569 A.2d 971 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1990
This appeal is from an order dated September 22, 1986, dismissing appellants’ motion for post-trial relief. The motion for relief was filed after the trial court dismissed appellant’s wrongful garnishment action against appellee, Northeastern Bank of Pennsylvania (hereinafter “Northeastern”). Appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their action because the court erroneously required them to show that Northeastern knowingly garnished their bank accounts in order for them to prove that Northeastern violated their right to procedural due process. For the following reasons we affirm.
The relevant facts are as follows: On August 15, 1974, Pulmac, Inc. (hereinafter “Pulmac”), by Walter E. Olenick, Sr., President, executed a judgment note in the amount of fifty-five thousand dollars ($55,000) to be payable to the order of appellants Albert R. McCormick, Jr., Brian J. McCormick and Stephen S. McCormick. The appellants were ages 20, 15 and 8, respectively, at the time of the
On April 21, 1980, appellants filed the instant action in trespass against Northeastern, alleging wrongful garnishment of certain of their bank accounts to pay their parents’ judgment debts. On May 30, 1984, the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County issued an order stating that, by agreement of the parties, the case would be tried on the basis of stipulated facts, interrogatories and depositions. The stipulation of facts was filed on February 26,1985. On February 12, 1986, after hearing argument in the case, and considering the stipulation of facts, interrogatories and depositions, the trial court entered an opinion and order dismissing appellants’ action. In making its decision, the court reasoned that Northeastern could not be liable because the evidence failed to establish that Northeastern was aware that its actions had resulted in the garnishment of funds that were not held in its judgment debtor’s name. Appellants timely filed a motion for post-trial relief on February 24,1986, requesting that the trial court reconsider its decision. The trial court entered an order dismissing
Appellants’ claim below was based upon their allegation that Northeastern wrongfully garnished their accounts because appellants were not properly notified prior to the garnishment. On appeal, they contend that the trial court erroneously required them to show that Northeastern had knowingly garnished their bank accounts, in order to prove that Northeastern’s garnishment was wrongful. Appellants thus suggest that we should hold that a garnishor violates a party’s right to due process, and therefore becomes liable for wrongful garnishment, regardless of whether he is aware that his attempt to execute a judgment has resulted in the seizure of funds from someone other than his judgment debtor. As a general matter, of course, due process requires that a party who is to be deprived of property in a legal action have notice of the action and the opportunity to air his views before that action takes place. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Comm. v. Thompson, 444 Pa. 312, 281 A.2d 856 (1971). Our research, however, reveals no cases, and appellants have cited none, that require a garnishor to give
The common thread woven into all torts is the idea of unreasonable interference with the interests of others____ The tort-feasor is usually held liable for acting with an intention that the law treats as unjustified, or acting in a way that departs from a reasonable standard of care____
Society has a two-fold interest in such a case. First, society has an interest in having any single dispute between individuals resolved fairly and promptly. Second, society has an interest in the outcome because of the system of precedent on which the entire common law is based____ There is good reason, therefore, to make a conscious effort to direct the law along lines which will achieve a desirable social result, both for the present and for the future____
The prophylactic factor of preventing future harm has been quite important in the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only with compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer. When the decisions of the courts become known, and defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm. Not infrequently one reason for imposing liability is the deliberate purpose of providing that incentive.
W. Prosser, W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts 6-25 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter “Prosser and Keeton ”].
Here, a close examination of the record and stipulated facts reveals that the conduct of Northeastern is not
We find further support for our conclusion that Northeastern’s conduct was not tortious by noting that a rule that
In summary, we hold that a garnishment creditor cannot be liable for wrongful garnishment if the creditor followed the proper procedure for obtaining the garnishment, and was unaware that the funds it received in satisfaction of the garnishment belonged to someone other than its judgment debtor. Here, Northeastern did not violate a reasonable standard of care by intentionally disregarding the issue of who owned the funds in question, because Northeastern served Olenick with interrogatories in an effort to determine whose funds he held. Northeastern was unaware that the funds it garnished belonged to anyone other than its judgment debtor, and was not responsible for Olenick’s actions in utilizing appellants’ funds to satisfy the garnishment. On such a record, we agree with the trial
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court.
Order affirmed.
. The parties stipulated that no determination would be made regarding whether this arrangement was a fraudulent conveyance.
. The judgment arose from a lawsuit based upon debts previously owed Northeastern by appellants’ parents.
. Specifically, our Supreme Court noted that, as a general matter: “it is the order of the trial court disposing of a motion for post-trial relief that has been reduced to judgment which comprises the final order in the case from which an appeal must be filed within thirty days." The Court also noted that "[a]lthough ... the decision of the trial court dismissing appellants' motion for post-trial relief was not reduced to judgment by praecipe of either party as required by Pa.R.A.P. 301, in the interests of judicial economy, we shall ‘regard as done that which should have been done.’ ” 522 Pa. 251, 254 n. 1, 561 A.2d 328, 330 n. 1 (1989) (citation omitted).
. We should note that the duty to notify that appellants ask us to impose does not have support in the Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the Rules governing garnishment activities, a garnishor needs only to notify the garnishee and garnishment defendants. See Pa.R.C.P. 3108, 3111. Because Northeastern sought the property of appellants’ parents, appellants were not entitled to notice at all under the Rules.
. The panel opinion in Gulf was authored by Judge Hester. Judges Spaeth and Cavanaugh concurred in the result.
. The trial court also distinguished this case from Gulf because appellants here waited two years and five months from the beginning of their injury before bringing their suit, whereas appellant in Gulf brought her action promptly. Based upon this distinction mentioned by the trial court, appellants now suggest that the trial court dismissed their action in part because it was untimely. Appellants then argue that such a dismissal would clearly be improper because the issue of timeliness is an affirmative defense that appellees waived. Although the trial court distinguished this case from Gulf on those grounds, appellants overemphasize the role the trial court's determination regarding timeliness played in its decision. The court clearly based its decision on its determination that Northeastern had no duty to notify appellants of its garnishment of their funds because Northeastern was unaware that the funds held by Pulmac belonged to appellants. For reasons set out later in this opinion, we agree with that distinction.
. The fact that appellants cannot recover against the garnishor does not, of course, affect their potential claims against other parties. In particular, we note that appellants may have had a cause of action against their trustee. Cf. Garden City Shopping Center v. Super Gen. Stores, 29 Pa.D & C 3d 319, 335 (C.P.Allegheny Co.1982) (knowing garnishee releasing funds to garnishor ignorant of potential third party claims to funds may be liable to third party claimant).