Thе defendant has brought this case to this court by writ of error. The action is for an injury to plaintiff, who was run over by defendant’s street car. Upon the trial, the principal question of fact was whether defendant was negligent in starting its car when plaintiff was in the act of stepping from the car to the pavement, or whether he attempted to alight before the car stopped. There was testimony which mаde this a proper question for the jury. A number of assignments of error are relied upon, most of which аre upon rulings which fail to impress us as having been prejudicial to the defendant. Some of them complain of leading questions, which are usually within the discretion of the trial court; one or more to thе language used by counsel, which we think was not especially prejudicial; one was a comрlaint that questions relating to the number and ages of plaintiff’s children were persisted in, after the cоurt ruled against such testimony; and one was to testimony offered to account for the failure of а boy to testify at a former trial. We are of the opinion that there was no necessity
A physiciаn who was familiar with the injury was asked, “How much, in your opinion, have those two injuries — that is, the injuries to each foot — reduced this man’s physical ability to perform manual labor?” to which he answered, “I think it has beеn reduced fully three-quarters.” This was objected to upon-the ground that it was pure “ speculation.” It is nоw argued that it was for the jury to determine that, and that it was incompetent for an expert to give an opinion. It would be competent to prove by an expert surgeon that a physical injury would mаke the use of an injured member an impossibility, and he should be able to tell in cases where an unprofessional man could not determine whether such, an injury would impair a man’s ability to do physical or mеntal labor, and in such a case no reason is suggested ,for not taking his opinion as to the degree of impairment. The case of Muldraugh’s Hill, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Maupin,
“ Dr. Bass’ statement that, if he were examining the appellee fоr a pension, he would allow him one-fourth, we understand to be his professional opinion that his cаpacity for labor is reduced one-fourth by the rupture. This, we think, was competent. The jury cannot bе'supposed to be familiar with the character of that injury, or to be able, unaided, to properly estimate its effect in impairing the appellee’s capacity to earn money, and, hence, it was proper to allow them to be enlightened by expert testimony. But the witness should not hаve been permitted to intimate what he regarded as proper compensation
See, also, Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Henderson,
It is contended that it was error to permit the plaintiff to testify that he had no use of his foot. It is admitted that he followed the statement with а full description of its condition, whereby it appeared conclusively that he could use it; but it is said thаt the testimony first given was the statement of a conclusion by the witness and should have been stricken out. It is proper to permit a witness to state whether he can move an arm or leg, whether he can use a member in the usual way, and this testimony is no more than such a statement. It may have been untrue, but that does not affect its admissibility. It is no more a conclusion of the witness than is permissible in many instances. Not being arrived at by reasoning from known conditions only, as contradistinguished from experimental knowledge, the testimony was competent.
We think it unnecessary to discuss the question relating to .the exclusion of thе testimony of the witness Johnson, taken upon another trial. It was not a deposition, and we cannоt hold broadly that, before a witness can be asked questions as a basis for impeachment, all оf his testimony, taken by a stenographer, must be read to him.
The judgment is affirmed.