Benjamin McCORMICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF OREGON, by and through the Oregon State Parks and Recreation Department, Defendant-Respondent.
Jefferson County Circuit Court 14CV00131; A159931
Court of Appeals of Oregon
December 30, 2020
308 Or App 220; 482 P3d 187
Gary Lee Williams, Judge.
Submitted on remand from the Oregon Supreme Court June 10, affirmed December 30, 2020
Plaintiff sustained severe injuries while visiting The Cove Palisades State Park and thereafter initiated a negligence action against the state. The state moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted it, concluding that the state was entitled to recreational immunity under
Affirmed.
On remand from the Oregon Supreme Court, McCormick v. State Parks and Recreation Dept., 366 Or 452, 466 P3d 10 (2020).
Gary Lee Williams, Judge.
Shenoa Payne and Haglund Kelley LLP filed the opening brief for appellant. On the reply brief were Shenoa Payne and Shenoa Payne Attorney at Law PC.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Deputy Solicitor General, and Peenesh Shah, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Kathryn H. Clarke filed the brief amicus curiae for Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
Before DeHoog, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge.
LAGESEN, J.
Affirmed.
LAGESEN, J.
This
Under
Below, in opposing the state‘s motion, plaintiff argued that he should be permitted additional discovery into the purposes for which the fee was used and that, in all events, the record evidenced factual disputes as to whether the $5 fee was a parking fee or a charge for using the park. The trial court rejected those arguments, concluding that the undisputed facts showed that the $5 fee was for parking, and, thus, was not an immunity-precluding charge under
On appeal, plaintiff reiterates the arguments he made below. He asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling on the state‘s summary judgment motion without
We disagree. First, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not waiting for plaintiff to conduct additional discovery on the uses that the parking fee was put to because, as the state notes, that evidence likely would be irrelevant to the question of whether the fee was a parking fee. Absent indications of a contrary legislative intention, we give common words their ordinary meanings. State v. Corcilius, 294 Or App 20, 23, 430 P3d 169 (2018). The ordinary meaning of the phrase “parking fee” in
As for the existence of factual disputes about the nature of the $5 fee, on the summary judgment record before the trial court, all reasonable factfinders would have no choice but to conclude that the state charged the fee for the privilege of parking. See Wieck v. Hostetter, 274 Or App 457, 470, 362 P3d 254 (2015) (where party that would have burden of proof on a particular point at trial seeks summary judgment on that point, “our task on appeal, as circumscribed by our standard of review, is to determine whether the uncontroverted evidence presented by [the party] in support of [the] motion for summary judgment is such that all reasonable factfinders would have to find in” that party‘s favor on the point). Indeed, as the state points out in its brief, by law—an administrative rule—the fee is for the privilege of parking and not for the recreational use of the park.
Affirmed.
