43 Ga. 356 | Ga. | 1871
1. It appears from the record in this case that the parties thereto had mutual dealings with each other, involving a multiplicity of matters and continuing unsettled for some
We recognize this general principle with the proviso expressed in the Code, “ unless a good reason can be given for the interference of equity.” The question in this case is whether the bill makes out such a reason as may properly invoke the interposition of a Court of Equity. It is true, as appears from the record, that the action of ejectment was dismissed, before the hearing; from which it was argued that the ease stands upon the naked question, over which a Court of law has concurrent jurisdiction with equity, and that there is nothing peculiar in the accounts, except their magnitude, to make it necessary for equity to interfere.
2. It is a well settled principle that where a Court of Equity obtains jurisdiction for one purpose it will retain it un
Again, by the pleadings it appears that the accounts between the parties, over which the law has taken jurisdiction, is only a part of the litigation, and from the allegations in this bill become mixed with a subject matter over which equity has a peculiar jurisdiction, and may therefore constitute a substantial reason for a transfer of the whole matter into a Court of Equity.
Again, under section 3075 of the Code, “ equity jurisdiction over matters of account is defined to extend to mutual accounts growing out of privity of contract, or where accounts are complicated and intricate.” By examination of this record, containing the exhibits to the bill, and the mass of items covering some sixty pages, we are satisfied the machinery of a Court of equity, through an auditor or master, can more readily and with greater certainty of justice, analyze the mutual accounts between these parties ,• and this is better than to encumber a Court of law by unnecessary delajq before a jury, in endeavroing to do justice between them.
3. Again, we affirm the judgment upon the ground that the granting or refusing injunctions, is a matter vested by law in the discretion of the Chancellor, and his decision will only be disturbed in cases where that discretion is abused.
Judgment affirmed.