Opinion by
Dеfendant admits the verdict conclusively determines defendant was guilty of negligence, resulting in plaintiff’s injury, and that she was not сontributorily negligent. The court below sustained a verdict in her favor, and defendant appeals, alleging the judgment should be reversed because of certain trial errors affecting the items of damages which might be included in the recovery.
It appears that, some seven weeks after the accident, plaintiff became sick with lobar pneumonia, and was taken to a hospital for treatment. When the detailed evidence regarding the diseasе was offered, defendant ineffectually objected thereto, and later unavailingly moved to strike it out, though it did not show the disease had resulted from the accident. The court below charged the jury that plaintiff was entitled to reсover the bill paid by her at the hospital, and, depending on the view *494 which they might take regarding the medical testimony, thеy should or should not make plaintiff an allowance for her suffering on account of the attack of pneumonia, and also for the effect it had on her earning power.
In its opinion refusing a new trial, the court below cоncludes that the evidence above referred to was properly admitted, because we said in Miller v. Director General of Railroads,
The difficulty with the court’s conclusion is that there is no evidence here to justify the application of thе principle stated. Only one doctor testified for plaintiff on this branch of the case, and though often asked if the injury caused the pneumonia, he as repeatedly refused to say it did, the limit of his testimony appearing in the following extracts therefrom: “Well, from the results of her injury, of course her general system would be run down, and make her perhaps more subject to pneumonia, if she was exposed, chilled......I can’t say that [her lowered condition of rеsistance left her open to an attack of pneumonia]. It was resistance lessened. If she was exposed, she could take anything to an extent......I couldn’t say that the injury caused the pneumonia......I say this, her system was lessenеd by this accident,......she was more susceptible to the pneumonia from having this accident.” Upon the point under сonsideration, there was no other evidence of equal probative value with that just quoted. It would have justified the trial judge in saying to the jury that, if they believed it, they would be entitled to give due consideration to it, with respect to the gеneral effect of the accident on plaintiff’s health, and, perhaps, on her earning power also; but it did nоt justify proof regard *495 ing the pneumonia, nor the submission of its effect or expense, as distinct items of damage, sincе it wholly failed “to show with reasonable certainty that the disease ......was caused by the injury received.” Perhaps the error of the ruling below could not be made clearer than by stating that, under it, the injury being permanent and the resistance lessened, a jury could, without further proof, specifically allow damages for every disease, whether аrising seven weeks, seven months, seven years, or any other period after the accident. Probably no one would so contend; certainly plaintiff’s counsel did not.
Where, as here, the connection, if any, between an injury and а subsequent disease must be shown by medical testimony, the “reasonable certainty” required to be established, is exactly the same test as specified in Fink v. Sheldon Axle & Spring Co.,
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded.