McCoy v. StateMcCoy v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Murphy
Thomas McCoy, the . appellant, jointly indicted with
The appellant contends that a confession obtained from him during a custodial interrogation without the presenсe of an attorney was improperly admitted in evidence because the circumstances precluded him from knowingly and intelligently waiving his rights.
There was evidence before the court from which it could find preliminarily
prima facie
and before the jury from which they could find ultimately beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was apprised of the complete panoply of warnings as required under
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 and that the confession was voluntary in the traditional sense, that is that it was not the product of force, violence, threats, inducements or promises. See
Barnhart v. State,
5 Md. App. 222. The testimony of the three officers, who, it appeared, were the only officers who had contact with the appellant from the time of his arrest to the time the confession was obtainеd, a period of about two hours, was sufficient to support these findings and the appellant signed a form, prior to interrogation, specifically setting out the
Miranda
warnings. The arguments of the aрpellant with respect to the voluntariness of the confession do not compel findings to the contrary. It was not necessary that he be apprised of his rights “at the time of his arrest in his home where he could have had the assistance of his parents or
As the evidence was sufficient for the court and jury to find, under the respective applicable tests, that the
Miranda
warnings had been given prior to any interrogation, the question is whether the appellant waived those rights. There was evidence to show that the appellant was apprised of the warnings by two officers. One officer gave thе appellant the Explanation of Rights form which contained each of the warnings. The appellant perused it and when he handed it back said he had read it. Then the officer read the rights to him one by one and as each right was read asked the appellant if he understood it.
We fully discussed the matter of waiver in the context of the Miranda requirements in Brown v. State, 3 Md. App. 313, and further explained it in Anderson v. State, 6 Md. App. 688. And see Spell v. State, 7 Md. App. 121. In the light of those opinions we find a valid constitutional waiver here for we think that the totality of the circumstances — the attendant facts of the case — implicitly showed that the appellant voluntarily and intelligently relinquished his Miranda rights and made a statement. In Anderson we cited with approval State v. Kremens, 245 A. 2d 313, where the Supreme Court of New Jersey said, at 317:
“* * * Any clear manifеstation of a desire to waive is sufficient. The test is the showing ofa knowing intent, not the utterance of a shibboleth. The criterion is not solely the language employed but a combination of that articulation and the surrounding facts and circumstances.”
The appellant also claims that the statement was inadmissible because it was “rendered by a minor without the advice or counsel of a friendly adult, such as a parent, guardian or other responsible person.” It appeared that the appellant was 19 years of age and had received an eighth grаde education. On the witness stand he testified fluently and coherently both on direct and cross-examination, indicating a full understanding of the nature and import of the questions asked. That he was under 21 years of age did not, in itself, or considered with the circumstances here existing, render his confession inadmissible. It was succinctly stated in Green v. State, 236 Md. 334, 339 that “age alone will not render an otherwise voluntary statement involuntary.” And we said in State v. Hance, 2 Md. App. 162 at 168: “* * * [I]f a statement is found to be voluntary, the fact that the mother of the juvenile making the statement was not permitted to attend the interrogation would have no bearing оn the admissibility of the voluntary statement.” See Wiggins v. State, 4 Md. App. 95, 106.
The appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction. His argument on the contention goes only to his criminаl agency, claiming that when he became aware that his companions actually meant to rob the victim as they had discussed “he proceeded to remove himself from the evеntual scene of the crime.” But the jury could properly find from the confession of the appellant that he participated in the murder and robbery. It permitted a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was one of those who planned the robbery, was present when the murder and robbery was committed, at the least in a position to render aid and assistance to the other perpetrators, and that he received a fourth of the loot from which he paid a
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the motions for judgment of acquittal. See Williams and McClelland v. State, 5 Md. App. 450.
Judgments affirmed.
Notes
. Matthews was found guilty by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore of murder in the first degree and robbery with a deadly weapon and given consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and 15 years rеspectively. Powers was found guilty of murder in the first degree at a court trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore and sentenced to life imprisonment. The disposition of the indictment charging him with robbery with a deadly weapon is not disclosed by the record before us. Willson moved to dismiss the indictments, the motion was denied and his appeal therefrom to this Court is pending.
. The victim was an insurance man who сollected insurance premiums from Fannie Morton. On the day of the crime Powers asked her if the insurance man had made his collection that day and the color of his car. When the insurance man arrived, Mrs. Morton paid him $8.79 in cash and went to the door when he left. She saw her brother, McCoy and several other boys across the street. The insurance man went into two other houses in Harford Court and “the boys were going down Harford Court and they seemed to have split up.”