| Wis. | Jan 15, 1875
"We are quite well satisfied that the facts stated in the complaint present no case for a bill of interpleader. The sheriff has another ample remedy, and does not need the aid of the court by a bill of interpleader for his protection. A bill of interpleader is defined by an approved writer on equity jurisprudence as follows: “A bill of interpleader is a bill filed for the protection of a person from whom several persons claim legally or equitably the same thing, debt or duty ; but who has incurred no independent liability to any of them, and does not himself claim an interest in the matter. The equity is, that the conflicting claimants should litigate the matter amongst themselves without involving the stakeholder in their dispute.” Adams’ Eq., 202. Substantially the same definition is given or adopted in 2 Story’s Eq., §§ 806 and 807; Jeremy on Eq., 347; Willard’s Eq., 314; and Bedell v. Hoffman, 2 Paige, 200. The principle on which the jurisdiction is supported, is the danger of injury to the plaintiff from the doubtful titles of the defendants. Mitf. Plead., 49. “ The filing of bills of interpleader ought not to be encouraged; and they should never be brought except in cases where the complainant can in no other way protect himself from an unjust litigation in which he has no interest.” Ch. Walwokth, in Bedell v. Hoffman, supra.
“The true ground,” says Mr. Justice Story, “upon which . the plaintiff comes into equity, is, that claiming no right in the subject matter himself, he is, or may be, vexed by having two
According to these authorities, if the plaintiff could exonerate himself from all liability in respect to the funds in his hands without filing a bill of interpleader, then he should not invoke that remedy. And we have no doubt but that he could do so, and effectually relieve himself from all responsiblity, by paying the money into court, and by making a full return of the facts out of which the controversy in regard to the money arose. The complaint states the nature of this controversy. It is a contest between different creditors of Beekman as to who is entitled to the money in the hands of the sheriff after the Wright execution is satisfied. Allen claims the amount by virtue of his prior judgment and execution, while the subsequent attaching creditors insist that this judgment is fraudulent and void as to them. Now it seems to us the sheriff ought not to be called upon to settle this controversy between these different creditors, and that the proper course for him to pursue is to pay the money into court and make return of the facts, and leave the parties in interest to apply to the court for a determination of the question to whom the money belongs. This course, it seems to us, will afford him full protection. There are most weighty reasons of public policy which forbid that the sheriff should be mixed up in such litigation unless absolutely essential for his protection. He has important duties to perform of an official and public nature, and which he might not be able to properly perform if he has to prosecute suits to settle such conflicting claims. Besides, the officer, if allowed this remedy, would seek to charge the expense of the litigation to the funds in his hands, to the injury and prejudice of creditors having process to which such funds should be applied. And we therefore think that if there was any question as to whom the money belongs .to, it was the duty of the sheriff to pay it into court, making a return of the facts, and let the court decide upon the conflicting claims of the creditors. This is the practice
We will add further, that our views upon the subject may be fully understood, that upon the sheriff’s paying the money into court and notifying all parties interested in the controversy of what he has done, he should be deemed to have performed his duty in the premises; and also that if Allen, upon the facts disclosed in the complaint, had obtained a rule upon the plaintiff to pay the money on his execution, in that case the plaintiff might relieve himself of all responsibility by giving the attaching creditors notice of this rule, and affording them an opportunity to be heard on its return. This course will work no inconvenience or injury to the sheriff, and is the one suggested in Saunders v. Bridges, 3 Barn. & Aid., 95; Warmell v. Young, 5 Barn. & Cress., 660, by which the officer' may relieve himself from liability. In the absence of all authority we should have been disposed to lay down the same rule as to the duty of the sheriff, but it is a comfort to know that it has the sanction of the court of King’s Bench. It is the best general rule that can be laid down in a case like the one set forth in the complaint, both for the protection of the officer and to secure to creditors a just settlement of their conflicting claims. And it effectually does away with the necessity for filing bills of interpleader by the sheriff, which, if allowed, would inevitably open a wide door to litigation, and in many instances, probably, to favoritism on the part of those officers.
It appears from the complaint that the plaintiff, as sheriff, on the 30th of March, 1874, received two executions issued upon judgments rendered against one Beekman: one in favor of Wright and others, and one in favor of the defendant Allen. The Wright execution had preference by reason of a prior at
The demurrer should have been sustained, on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
By the Court. — The order of the circuit court overruling the demurrer is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.