delivered the opinion of the court:
Plаintiffs appeal from the dismissal by the trial court of their complaint for specific performance of a real estate contract, or, in the alternative, for reсovery- in quantum meruit for the value of materials and services rendered. We affirm.
Plaintiffs’ third amended complaint consisted of three counts. All three counts alleged these facts: Defendant is the owner of certain lands in Sangamon County; plaintiff and defendant entered into a written agreement to convey part of that property; in addition to the written agrеement plaintiff agreed to make repairs; plaintiff had been in possession of the premises since October 20,1970, pursuant to a lease but on February 14, 1972, took possession pursuant to the agreement; in reliance on the agreement plaintiff has partially performed; defendant has refused to carry out the agreement; plaintiff has been and is rеady and willing to perform.
The first count prayed for specific performance. The second alleges that the Statute of Frauds is not applicable by virtue of part performance by plaintiff. The third count alleges plaintiff is entitled to quantum meruit recovery for the materials and services he has rendered.
The document in question reads:
“2/14/72
I agree to sell to George McDaniel the house on R.R.2, in which he now lives, plus two acres, xxx for *6000. to be agreed.
Alfreida Silvernail
Rent of *70 monthly to be applied as purchase price — less taxes & Ins.”
Manifestly, this writing is insufficient to satisfy the Statute оf Frauds (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 59, §2). A contract for the sale of land cannot be specifically enforced by a court unless the writing contains: (1) the names of the vendor and,vendee; (2) a description of the property which is sufficiently certain so that it can be identified; (3) the price, the terms and conditions of sale; and (4) the signature of the party to be charged. Callaghan v. Miller,
From this document, a court would be unable to locate the boundaries of the property to be conveyed. Plaintiffs rely on the Callaghan case and upon Draper v. Hoops,
“ ‘[T]he Altha Martin property located on Route 25, north of the city of Batavia, Illinois (not in corporation). This area comprises 5 acres more or less. The space now occupied by 20 trailers is properly licensed and zoned by the State of Illinois and Kane County Zoning Dept. ° * ** ”17 Ill. 2d 595 , 599,162 N.E.2d 422 , 423.
There was no evidence in Callaghan that the seller owned more than 5 acres at that location. The description therefore is ref enrabie to the еntire property held by the seller. In the case at bar plaintiffs allege defendant is the owner of a quarter-quarter section but the contract refers to only two acres оf that land.
In Draper the property was described as “158 acres in Lee County, Illinois.” That was sufficient when supplemented by a definite written description given to the buyer simultaneously with the agreement. However, two parcels of property described as a frame residence in Walnut, Ill., and a two-story house in Franklin Park, Week Resubdivision, east of W.C.R.R. were both so indefinite that specific performance could not be ordered.
The case at bar is similar to Wetmore v. Watson,
Plaintiffs have attempted to cure the uncertain description. They argue parol evidence is admissible to show the intention of the parties. However, the essential terms of a real estate cоntract must be wholly in writing. (Hanlon v. Hayes,
We find it unnecessary to decide whether the рerformance alleged is sufficient to take this case outside the Statute of Frauds. Before part performance can be effective there must be a contraсt and all of its essential terms must be certain and definite. Cowen v. McNealy; Drobnick v. Rollery,
Plaintiffs argue that the terms are not indefinite. They have alleged a more definite descriptiоn (although there is no allegation that both parties agreed to that description). But even the more definite description is insufficient. The description reads:
“[0]ne square acrе, 69.57 yards to the west; 69.57 yards to the north; 69.57 yards to the east; 69.57 yards to the south, comprising one square acre or 4,480 square yards, from a reference point of two concrete stakеs 9M feet apart located to the east of the residence on the south property line. The second acre is a square acre directly to the north of the afоresaid acre containing the residence.”
It is impossible from this description to ascertain the starting point. Is it one of the two concrete stakes or is it some undetermined point in between them? This alleged description is too indefinite to enable a court to order specific performance. In view of this holding it is unnecessary to go into the detаils of defendant’s argument that the terms and conditions of the sale are also uncertain. We do note, however, that the contract is ambiguous in that the monthly rent is to be appliеd to the purchase price but it is not made clear whether the rent paid under the lease is to be so applied or whether the provision is prospective only. Plaintiffs, in their complaint, have not alleged that this ambiguity could be explained with parol evidence. The terms of the sale are an essential part of the contract and must be certain in order for specific performance to be ordered. Cefalu v. Breznik,
The third count of plaintiffs’ complaint is for recovery in quantum meruit for the material and servicеs rendered. Plaintiffs allege that considerable time and money was spent for repairs and improvements. An attached exhibit contains a fist of the repairs, their cost and the time consumed. The list includes such things as repairs on the roofs, painting, and installation of laterals to the septic tank.
The issue is whether plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts for recovery under a theory of implied contract.
“An implied contract is an obligation created by law independent of an agreement of the parties. It arises out of the acts and conduct of the parties — out of circumstances from which the intent to contract can be inferred. (Highway Commissioners v. Bloomington (1911),253 Ill. 164 ,97 N.E. 280 .) In Highway the court gave the following exаmple of an implied contract:
[Wjhere one person, in the absence of any express agreement, renders valuable services to another which are knowingly accepted by such other, the law will imply a promise to pay a fair and reasonable compensation for such services.
A contract implied in law is equitable in its nature and is one which reason and justice dictate. It does not arise from an intent to contract or a promise to pay. It exists where there is a plain duty and a consideration. The consideration may be a parting with something by the party seeking to enforce the contract; the promise is presumed so that there will not be a failure of justice. Its essential element is the receipt of a benefit by one party which would be inequitable for that party to retain. It is predicated on the fundamental principle that no one should unjustly enrich himself at another’s expense. [Citations.]” First National Bank of Lincolnwood v. Glenn,132 Ill. App. 2d 322 , 324-5,270 N.E.2d 493 , 495.
Plaintiff has alleged that there existed a specific agreement with the defendant by which plaintiff was to make all repairs. Plaintiff has not alleged that defendant ever agreed or intended to compensate plaintiff for these repairs. The traditional rule is that a landlord is not bound to repair unless he has expressly agreed to do so. (Forshey v. Johnston,
Accordingly, for the reason stated above, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
CRAVEN, P. J., and GREEN, J., concur.