111 Ga. 132 | Ga. | 1900
As before remarked, an examination of the bill of exceptions and of the note of the court shows that the latter does not contradict any statement made in the former, but merely adds to it another fact. We think that we can not sustain the motion to dismiss the writ of error. The corrections made by the judge are simply additional statements of facts which had been omitted by counsel and which the judge thought necessary to a clear understanding of the case. The material part of the corrections was to state that a certain decree or order was taken in open court by consent, with counsel for all parties present. This does not contradict anything stated in the bill of exceptions as
We think that the court should have sustained the objections filed, and have refused to confirm the sale. It is recognized as a general rule that a trustee can not act for his own benefit in matters connected with the trust, and it is held that where a trustee becomes himself the purchaser of the .trust estate, the cestuis que trust may set aside the sale, though it was at public auction, bona fide, and for a fair price. The reason ,of the
It was urged by counsel for the defendants in error that the confirmation of the sale was proper, because the defendant had, knowing that Verdery was a shareholder and director of the
For these reasons we think that the objections to the sale should have been sustained, and the sale set aside. We can not see any merit in the remaining grounds of objection to the sale, to wit, those relating to the disqualification of the commissioner’s counsel and to the date of the sale, but, as we decide that the sale should be set aside upon other grounds, ‘it is unnecessary to rule upon these.
Judgment reversed.