109 Tenn. 128 | Tenn. | 1902
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This bill was preferred by complainant in the chancery court of Hamblen county to recover the penalty prescribed by the act of Congress against national banks for knowingly collecting usurious interest. The facts of the case are that the defendant is a national hank doing business in Morristown, Tenn. The complainant, on March 9, 1900, filed this bill, alleging that within the preceding two years he had divers transactions with the defendant, in which it had knowingly, illegally and wrongfully charged him a greater rate of interest than that allowed by the laws of the State of Tennessee and of the United States, aggregating $225.86, and the bill prayed for a decree against the defendant for double this sum.
The defendant filed its demurrer to the jurisdiction .of the court, setting up several grounds, the second being as follows: “This being a suit for penalty against a national bank, the chancery court in Tennessee has no jurisdic
The fourth ground of demurrer was as follows: “The defendant demurs to so much of complainant’s bill as seeks to charge defendant with interest on the penalty, for the reason that complainant’s suit is a suit for a penalty, and arises only by virtue of penal statute, not giving interest, the same can not be recovered in this action.”
The demurrer was overruled by the chancellor, and defendant answered the bill. The cause went to proof, and on the final hearing the chancellor pronounced a decree in favor of complainant, McCreary, for the sum of ¡§490.17, the amount being double the usury charged, \vith interest from date of the filing of the bill. The court of chancery appeals affirmed the decree of the chancellor, excepting the interest, and the cause is before this court on the appeal of the bank.
The questions presented for the determination of the court on the appeal are: (1) Whether any State court has jurisdiction to enforce a penalty created alone by federal statute; (2) whether the chancery court has jurisdiction to enforce the national banking act penalty; and (3) Avhetlier interest is alloAVable on such penalty. On the first proposition it is argued on behalf of appellant that the State courts
The supreme court of the United States, through Mr, Justice Swayne, in considering the federal statute which is now invoked, said: “The remedy given by the statute for tire usury is a penal suit. To that the party aggrieved, or his legal representative, must resort. He can have redress in no other mode or form of procedure. The statute which, gives the right permits the redress. The suit must be brought especially to recover the penalty where the sole question is the guilt or innocence of the accused.” Barnet v. Bank, 98 U. S., 555 (25 L. Ed., 212); Blaine v. Curtis, 59 Vt., 120 (7 Atl., 708; 59 Am. Rep., 702).
It being settled that this is a penal statute, the next question presented is whether the State courts will enforce a federal statute denouncing a penalty. Counsel admits there have been diverse holdings on this question by the courts of other States, but insists that the correct rule is that laid down in Blaine v. Curtis, 59 Vt., 120 (7 Atl., 708; 59 Am. Rep., 705, viz.: “It is well-known law, settled in this State as well as elsewhere, that no State will enforce penalties imposed by the laws of another State. Such laws
In the case of Newell v. Bank, 12 Bush, 57—a Kentucky case — the supreme court of Kentucky, speaking through Judge Lindsay, in regard to the statute in question, wrote, viz.: “We need not inquire as to the rights of the parties under the provisions of the act of Congress. The forfeitures claimed under said act are wholly penal in their nature. The courts of this State have not, up to this time, undertaken to enforce penalties arising under the laws of the government of the United States, and these cases present no sufficient reason to authorize the inauguration of a new judicial policy upon that subject.”
In the case of Missouri River Tel. Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Sioux City, 74 Ill., 217, it is said: “It is equally true that both the government of the United States and. Iowa are wholly, independent of this State. They severally have all the attributes of sovereignty essential to the enactment and enforce
Whatever may have been the holdings on this question at one time, the jurisdiction of the State courts is now definitely fixed by the amendment to the statute enacted by Congress February 18, 1875. The last sentence of this section, it appears, was not in the original act, and is as follows, to-wit: That suit, action and proceeding against any association, under this title, may be had in any circuit, district or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases.”
In 21 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.), p. 396, it is said, viz.: “Whatever doubts may have existed as to the jurisdiction of State courts to entertain a suit for the penalty given by the national
It is next insisted on behalf of appellant that, conceding the jurisdiction .of the State court, a court of chancery has no jurisdiction to enforce a penalty, but the action should have been brought at law. It is true that prior to the act of 1877, extending and enlarging the jurisdiction of courts of chancery in this State, the chancery court did not have jurisdiction to enforce a penalty or forfeiture, but the party was remitted to his remedy at law. Gibs. Suits in Ch., section 302, citing 1 Daniell, Ch. Prac., 387, 563. So it was held in this State that courts of law only have jurisdiction of the enforcement of penalties. Williams v. Patterson, 2 Tenn., 229; Turney’s Ex’r v. Young, Id., 265; Druggist Cases, 85 Tenn., 449 (3 S. W., 490; Love v. Smith, 4 Yerg., 117-129). We are of opinion, however, that such jurisdiction is necessarily conferred by chapter 97, Acts 1877, which provides, viz.: “It [that is, the chancery court] shall have and exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court of all civil causes of action triable in the circuit court, except for injuries to persons, prop
It is insisted that a suit to' enforce a penalty is not a' civil cause of action in the sense of the statute. The case of Duncan v. Maxey, 5 Sneed, 115, .simply holds that a justice of the peace at that date had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit to recover a penalty of $62.50 given by Act 1782, c. 29, section 1, for an unlawful firing othe woods, “but that the jurisdiction in such cases belonged to the circuit court.” The same rule was announced in Stover v. Lasater, 8 Lea, 631. In the former case it was said: “The cause of action in the case before us is of its own kind. It is a pecuniary punishment, inflicted for wrong done in violation of the statute, and, although the statute authorizes the penalty to be recovered by an action of debt, yet it does not fall within either class of cases specifically enumerated; and it is a settled rule that penal statutes are to be construed strictly, and are not to be extended beyond the plain letter of the law. It follows, consequently, that the jurisdiction of such cases belongs to the circuit court, and not to the justice of the peace.”
The court in that case did not hold that a suit to recover a penalty was not a civil
In such cases the recorder of a town, in -enforcing penalties for the violation of a municipal ordinance, is not exercising criminal jurisdiction, as has been frequently decided. “Debt,” says Judge Caruthers, in Meaher v. City of Chattanooga, 1 Head, 76, “is the proper action for penalties prescribed for certain offenses by acts or ordinances, and the only proof required is that the offense or act to which such fine or forfeiture is attached has been committed.” Undeniably, then, a suit to enforce a penalty is a “civil cause of action,” that prior to the passage of the act of 1877 “was exclusively
We do not think the construction placed by the federal courts on language used in the federal statutes is at all controlling in the construction we shall place on similar language used in our own statutes, especially when we can see that such was not the intention of our legislature. It is very obvious that the lawmakers, in enacting this statute, used the language “civil causes of action now triable in the circuit court” in the sense these words are expounded and understood in our own decisions and statutes; and we have seen that under the adjudications of this
In the -former case it was said: “While chapter 97 of the acts of 1877 (Shannon’s Code, section 6109) has been liberally construed in favor of the extension of the chancery jurisdiction, as can be seen by reference to. many cases in onr reports, yet we have declined to apply it to others, which, while falling within the words of the statute, were so exceptional in character as to preclude the idea that they were within its intent.”
Shields v. Davis presented a contest over the office of sheriff. This court, in adjudging that the chancery court had not concurrent jurisdiction, under the act of 1877, with the circuit court, to hear and determine a contested election of sheriff, among other things wrote, viz.: “On examining chapter 3 of the Code, it will be found' that the legislature has adopted a general scheme for the trial of all contested elections, and to that end, and for that purpose, conferred jurisdiction upon different tribunals. By section 1308' of Shannon’s Code, the right is given to the county court to hear and determine all cases of contested elec-'
It was held that a contest of this character is not a cause within thé meaning of the act of 1877. To the same effect is Baker v. Mitchell, 105 Tenn., 610 (59 S. W., 137).
In Simmons v. Leonard, 89 Tenn., 622 (15 S. W., 444); this court held that the chancery court had no
Hence it was said the act of 1877 did not contemplate such radical and sweeping changes, but only included those civil actions which could originate in the circuit court, etc. But no reason is perceived why the chancery court is not clothed with jurisdiction, by the act of 1877, of a civil action to recover a penalty, that was triable in the circuit court prior to the passage of that act. The federal statute allowing the recovery of this penalty provides that it may be had in “an action in the nature of debt, and that the suit for its recovery may be brought in any State court in which the bank is located having jurisdiction in similar cases.”
While this question was not raised or decided in Bobo v. Bank, 92 Tenn., 444 (21 S. W., 888), this
The court of chancery appeals so held, but disallowed interest, and this is assigned as error. The act of Congress makes no provision for the allowance of interest, but fixes the amount of recovery at twice the amount of the usury charged. Laws prescribing penalties and forfeitures are strictly construed, and, in the absence of any authority in the act for interest on the penalty, we can not superadd it. Duncan v. Maxey, 5 Sneed, 115.
The decree of. the court of chancery appeals is therefore affirmed.
Note. — Mr. Justice Shields, having keen of counsel, did not participate in the hearing or decision .of this cause.
Mr. Justice Neil, having been a member of the court of chancery appeals when this cause was determined there, did not take part in the hearing and decision in this court.