206 S.W. 221 | Tex. App. | 1918
The property in controversy having been acquired by D. L. McDaniel long subsequent to his divorce from Elzada McDaniel, there is no presumption that it belonged to their community estate. There is no evidence to show that it was community property. Upon this state of the record it must be presumed to be the separate property of D. L. McDaniel or belonging to the community estate of himself and second wife. Creamer v. Briscoe, 107 S.W. 635. This being its status, Elzada McDaniel had no interest in it. But it is claimed that the decree of the district court of Coleman county is res judicata of title in Elzada McDaniel. Waiving all questions as to the jurisdiction of the district court of Coleman county in the partition suit, and assuming that it had jurisdiction over the parties and subject-matter, the fact, nevertheless, remains that Gibson, in his capacity as independent executor of the estate of D. L. McDaniel, was not before the court. The pleadings of the plaintiff are insufficient to bring him into court in that capacity. Therefore in that capacity he was not concluded by the decree rendered. Lauchner claims under Gibson as executor, and he likewise is not concluded by the decree in the Coleman county suit. His rights are in no wise affected by the same. Upon the death of D. L. McDaniel and probate of his will, his title to the lots passed to Leo McDaniel, subject to the rights of creditors. These rights have been enforced against the executor of the estate and the title passed to Lauchner.
Upon the views stated, it follows that the various assignments are without merit.
Affirmed.