The Constitution (Code, Ann., § 2-4001) declares that, “In any county within which there is, or hereafter may be a City Court the Judge of said court and of the Superior Court may preside in the courts of each other in cases where the judge of either court is disqualified to preside.” The manifest purpose of this provision was to avoid delay, expense, and inconvenience when the judge of either court is disqualified to perform any duties which the law places upon him as judge. There is neither language nor implication in the above provision of the Constitution that restricts the substitution of judges there provided for to any type of cases, to term matters or to chambers matters. It is obvious that disqualification in a chambers matter wоuld necessitate inconvenience, delay, and expense in securing a judge of another circuit in the same manner that it would cause in a term case. We see no reason whatever for restricting the unambiguous language of the Constitution by judicial construction when the Constitution itself contains no such restriction, and it is plain that any such restriction aсcomplishes nothing except a defeat in part of the purpose of the Constitution.
We are requested here to hold that the' city court judge was unauthorized, by the above-quoted provision of the Constitution, to preside in the сhambers hearing on an application to be purged of contempt of court for non-payment of permanent alimony, after the superior court judge, on motion of counsel for the
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plaintiff in error, had entered an order declaring his disqualification. It is contended that the decisions in
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v.
Wilcoxon,
64
Ga. 556,
and
Bugg
v.
Verdery,
149
Ga.
85 (
For the reasons pointed out above, we hold that the city court judge was, under the facts of this case, аuthorized by the Constitution to preside and render judgment therein.
The judgment excepted to ordered that the appliсant be purged of contempt of court upon his meeting current and future payments of the alimony judgment and paying $2.50 per week on back alimony which had accumulated and $20 on attorneys’ fees. Counsel for the plaintiff in error take the position that, since attachment for contempt is an available remedy provided by law to enforce the payment of an alimony judgment, the judge to whom the application for contempt is presented is required to hold the defendant in contempt and impose sentence which can be avoided only by paying the alimony in full. We can not sustain this contention. Imprisonment for contempt is always conditional and is a matter solely within the sound discretiоn of the judge, and he may at any time, in the exercise
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of that discretion, discharge one so imprisoned.
Carlton
v.
Carlton,
44
Ga.
216;
Poole
v.
Wright,
188
Ga.
255 (
The facts in the present case are that the defendant in еrror had previously been adjudged in contempt of court and was required to make certain payments or be рlaced in jail, and on his failure to make the payments thus required he was incarcerated, and the present judgment wаs rendered on his application to be purged of contempt because of his inability to make the paymеnts required by the previous order. Obviously, he could not earn money with which to make the payments while in jail, and this was a cоntention urged in the present case. The judge was authorized to order him to pay less than called for by the alimony judgment when that amount was, in the judgment of the court, as much as he was able to pay, and such order does not amount to а modification or a reduction of the alimony judgment.
Curtright
v.
Curtright,
187
Ga.
122 (
The record here does not show the nature of the evidence before the judge at the time the defendant in error was adjudged in contempt of court, on which judgment he was imprisoned, the only evidenсe in this record being a brief of the evidence on the last hearing, which was on the application of the defendant to be purged of contempt because of his inability to pay the amount required by the previous order. It can not be said that the judge abused his discretion in reducing the amount required to be paid, which, if complied with, would purge him of сontempt, since there was some evidence to substantiate the allegations of inability to meet the conditions of that order.
Jones
v.
Jones,
145
Ga.
714 (
Judgment affirmed.