State, 163 Wis. 484, 155 N. W. 609, 158 N. W. 328, but the reasoning in that case is not applicable to the one at bax*. The meaning of Amendxnent 14 of the Constitution of the United States is that it guarantees equal protection of law to all pex’sons, and relates to individual persons or private corporations in their dealings, contx-acts, personal affairs, and rights; but such px’ovision of the United States Constitution does not extend to public corporations created by the legislative authority as public agencies for the purpose of facilitating and carrying on matters which are of interest to the state alone, and which are created by legislative power exclusively, and with which the state is in no way bound by contract; and thex’e is no x-eciprocal stipulation between such agencies and the state; and the objects of their creation and the duties which they are authorized to perform do not have their origin in anything of the nature of a contract. Such
The case just cited is approved in the case of Atty. Gen. ex rel.
We cannot discuss all the authorities cited by appellant, nor include in the body of the opinion all of the citations of the respondent; but from a thorough examination of the case, we are satisfied that the judgment of the District Court must be in all things affirmed, and the same is in all things affirmed, with costs.