*1 839 hеld.2 acquired Since Jackson no claim trial court’s discretion. Platte County Ludvik, against position was not im School District No. 1 v. Basin Electric over that potential Cooperative, Wyo., Power 1276, 638 P.2d judgment purposes creditor for of interven (1982). Therefore, appellee’s request ing in might deplete a suit which the col for a assessment damages is lectible judgment assets of the debtor. denied. position We hold that Jackson’s as a judgment of the district court deny- judgment creditor with an execution order ing appellant right intervention as of intangible assets carried no affirmed. special right to adjudi-' intervene in a suit to
cate judgment claim debtor’s to those
assets. posi Jackson continues to hold its judgment
tion as a creditor of Horseshoe
following assignment rescission of the
the contract pos for deed and continues to
sess a lien equitable assets of Therefore,
Horseshoe.
ability
Jackson’s
assignment
its interest in the
of the
Mary
Tuttle,
William E. McCOY and
L.
contract for deed—which interest was cir
Appellants (Defendants),
by
rights
cumscribed
Horseshoe’s
impeded
impaired
contract —was not
McCoy, (Defendant),
Karen E.
the denial of intervention. James S. Jack
Company,
son
Inc. v. Horseshoe Creek
Limited, supra,
principles.” Bacon v. Carey Company, 669 P.2d propri
ety of 24(a)(2), intervention under Rule
W.R.C.P.,
just
such an issue within the
" * * *
Ludvik,
against
2. To enforce a claim
as Horse
Unless the court certifies that there
debtor,
shoe’s
Jackson would have needed to
appeal,
was reasonable cause for the
there
* * *
prove
proceeding
such a claim
part
in a
shall
case,
be taxed as
of the costs in the
1-17-501, W.S.1977,
garnishment-in-aid-
fee,
§
our
a reasonable
to be fixed
the court
statute,
1-17-401,
($100.00)
of-execution
or under
W.S.
not less than one hundred dollars
provides
nonsummary
($500.00),
civil
nor more than five hundred dollars
against persons
possession
action
appellee,
to the counsel of the
and to the
Boyden, Wyo.
appellee damages
due to the debtor. Schloredt v.
in such sum as
(1901);
Devon,
reasonablе,
Before ROSE, BROWN, CARDINE, JJ. BROWN, Justice.
Appellees purchased build- appellants. from At the time licensed real transaction were of an incor- persons. estate sales Because result- property description rect a lawsuit The trial court found that ed. selling were «41 statutory penal- pension assessed a revocation ty against license them. for: appellants the are:
According to issues “Any conduct in a real estate transaction faith, “I. the trial court erred as a Whether which demonstrates bad dishones- $13,000 assessing pen- ty, matter of law untrustworthiness or alty against 33-28-114(b), W.S.1977, states: *3 erred in “A. Whether trial court “In any persоn case shall have received appellants finding the were any money or equivalent thereof as a § 33-28-lll(a)(ix). tent under W.S. fee, commission, compensation profit “B. Whether the trial erred in consequence or in a violation of of § 33-28-114(b) applying to im- W.S. any provision this act 33-28-101 [§§ of pose penalty appellants on the 33-28-117], shall, addition, he be of this circumstances case. penalty to a liable of less than appellants, “II. act- Whether when of money amount the sum of so received principals as the sale their own of and not more than three times the estate, exempt provi- are from the sum may so received as be determined pursu- Court, sions of the real license act penalty may be recov- § § ant to 33-28-103 33- W.S. and W.S. ered in competent jurisdic- court of 28-104.” any person aggrieved.” (Empha- tion added.) sis We will reverse. pur- appellees a real estate transaction The trial appellants court found that § were in 33-28-lll(a)(ix)
chased from
build-
violation of
ing.
sale,
because of
incompetency
The
and
and
contract
the deed
assessed
§
$13,000 penalty
provided
all
as
for in
escrow instructions
contained an incor-
33-
114(b).
property description.
description
rect
28—
supplied by appellants. They were
was
The critical elements in a cause of action
developers
owners and
of the
and
statutory
penalty are:
also
Real
Li-
Wyoming
held
Estate Sales
1) Proof of the
person’s incompe-
sales
censes. Because of the erroneous
tence.
policy provided
a title insurance
2) Receipt by
fee,
person
sales
com-
for in the
for sale
not be
contract
could
pensation,
profit.
commission or
descrip-
appellees.
issued to
The incorrect
title,
appellees’
tion
created a cloud
3)
consequence
of a violation of the
agаinst
prompted
complaint
them to file a
Estate
Real
Brokers and Salesmen Act.
setting
of
out seven causes
ac-
appear
It does not
from the record that
tion.
appellees
they
or that
of
At trial some
the causes of action
proved the
from the
received
trans-
were
in favor of
resolved
appellants’
action was
some
favоr
In the resolu-
Incompetency
violation
the act.
is not
cause of
in favor of
tion of the fifth
action
assume,
defined
statute. We must
appellees,
statutory penalty
was awarded
therefore,
legislature
intended the
judg-
appellees.
only part
ordinary meaning
usual and
of the word.
appealed
ment
from the assessment
appel-
statutory penalty аgainst
When
a statute the
lants.
given
to be
words used
the statute are
statutory
meaning
Appellees’
plain
ordinary
of action for a
unless
cause
on the
Bro-
indicated.
State De
was based
otherwise
§
Barber,
Act,
to 33-
partment
kers and Salesmen
33-28-101
Education v.
28-117,
“incompe
33-28-
majority appear to embrace a standard of applied “willful misconduct” ROSE, Justice, with dissenting, whom determination of in a single CARDINE, Justice, joins. transaction such as the transaction in “Real salesmen estate brokers and are volved in the case at the majori bar. See licensed State of *5 ty’s reliance on Van v. Ettinger Pappin, required high to meet standards of hon- (1978). 180 Mont. P.2d 988 esty, integrity, trustworthiness and com- agree legislature, I am to unable that the petency. regulated profes- Theirs is a in enacting public this law to the sion. satisfy Failure to those standards inept from the ground suspension handling of real or revocation of estate transactiоns, salesperson’s place a real intended to such a estate broker’s or strin- gent proof complainant. license. An act real burden licensing estate of the agents light supra, must construed in the v. Ettinger Pappin, upon Van of purpose protecting obvious the majority rely, only which the the case of public important handling I requires that have able to find been which of and relating valuable transactions to proof of willful intentional behavior to State, property. real Toavs v. support imposition penalty the under (1981).” (Emphasis P.2d add- courts, the real estate license act. Most in ed.) v. Hagar Mobley, Wyo., 638 P.2d regulate profes- statutes conduct, distinguish punish- sional between incompetence able and intentional acts of finding Because I of believe incom- Warner, wrongdoing. Ky.App., Helm v. petency the and the assessment of statuto- 597 S.W.2d ry penalty against appellants by the trial supported by court are the evidence and example, For New Goodley Jersey v. promote purpose of Real the the Estate Commission, supra, corpo- §§ License Act of 33-28-101 to 33- rate property seller of real had obtained a 28-117, W.S.1977, in Hagar as set out v. survey which was inconsistent with a title I Mobley, supra, would have affirmed. policy property on the as well as with the asked, case, We are in this to construe grantor. deed into the The licensed real § 33-28-1ll(a)(ix), W.S.1977, which autho- broker, president estate who was of also rizes certain sanctions where the licenseе is corporate grantor, prepared warranty a guilty found of: which, map deed and to the by references “Any map, purported convey conduct in a real to the tract of land estate transac- faith, by survey. up- tion which demonstrates dis- The court bad indicated held, supra, Hagar Mobley, held the licensees are finding commission’s that such (3) factual that negligenсe incompetency: the trial court’s conclusion amounted “ * * * akin misconduct was more why He should have ascertained mistake, (4) tency than to the vital exception policy set forth the title legal importance strictly of accurate de- up and the deed did not on the show transactions, I scriptions in estate survey. conclude suffi- We there was upheld the trial court’s conclu- proof negligence cient him in con- of accu- that the failure of sion profession, nection with his to sustain pertinent rately describe the 102 A.2d at documents amounted 67. § 33-28-lll(a)(ix). Commission, In Greene v. Real Estate majority case also conclude that this supra, the licensed real broker had $600, reversal accepted deposit client a warrants because from a prove failed to had realized promptly had failed to return the de- but profits consequence could of the incorrect posit appeared when it that the sale affirming description. 15-day sus- A causal connection be- not be made. license, profits pension the broker’s the misdeed and the must be tween demonstrated, the court assess said: before can § 33-28-114(b), penalty under W.S.1977: “The could con- properly Commission findings petitioner’s any clude person “In case shall have received his careless and callous failure to inform any money equivalent or the thereof as a difficulty fee, commission, client the reasons compensation repaying deposit, of he which was or in a violation trustee, incom- constituted such provision 33-28-101 [citation] this act [§§ petence untrustworthy as to addition, shall, 33-28-117], he endanger public 263 A.2d interest.” less than liable at 635. money amount of the sum of so received not more three times the than Realty, Lewis Inc. v. Real Wisconsin sum so received as be determined Board, supra, represents Estate Brokers’ *6 court, penalty may which recov- the upheld in which court instance in jurisdic- ered court of incom- the administrative board’s by any person aggrieved.” (Empha- tion in petence the absence willful miscon- added.) sis There, in- duct. the court concluded that competency the was demonstrated where provision, this it is neces- unsigned purchase of- broker obtained sary distinguish between the various buyers. from court prospective fer § 33-28-1ll(a)(ix) specified as acts in suspending affirmed the board’s order the grounds imposition penalty. the salesman’s license for one month. broker’s faith,” “Incompetency,” “bad “dis- unlike honesty,” or “untrustworthiness” is not a case,
In the instant the trial court found might characteristic which be assumed appellants opportunities to had several in reap profits. an effort broker misdescription discover Accordingly, logical it seem to focus they would developed project since had their appellants whether received maps, plans specifi- were familiar with “by” misdescription profits their of the real cations. trial concluded estate, rather “in of” the failure of check and than double misdescription. 33-28-114(b), description cross check the to insure su- accuracy incompetency. pra. Appellees relied on to fur- amounted statutory description correct light language which nish a and testified contemplates they purchased not have a demonstration of transaction, (2) tency apartment they in had known the Therefore, wrong. high appellants, standard of care to which real estate to be supplying legally pie rely deficient documents on and trust them. Failure to they being accurate, held out as comply accepted with either the stan- purchase caused in dards or the field standards socie- and to confer This ty willing recognize acceptable, construction of the statute is consistent actionable.” with thosе cases which hold that actual CARDINE, Justice, dissenting. damages proven need not harm join I the dissent Justice Rose. penalties order to statutory assess incompetency. broker’s Lewis Realty, Inc. I 33-28-lll(a)(ix), would hold that Board, v. Wisconsin Real Estate Brokers’ W.S.1977 concerns conduct in the real es- supra. litigation. tate transaction involved this If appears from that transac- would, An аffirmance in my this case tion, of the district court opinion, promoted the purpose of the ought reasons, to be For affirmed. these I Real Estate License Act of 1971 to join in the dissent Justice Rose. public unprofessional practices from handling of real estate transactions. in Hagar Mobley, supra, As we said at
P.2d 138:
“Realtors, doctors, just lawyers, like en- consultants,
gineering builders, hold professionals;
themselves out as it is job profession. to know their Peo- W.S.1977, l(a)(ix), provides:
1. Section 33—28—11 "Any a real estate transaction faith, dishonesty, which demonstrates bad un- trustworthiness or