167 N.W. 225 | N.D. | 1918
Lead Opinion
This is an action for libel. The defendants interposed a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled, and defendant appeals to this court.
The complaint, the sufficiency of which is the sole question here, is as follows:
For his cause of action herein the plaintiff alleges and shows to the court:
1. That during the times hereinafter mentioned the defendant the Co-operative Publishing Company was and still is a corporation duly organized, created, and existing under the laws of the state of North Dakota, and having its main office and principal place of business at the city of Fargo, in Cass county, North Dakota; that during said times the said defendant, the Co-operative Publishing Company, published and still publishes a weekly newspaper at Fargo, North Dakota, known as “The Co-operators’ Herald;” that the defendant A. M. Baker 'was, at said times and still is, the editor and manager of said newspaper; that said newspaper has a wide circulation among the people throughout the state of North Dakota, and in adjoining states, and is read by many persons in the said state of North Dakota and elsewhere.
A DIFFERENCE WITHOUT MUCH DISTINCTION.
Last week the Herald ran an editorial in which reference was made to an alleged railroad trip of Secretary McHugh and the attorney general of North Dakota.
The spirit of the editorial was all right, but we got the wrong pig in the dead fall. ‘
Secretary McHugh can establish an alibi. It was another person and not the “$10,000 Beauty” who sat and conversed with Mr. Linde.
Therefore we hasten to correct ourselves — it was another McCue — ■ one T. F. McCue of Carrington, who was commiserating with Mr. Linde and bragging, so it is alleged, that he was raising a fund to help defeat the candidates for the supreme court who have the Nonpartisan League indorsement.
With McCue collecting an alleged “slush fund” to defeat the candidates of the League there ought to be no question of their election; McCue was formerly attorney general of North Dakota, but he was so blind to the operation of the blind pigs that the people discarded him on the first opportunity.
McHugh or McCue — take your choice — they are a fine pair and stand for the same proposition.
That the defendants intended by publication of said article to charge and convey and did thereby charge and convey to the readers of said newspaper that plaintiff was wrongfully and unlawfully engaged in the business of collecting a fund of money to be used wrongfully, unlawfully, and corruptly to defeat the candidates of the said Nonpartisan League for the supreme court of this state, and that plaintiff was actively engaged in corrupting the morals of the people and voters of the state of North Dakota by the unlawful use of money in purchasing-votes to defeat candidates for the high office of justice of the supreme court of this state, and meaning thereby and intending to charge and convey that as a man plaintiff is and was personally corrupt and disreputable, and that as a business‘man plaintiff is and was dishonest, corrupt, crooked, and contemptible, and that plaintiff was engaged in wilfully violating the Corrupt Practice Act of the state of North Dakota, and was engaged in the commission of criminal acts; that the persons who read said article so understood its meaning and import, and many of the persons who read said article believed the said matters and things therein charged and conveyed to be true; that the said charges made against plaintiff in said article as aforesaid were and are each and all absolutely false and were known to be false by the said defendants when the said article was published as aforesaid.
“McCue [meaning this plaintiff] was formerly attorney general of
Wherefore, plaintiff prays judgment against defendants for the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), together with his costs and disbursements of this action.
It is elementary that a demurrer admits the- truth of all issuable, relevant, material facts well pleaded. 31 Cyc. 333; 6 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 334, 6 Standard Proc. 943. Hence a general demurrer to a complaint in an action for libel “admits allegations of falsity and publication and malice and the correctness of the innuendoes as averred in the petition, unless the innuendo attributes a meaning to the words which is not justified by the words themselves or by the extrinsic facts with which they are connected.” 25 Cyc. 469; 13 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 91, 92. And such demurrer “will be overruled if any of the words laid therein are actionable.” 25 Cyc. 468.
In this state “every man may freely write, speak, and publish his opinions on all subjects, being responsible for an abuse of that privilege. In all civil and criminal trials for libel the truth may be given in evidence, and shall be a sufficient defense when the matter is published with good motives and for justifiable ends; and the jury shall have the same power of giving a general verdict as in other eases.” N. D. Const. § 9. But every person has, subject to the qualifications and restrictions provided by law, the right to protection from personal insult or defamation. Comp. Laws 1913, § 4350. Defamation may be
Section 4354, Comp. Laws 1913, provides: “A privileged communication is one made:
“1. In the proper discharge of an official duty.
“2. In any legislative or judicial proceeding, or in any other proceeding authorized by law.
“3. In a communication without malice to a person interested therein by one who is also interested, or by one who stands in such relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the-motive for the communication innocent, or who is requested by the person interested' to give the information.
“4. By a fair and true report without malice of a judicial, legislative or other public official proceeding, or of anything said in the course thereof.
“In the cases provided for in subdivisions 3 and 4 of this section, malice is not inferred from the communication or publication.”
The right to “freely write, speak, and publish his opinions,” which is guaranteed to every man by our Constitution, does not mean unrestrained license to publish false and libelous matter. For while the Constitution makes it permissive to publish the truth with good motives and for justifiable ends, it also recognizes the responsibility for injury to others occasioned by one who abuses the privileges of liberty of speech and of the press. “The provisions [guaranteeing freedom of speech and liberty of the press] of the Federal and state Constitutions . . . were designed to secure rights of the people and of the press for the public good, and they do not license the utterance of false, slanderous, or libelous matter. Individuals are free to talk, and the press is at liberty to publish, and neither may be restrained by injunction, but they are answerable for the abuse of this privilege in an action for slander or libel under the common law, except where by that law, or by •statute enacted in the interest of public policy, the publication is privileged and deemed for the general good, even though it works a private
In discussing the subject of newspaper publications, Ruling Case Law (17 R. C. L. p. 349, § 95) says: “While the law of libel cannot be invoked to redress every breach of good morals or manners in newspaper publications, the general rule independent of statute is that a newspaper has no more right than a private individual has to trifle with the reputation of any citizen, or by carelessness or recklessness to injure his good name or business without answering therefor in damages. Publishers of newspapers have the right to publish the truth, but they have no right to publish falsehood to the injury of others.”
We are not called upon to determine whether the newspaper article under consideration standing alone is plainly libelous; nor are we called upon to determine whether any of the words used therein are actionable per se, as plaintiff has by inducement, colloquium, and innuendo, and by allegation of special damages, averred that the language published referred to plaintiff, and was intended to, and did, convey to the readers thereof a certain defamatory meaning, whereby plaintiff sustained certain special damages. This being so, the complaint is not demurrable unless the court can say as a matter of law that the publication of the newspaper article in question of and concerning plaintiff did not expose him “to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy,” and could not have caused him “to be shunned or avoided,” or had “a tendency to injure him in his occupation.” Comp. Laws, § 4352. If reasonable men in the exercise of their judgment and reason might differ as to whether the publication of the article had such effect, then it is for the jury to determine what the fact is. 25 Cyc. 542; 13 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 106; Newell, Slander & Libel, pp. 281, 290, 291. “If there is any doubt of the meaning of a publication claimed to be libelous, so that extrinsic evidence is needed to determine its character as to its being actionable or not actionable, it is then a question for the jury, under proper instruction from the court, to find its true character and significance.” Newell, Slander & Libel, 2d ed. p. 290, § 3. And where the words of an alleged libelous publication “arc reasonably susceptible of two constructions, the one innocent and the other libelous, then it is a question for the jury which construction is the proper one. In such a case- if the defendant demurs to the declaration his demurrer will be overruled.
It will be noted that the complaint alleges that the article makes three different libelous charges against the plaintiff: (1) That he is engaged in collecting a “slush fund” for wrongful use in an election; (2) He is compared with, and said to stand for the same proposition as, oneMcHugh, whom it is charged the Co-operators’ Herald has continually and consistently held out to its readers as being dishonest, deceitful, and fraudulent in his business transactions, and engaged in cheating and defrauding the farmers of North Dakota; (3) that the plaintiff while attorney general of the state of North Dakota failed to perform his official duties by neglecting to enforce the Prohibition Law of the state, and by permitting persons to engage in the unlawful selling of intoxicating liquors.
In determining the actionable quality of words claimed to be libelous, the entire writing, including the title or headlines, must be considered. 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 985; 25 Oyc. 357. And particular-words or phrases must be construed in connection with remainder of the article of which they form a part. Ibid.
The actionable quality of the words is dependent primarily upon the-effect which the language complained of was fairly calculated to produce and would naturally produce upon the minds of persons of reasonable understanding, discretion, and candor. 18 Am. & Eng. Ene. Law, 977. But in arriving at the sense in which the defamatory language is employed it is proper and necessary to consider the circumstances surrounding the publication and the entire language used. 17 B. O. L. p. 313. A person who libels another cannot escape liability by the use of obscure or ambiguous language, or language which is figurative, ironical, or comparative. But the courts and juries will understand it according to its true meaning and import, and the sense in which it was intended to be gathered from the context, and from all the facts and circumstances under which it was used. 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 977. Townshend on Slander & Libel, § 133, says: “Eor the purpose of its
As words gradually acquire a new meaning or as new words come into general use the court and jury cannot profess to be ignorant of such changes. Fowle v. Robbins, 12 Mass. 498. But the courts and juries will understand the language used according to its true meaning and import and the sense in which it was intended to be gathered from the context and from all the facts and circumstances under which it was used. 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 977.
Hence, it may be shown that certain words, harmless in themselves, have acquired a certain meaning rendering them libelous. In speaking on this subject the supreme court of Vermont said: “There is considerable conflict in the cases touching the admission of testimony of witnesses as to their understanding of alleged libelous language. The authorities are uniform that the meaning is a question for the jury, and the jury are to put themselves as nearly as may be in the shoes of the reader, and from his standpoint determine the character of the language. To determine this question it is obvious that the language will be construed by the reader, not only with reference to all the facts and circumstances recited in the article itself, but also with reference to •such other facts as the writer might reasonably expect to be within the present knowledge of the reader. If an article adopts terms or forms of -expression which have a provincial meaning unlike their natural import, and are addressed to persons of the locality where such provincialisms are understood, the writer is bound to expect that his language will be read in its provincial sense. If a person is known in a locality as having a nickname, or one given him by reason of some oddity of manner, peculiarity of gait, or dress, or some official charactei*, and the article refers or may refer to such name or character instead of the
In Bailey v. Kalamazoo Pub. Co. 40 Mich. 251, it was held that the following words printed of a clergyman were libelous as implying a charge of adultery: “Then there was that Iowa Beecher business of his, which beat him out of a station at Grass Lake.” And the Illinois supreme court held it to he a libel (under conditions then existing) to publish an article charging a person with being an “anarchist.” Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News Co. 139 Ill. 345, 13 L.R.A. 864, 28 N. E. 692.
It is well settled that a publication imputing roguery, rascality, or general depravity, which carries with it a charge of moral turpitude and degradation of character, the natural tendency of which is to hold the party up to hatred, contempt, or ridicule and to expose him to the reprobation of virtuous and honorable persons, is libelous. 25 Cyc. 260 ; 17 R. C. L. pp. 290-291.
It is also well settled that a libelous charge may be made indirectly as well as directly; and may be couched in figurative, ironical, or comparative language. 17 R. C. L. p. 314; 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 977. Hence, if the Co-operators’ Herald had continually vilified McHugh and held him out as, and led its readers to believe that he was, dishonest and corrupt, and engaged in fraudulent and dishonest business practices, then manifestly its subsequent statement to the same readers with respect to McCue that he stands for the same proposition as McHugh, and that there is little or no room for distinguishing between McHugh and McCue, -might, and probably would, result in exposing McCue to “hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy,” or cause “him to be shunned or avoided,” or have “a tendency to injure him in his occupation.” Of course the actionable quality of these words depends upon proof, and in ruling on a demurrer this court cannot take judicial notice -of what has or has not been published in the Co-operators’ Herald, but' musí; assume the facts to be as stated in the complaint.
A majority of the court therefore agree that in so far as the complaint charges that plaintiff has been libeled by comparing him with
The state now has, and since its admission into the Union, has had,, constitutional prohibition. The attorney general is the principal law-officer of the state. “His duties are general; his authority is coextensive with public legal affairs of the whole community.” State ex rel. Miller v. District Ct. 19 N. D. 831, 124 N. W. 417, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 935. It is his duty, among other things, “to appear for and represent: the state before the supreme court in all .cases in which the state is interested as a party. And “when in his judgment the interest of the-state requires it, he shall attend the trial of any party accused of crime- and assist in the prosecution.” Comp. Laws 1913, § 157. He is specifically charged with the duty of enforcing the State Prohibition Law in any county of the state wherein the state’s attorney fails, neglects, or refuses to do so. Comp. Laws 1913, § 10,112. State v. Heiser, 20 N. D. 357, 127 N. W. 72. Under our laws any wilful omission on the part of a public officer to perform any duty enjoined upon him by law is a misdemeanor. Comp. Laws 1913, § 9432.
In the opinion of the writer the language used is capable of the-meaning that plaintiff while attorney general wilfully failed to perform his duty in enforcing the State Prohibition Law. In fact it is difficult, to understand how it is reasonably susceptible of any other meaning. Statements far less capable of defamatory meaning have been held libelous. See Sharpe v. Larson, 67 Minn. 428, 70 N. W. 1, 554; 10 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 949 et seq., and cases cited; 25 Cyc. 333, 346, et seq., and cases cited; 17 R. C. L. pp. 301, 307; Newell, Slander & Libel, pp. 184, 185; Odgers, Libel & Slander, 26; Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co. 32 Minn. 217, 18 N. W. 831, 20 N. W. 87. See also Estelle v. Daily
Inasmuch as a majority are of the opinion that the complaint states a cause of action, the order appealed from must be affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). This is a petty libel suit based on the publication of a rather harmless looking political squib. The case comes here on a demurrer to the complaint. The demurrer may save the parties and taxpayers the expense of long and vexatious .trial resulting in a verdict of 5 cents or nothing. The squib is in plain simple every-day language. Its words are small and its sentences are all short and in no way complicated. To any reader the meaning is obvious, and it cannot be changed or varied by any averments or innuendoes. It charges no crime and nothing to cause anyone to be shunned or to bring anyone into hatred, contempt, or ridicule.
The squib was published during the last political campaign. -Its manifest purpose was to forestall and curb the political activities of the «x-attorney general in working against the supreme court candidates who were indorsed by the Nonpartisan League. The publisher apparently did not know McCue, as he improved the name by spelling it McHugh. Hence, by way of correction, it was said: “The reference was not to Secretary McHugh of the Chamber of Commerce. It was another McCue, — one T. H McCue, of Carrington, who was commiserating with Mr. Linde and bragging, so it is alleged, that he was raising a fund to help defeat the candidates for the supreme court. With McCue collecting an alleged slush fund to defeat the candidates of the League, there ought to be no question of their election. McCue was formerly attorney general of North Dakota, but he was so blind to the operation of the blind pigs that the people discarded him on the first
In nearly every political campaign money is collected and used too-freely, and each party charges the other with a slush fund or the use of money like slush. It is a well-known figure of speech which does not deceive or startle anyone. When in Scripture we read: “Rivers of water ran down my cheeks,” we do not think of anything like the Missouri river.
In regard' to the blind pigs it is said McCue was so blind that the people did not re-elect him. That does not suggest or convey the idea that he wilfully disregarded his official oath. It should not be accounted a libel to say of any person that he was a little blind to official duty, as that is true of nearly every person who has held office. Everyone knows that in the exercise of his duties an attorney general must have a large discretion, and that an apparent blindness may be on the side of charity and in accordance with his sense of duty.
Three of the judges are agreed that what is said concerning blindness to the blind pigs and the slush fund is not a libel and does not constitute a cause of action. That narrows the issues, but it seems there is a difference of opinion in regard to what is said of the Macs being a fine pair and standing for the same proposition. The complaint charges that McHugh is secretary of the Chamber of Commerce in Minneapolis, and in said newspaper and many other newspapers it was frequently published. “That said McHugh was and is a thief, a rogue, and a rascal, and engaged in a crooked and fraudulent and disreputable business, and that said McHugh and his business associates -were engaged in a large scale in cheating and defrauding farmers of North Dakota, by wilfully and corruptly manipulating prices, of grain.” Now by fair construction the above charge against McHugh relates entirely to his doings as a member of the Chamber of Commerce. It does not by any fair construction charge that he had ever feloniously stolen and carried
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Christian-son in its entirety, including his holding that “it cannot be said as a matter of law that'any of the three charges are not libelous, and that in any event the meaning to be attributed to such charges should be submitted to the jury.”