Muratt W. McDaniel received a compensable injury on April 17, 1923, while in the employment of Circle A Products Corporation. Thereafter the employer аnd the employee entered into an agreеment in writing, by the terms of which the employer agreed to pay compensation “during total disability, beginning April 29, 1923, and not to exceed 500 weeks.” The agreement was approved by the Industrial Board and thereupon became an award. Subsequently, the employee executed a receipt for the compensation received up to the date therof. The receipt contains the recital that total disability ceased on May 14, 1923, and that there was no partial disability. On July 3, 1924, the employee filed a рetition for review on account of a chаnge in conditions, seeking thereby to have comрensation continued. The full board, by a majority of its members, found that the application to review wаs not filed within “one year after the termination of plaintiff’s disability.” Thereupon the application wаs dismissed.
The uncontroverted evidence shows that, in truth, thе disability never had ceased. The medical testimony is that the injury has been continuous from the beginning; that it is pеrmanent, unless remedied by a surgical operation; and that it is of such a character as necеssarily results in disability.
In determining whether or not the application is barred by the statutory limitation, it is necessary tо observe closely and attentively the exact words of the statute. Those exact words are:
“Thе board shall not make any such modification upоn its own motion nor shall any application therefor be filed by either party after the expiratiоn of one year from the termination of the cоmpensation period fixed in the original award, mаde either by an agreement or *294 upon hearing.” §45 Compensation Act (Acts 1919 p. 158, §9490 Burns 1926, §8020c2 Burns’ Supp. 1921).
The presumрtion is that, at the time the receipt was executed, the parties believed that the employеe’s disability had actually and permanently ceаsed. But they were mistaken. Consequently, the compеnsation period fixed in the original award did not terminаte at that time.
Ft. Branch, etc., Co.
v.
Farley
(1921),
The employee contends that his failure to file the petition sooner is due to thе conduct of the employer (or its insurance сarrier) with whom negotiations had been carried оn for some time in an effort to reach an agreement. That feature we need not discuss.
The award is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.