McCosker v. . Long Island Railroad Co., 84 N.Y. 77

McCosker v. . Long Island Railroad Co.

84 N.Y. 77 | NY | 1881

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *79 The doctrine established by our decision in Crispin v.Babbitt (81 N.Y. 516) is fatal to the plaintiff's claim. The yardmaster, through whose negligence the injury occurred, must be deemed to have been a fellow-servant of the deceased, as to all acts done within the range of the common employment, except such as were done in the performance of some duty *82 which the master owed to his servants. The act, in the present case, was very plainly not of that character. The yardmaster was charged with the duty of making up the trains and distributing the cars in and about the yard, and the repair-shops of the defendant, and the deceased was employed by him to assist in that service. As a necessary consequence, broken and disabled cars had to be handled and moved to the repair-shops, and whatever of risk was inseparable from their damaged condition, and the inconvenience, and even danger, of getting them to the shops was an open and palpable risk of his employment, which the deceased assumed. It is, of course, no ground of liability of the company that the bumpers of this car were broken, and it could not be coupled in the ordinary way. The deceased was employed to handle and move to the repair-shops damaged and disabled cars, and took the risk of his employment in that respect. While engaged in attaching the broken car to the one in front with the aid of a chain, and by direction of the yardmaster, the latter negligently, and at the wrong moment, signaled to the engineer to back his train, and as a consequence the deceased was crushed between the cars. The negligence which caused the injury was in no sense that of the master. In moving this train the yardmaster was acting not as the agent of the master in the performance of the master's duties, for it was not the latter's duty to effect the coupling of these cars and their movement to the repair-shop. What the yardmaster was doing was the work of a servant, in the department of labor and duty assigned to him as such. No duty which the master owed to his servants was being done by the yardmaster from the negligent performance of which the injury resulted. The question of liability was distinctly raised upon a motion for a nonsuit, based upon the grounds that the acts of the yardmaster, so far as they tended to cause the injury, were those of a fellow-servant with the deceased, and that there was no evidence of any failure to perform the duties which defendant owed to deceased, either on its part or on the part of any person to whom it had delegated the performance of such duties. *83 The motion should have been granted, and its denial was error, for which the judgment should be reversed.

All concur, except DANFORTH, J., not voting, and RAPALLO, J., absent.

Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.