This is аn appeal from a proceeding in habeas corpus in which the trial court found that plaintiff was not entitled to revoke her releasе for adoption and obtain custody of her child. ① The sole issue is whether ORS 418.270(5) prevented the mother from revoking her consent. Plaintiff contends that the statute is invalid under the due process and equal *538 protection clauses. In the alternative, if this court should find the statute valid, she alleges that her consent was obtained by duress.
ORS 418.270(5) was enacted by the 1971 Legislature and became effective during the period of time when the events in this ease were occurring. It provides:
“No agreement to release or surrender a child for adoption, or other agreement or waiver of rights having the same effect, executed before March 24, 1971, in connection with the surrender of a child into the guardianship of a child-caring agency for purposes of adoption, may be revoked or held invalid for any reason except upon affirmative proof of fraud or duress.”
On March 19, 1971, plaintiff signеd a release which expressly stated that it was given for the purpose of adoption of her child. At the same time, as part of the same trаnsaction, she signed a waiver of notice of adoption proceedings.
On March 24, 1971, the governor signed the legislative Act amending ORS 418.270, of which subseсtion (5) was a part. The new law set forth above took effect immediately.
On March 31, 1971, the agency placed the baby with its prospective adoptive parents.
On April 8, 1971, the agency received a letter from plaintiff withdrawing her consent.
When plaintiff executed the release on Mаrch 19, she had the power under the law as it then existed to withdraw her consent during the succeeding six months, subject to principles of estoppel. The fact that she simultaneously executed a waiver of notice did not
*539
prevent revocation under the decision of
Strobel v. Garrison,
The 1971 Oregon Legislature, concerned with the uncertainty that it felt attended adoptive placement by private agencies under Strobel, decided to narrow the circumstances under which a parent could rеvoke consent. Minutes, Senate Judiciary Committee, Feb. 8, 17, Mar. 24, 1971; Minutes, House Judiciary Committee, Mar. 16,1971. It therefore amended the existing statute so that future rеleases would be irrevocable if certain documents had been signed and the child had been placed for adoption. OES 418.270(5) applied to releases executed prior to the effective date of the legislation, which was plaintiff’s situation, and changed plaintiff’s ability to revokе her consent at will (subject to estoppel) to an ability to revoke only upon affirmative proof of fraud or duress. It is this retroactivity which plaintiff alleges as a deprivation of due process.
At the outset it must be noted that the right of a parent to raise his child has constitutional protеction and can be taken away only when the requirements of due process have been observed.
See Stanley v. Illinois,
But parental rights also can be waivеd by the parent. This power to waive forms the basis of adoption statutes since adoption, unknown to the common law, exists only by virtue of enabling lеgislation.
Once the parent has validly waived his relationship with his child, the legislature can decide Avhether, *540 or under what circumstances, he can revoke that waiver. While plaintiff does not contend that the legislature cannot allow her to waive her relationship, she contends that it could not change the law which governed her right to revoke that waiver. Such a right, however, which can be considered as a grace period rеstricted in time to revoke a valid waiver, cannot be considered a vested right immune from legislative action. We note that the legislature did not аbrogate plaintiff’s existing right to have notice of the adoption proceedings and to come into court for the purpose of revоking the release on the more limited grounds of fraud or duress.
Plaintiff’s equal protection challenge alleges that legislature has created unсonstitutional categories by forbidding parents who deal with adoption agencies from revoking their consent except for fraud or duress while parents in private adoption situations can revoke unless they are estopped.
Dugger et ux v. Lauless,
*541
In contrast, private adoption arrangements are more likely to involve principles of estoppel and can arise out of a myriad of fact situations, beyond the ability of the legislature to foresee. Compare, e.g.,
Smith v. Green,
Tbe legislative decision to limit revocation when a parent has given his consent to an adoption agency does not appear to be an unreasonable solution to the problem of providing as much stability as possible to the child’s environment since adoption agencies are licensed by the state and subject to state supervision. A classification which does not solve an еntire problem does not violate the equal protection clause as long as there is a rational basis for the lines which are drawn.
See Edwards v. State Military Dept.,
Plaintiff’s remaining assignment is that her consent was obtained by duress. The trial court found that plaintiff signed the release for adoption “* * * freely and voluntarily and not undеr fraud or duress * * We agree. Plaintiff testified that she had been considering giving up the child for adoption for about a month before she went to the adoption agency. Although her father made the appointment with the agency, she initiated the events which led up to that visit by asking her father for his help аnd telling him she wanted to give up the child. On the day of her appointment and before she went to the agency, she wrote a letter to a friend in which she said that she had decided to give up the child so that he could have a better life. She read the documents before she signed them and corrected an error in the child’s birthdate on the release.
*542 Plaintiff alleges that the stress of financial and emotional problems left her no alternаtive. She appears to have tried valiantly to attend school, hold a job, and care for the baby. Certainly her circumstances, many of which may have been beyond her control, convinced her that she should give up the child; but there is no evidence that anyone influenced her to follow the course of action which she chose.
Affirmed.
Notes
Plaintiff is the mother of the child and was 18 years old at the time of its birth. The father is unknown to the court.