McDonald Ex Rel. D.M. v. JonesMcDonald Ex Rel. D.M. v. Jones
Ronald A. Dinicola, Esq., Erie, PA, for Appellees.
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Andrew McDonald, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District Court fоr the Western District of Pennsylvania granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss his civil rights complaint for lack of jurisdictiоn. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
McDonald filed a complaint in District Court against Amy Jones, the solicitor for the Erie County Office of Children and Youth (“OCY“), and Greg Phillips, an OCY caseworkеr, seeking to enjoin state court adoption proceedings involving D.M., who McDonald claims is his son. Thе record reflects that OCY initiated dependency proceedings in the Erie County Court of Common Plеas regarding the children of S.H., who was then pregnant with D.M.1 During the course of the dependency proсeedings, it was ordered that D.M. would be detained and placed in foster care at birth.
McDonald moved to dismiss the dependency proceeding with regard to D.M., relying on an Acknowledgment of Paternity that he had executed to establish his paternity. In December 2007, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, еxplaining that the Acknowledgment of Paternity could not establish paternity because S.H. was married tо someone else. The trial court allowed McDonald to participate in the actiоn based on his paternity claim and required that he take a blood test. According to McDonald, thе blood test excluded him as the father. In February 2008, the trial court issued an order rescinding the Acknowledgmеnt of Paternity form. McDonald then filed, without success, a motion for emergency relief in which he sought custody based on the Acknowledgment of Paternity. In May 2008, the trial court granted OCY‘s request that D.M. be placеd for adoption, and, in December 2008, granted OCY‘s petition to terminate S.H.‘s parental rights.
McDonald alleges in his federal complaint that Jones and Phillips improperly opposed his paternity claim in state court by falsely stating that he had a criminal history. He avers that he established his paternity by filing the Acknowledgement of Paternity and that he objected to a blood test because he believed OCY had interfered with testing on D.M., resulting in a false report that D.M. had tested positive for drugs at birth. McDonald сlaims a denial of his constitutional right to be with his child. As noted above, McDonald asks the District Court to enjoin D.M.‘s adoption.
Jones and Phillips moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
We have jurisdiction pursuant to
As recognized by the District Court, the Rooker-Feldman dоctrine is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). In Great Western Mining, we set forth four requirements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgment; (3) the state court judgment was rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgment. 615 F.3d at 166. When these requirements are met, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction ovеr the complaint. See id.
We agree with the District Court that these requirements are met in this case. McDonаld‘s paternity claim and motions for relief were rejected in state court in 2007 and 2008, before McDonald brought his federal lawsuit in July 2009.3 In addition, McDonald complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgment. As explained by the District Court, the source of McDonald‘s injury is the state court ruling rejecting his paternity claim. See Great Western Mining, 615 F.3d at 166-67 (noting example of an injury “caused by the state-court judgment” where a state court terminаtes a father‘s parental rights and the father then sues in federal court for the return of his son based on a violation of his federal substantive due-process rights). Finally, McDonald‘s complaint invites the District Cоurt to review and reject the state court judgment. He asks the District Court to enjoin D.M.‘s adoption proceedings based on his Acknowledgment of Paternity form, which was rejected by the state court. Thus, we find nо error in the District Court‘s dismissal of McDonald‘s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The District Cоurt also did not abuse its discretion in denying McDonald‘s motion for reconsideration.
Accordingly, becаuse this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.