139 Iowa 548 | Iowa | 1908
The petition was in several counts, each of which alleged substantially the same cause of action, but for different years. The allegations of the several counts were in substance as follows: That during the years stated the amount of taxes due from the defendant, including interest, penalty, and costs as shown by the tax record in the treasurer’s office of Calhoun county, Iowa, “ a copy of said record being hereto attached.” The copies thus referred to were marked as exhibits, and made a part of the petition. The defendant moved the court to require the plaintiff to make his petition more specific in this: “ Let him state whether the taxes for which judgment is asked are taxes due on personal property or taxes due on real property.”
Name. .Value of Personalty.
Lake City Electric Light Company.
[Giving the amount and stating the year.]
Prior to the enactment of chapter 62, Acts 82d General Assembly, it was held in several cases decided by this- court that the treasurer could not maintain an action at law against the owner of property to recover taxes, and to meet these decisions of the court, the Thirty-Second General Assembly passed the act referred to, and provided therein as follows: “ In addition to all other remedies and proceedings now provided by law for the collection of taxes on the personal property, the county treasurer is hereby authorized to bring or cause an ordinary suit at law to be commenced and prosecuted in his name, for the use and benefit of the county, for the collection of taxes from any person, persons, firm, or corporation as shown by the tax list in his office, and the same shall be in all respects commenced, tried and prosecuted to final judgment the same as provided by the Code for ordinary actions.” The appellant, to sustain his position, relies largely upon sections 1390 and 1406 of the Code; but in our judgment they furnish no justification for laxity in pleading. The former section relates solely to the collection of taxes in the ordinary way, and the latter refers only to their collection by distress and sale. Neither of the sections has anything to do with a suit which shall be commenced and prosecuted under the provisions of chapter 62, Acts 32d General Assembly, to which we have already referred. But, notwithstanding this, we think the petition as a whole was sufficient
In Marriage v. Woodruff, 77 Iowa, 291, the action was to recover damages for an alleged unlawful arrest. It appeared from the petition and exhibits in that case that the district court entered an order appointing a referee, and requiring the plaintiff to appear and submit to an examination. The petition did not directly allege that the court ordered the plaintiff to appear for examination, but the application for a warrant for the arrest of plaintiff and the warrant issued by the referee both showed that to be the fact. The application and the warrant .were made exhibits to the petition-as showing the proceedings under which the plaintiff was arrested. The court held that the petition under those circumstances must be understood as averring the facts disclosed in those exhibits. The case is clearly an authority for holding in the instant case that the petition was sufficiently specific, and that the motion for a more specific statement was improperly sustained.
There was error in the ruling of tbe trial court, and the judgment must be, and it is, reversed.